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Abstract

This thesis examines Australian foreign policy change towards East Timor in 1998-99
and towards Solomon Islands in 2003. The thesis demonstrates the complexity of
foreign policy decision-making through an analysis of these two cases. A new
theoretical model of foreign policy change is presented and applied. It argues for the
importance of investigating both domestic and international factors that influence
foreign policy decision-making, as well as for the interaction between these producing
a combined influence or pressure on decision makers. Of equal importance is the key
decision-makers themselves in as much as they must perceive that a “window of
opportunity” exists for foreign policy change to actually occur.

This thesis argues that domestic factors played a key role in the Australian foreign
policy change towards Indonesia regarding East Timor in 1999. Together with events
in Indonesia, these caused the Howard government to change its policy in September
1999, after having been most reluctant to do so. The Australian government’s
decision-making process was mainly reactive rather than proactive in this case.
International factors played a larger role in the case of Australian foreign policy
change towards Solomon Islands in 2003. Their interaction created a window of
opportunity that the Howard-government perceived and acted upon. The Australian
government was more proactive in this case, although it reacted late to a situation that
had unfolded for the past three years. The model illustrates how in both cases pressure
was brought to bear on key decision makers and how domestic and international
sources of change affected foreign policy.
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A note on Language
The official name of the state is “Solomon Islands” however in English this
sometimes is joined by the definite article to make it easier on the ear. In this thesis
“Solomon Islands” is most commonly used, however on occasion “The Solomon
Islands” and “the Solomons” are also used, depending on context.

In certain places the gender-specific “he” is used. The author of course recognises that
it could just as well be “she”, and the male pronoun is adopted only to improve the
flow of the text and avoid the rather cumbersome “he/she”.

Previously published work

A previous version of Chapter 2 on foreign policy change appeared as a referred
conference paper from the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference
Refereed papers in 2006.

Selected parts of Chapter 6 and 7 will appear as a chapter on sovereignty and
intervention in Solomon Islands in an edited book Occupying the Other, forthcoming
mid-2009 with Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Changes in foreign policy can have huge repercussions on a state’s future relations
with the world or with particular actors. 1 Consider for example the United States
decision to open diplomatic relations with China in 1972, or Egypt’s approach to
Israel which changed their relationship from one of war to a lasting peace agreement
through the Camp David Accord in 1978, or the Soviet Union’s decision in the late
1980s to leave the communist Eastern European states to their own devices, leading to
them becoming democracies in a short period of time, and ultimately resulting in the
demise of the Soviet Union itself. Through foreign policy change, wars can begin or
end, states can be created or cease to exist, relationships can be strengthened or torn
apart, and new directions can be embarked upon with long-term consequences.
Although not all foreign policy changes result in global effects, they may be just as
important for the state in question on a regional or state-to-actor level. Clearly,
understanding foreign policy change – why it occurs, how it occurs, when it occurs is of vital importance.

Foreign policy change as a specific area of research only came about in the early
1980s. Foreign policy analysis overall only traces its roots back to the 1950s when
focus began to be put on the decision-making process and the key decision-makers, as
opposed to states as unitary actors reacting to external events. In 1954 Snyder, Bruck
and Sapin, argued for a deeper focus on the decision-making process itself. They
showed the importance of understanding the decision-maker’s perceptions, values etc.
in making decisions, as opposed to seeing the state as a single unit. The environment
in which the decision-makers make decisions, and how they perceive it, thereby
explain a state’s behaviour. 2 As Snyder et al. wrote: “State action is the action taken
by those acting in the name of the state”. 3

1

I chose “actors” because even though states often act towards other states it is not necessarily always
the case. It can also be towards international institutions such as the United Nations or the International
Monetary Fund, or towards non-state actors such as Amnesty International or Al-Qaeda
2
Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, & Burton Sapin, ‘Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of
International Politics’, in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International
Politics, The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1962 - Original article first published in 1954
3
R. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, & B. Sapin, ‘Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of
International Politics’, p. 65

1

Snyder, Bruck and Sapin’s work thus made scholars focus more on the decisionmaking process to explain why states behaved as they did. As Huxsoll has shown in
relation to the development of the field of Comparative Foreign Policy, this fresh
focus challenged the realist school of thought, which argued that states were unitary
actors, thereby disregarding domestic factors and individual decision-makers. In the
view of realists, states pursue basic goals such as the survival of the state, their
primary goal being the security of the state, which is pursued in a constant fight for
power with other states in the international arena. In contrast to realists, foreign policy
change proponents argue that the personal characteristics of leaders, influence and
pressure from domestic sources on decision-makers and the goals of decision makers
may be as important as security and power. 4

James Rosenau continued in this vein and launched a “pre-theory”, wherein he aimed
to theorise foreign policy further, hoping that in the future it would lead to a general
theory of foreign policy. Rosenau’s work was an important step in the development of
foreign policy analysis, out of which the sub-field of foreign policy change would
eventually grow by identifying the underlying factors contributing to and affecting
foreign policy decision-making. 5 However, failure to achieve a general theory led to
scholars focusing on specific aspects of foreign policy and influential works in that
regard were published in the 1970s. Groundbreaking studies were conducted on
organisational and bureaucratic explanations for foreign policy behaviour by Allison
and Halperin respectively. 6 Also in the 1970s, Irving Janis investigated Groupthink in
decision-making 7 and Robert Jervis looked at perceptions and misperceptions, 8 both
contributing to further understanding of what factors shape foreign policy decisions.

Even though the study of foreign policy was making some progress at this time,
foreign policy change was still neglected. Kalevi Holsti’s 1982 study Why Nations

4

David B. Huxsoll, Regimes, Institutions and Foreign Policy Change, Louisiana State University,
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 2003, pp. 5-6
5
James N. Rosenau, ‘Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy’, in ed. R. B. Farell, Approaches to
Comparative and International Politics, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1966
6
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little, Brown, Boston,
1971 and Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy, The Brookings Institution,
Washington D.C. 1974
7
Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1972
8
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1976

2

Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World was the first prominent
work attempting to construct a theoretical model of foreign policy change. Together
with a number of contributions to the field that were published in the early 1980s the
first steps had been taken to tackle the concept. 9 However, what really brought the
study of foreign policy change to the fore in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the
end of the Cold War, or rather the fact the main theories had failed to predict it. As a
result, the foreign policy change field received a boost and the number of scholarly
works aimed at explaining this concept multiplied. 10 Since the early 1990s there has
been a steady stream of studies on foreign policy change produced and the field is
today an established, albeit narrow, area of research. These specific contributions will
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

Explaining Foreign Policy Change
The last few decades has seen an increased focus on domestic factors as an important
influence in foreign policy decision-making has developed. It has become a more and
more common argument that the realist viewpoint of the state as a unitary rational
actor does not tell the whole story and many important contributions discussed below
show the importance of including domestic factors in any discussion on foreign
policy. When attempting to explain foreign policy change it is important to take into
account all the relevant actors and factors involved; domestic and international
factors; key decision-makers and their perceptions. All play a vital part in the
decision-making process.

Neo-realists and neo-liberals differ in their view on the importance of international vs.
domestic factors in the foreign policy decision-making process. Neo-realists see the
state as a rational unitary actor.11 Indeed, Kenneth Waltz describes states as “units”
and argues that the differences between how they act are due to the distribution of

9

Kalevi J. Holsti (Ed) Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World, Allen
& Unwin, London, 1982, Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1981, Barry Buzan & R. J. Barry Jones, Change and the Study of International
Relations, Pinter, London, 1981, Kjell Goldmann, ‘Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: Détente as
a Problem of Stabilization’, World Politics, 34-2, 1982, Jan Hallenberg, Foreign Policy Change:
United States Foreign Policy Toward the Soviet Union and The People’s Republic of China 1961-1980,
University of Stockholm, Stockholm, Doctoral Dissertation, 1984
10
For a detailed discussion on these studies, see chapter 2
11
Martin Griffiths & Terry O’Callaghan, ‘Realism’, in An Introduction to International Relations:
Australian Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2007, p. 57

3

capabilities. 12 It is their place in the international system and their capabilities that
will determine their behaviour, more so than the composition of the state, according to
Waltz. 13 Neo-liberal theorists challenge their stance, arguing that non-state actors and
domestic actors affect the decision-making process and point to the influence of
international organisations, transnational and transgovernmental actors. Keohane and
Nye in their “Complex Interdependence” theory refer to “the multiple channels of
contact”, and how decision-makers now have to take them into account. The main
goal of the state is no longer just military security, rather there are a multitude of
goals that will have to be pursued and dealt with, including human security, economic
stability, the environment and health issues. 14

The literature on the importance of looking at domestic factors in understanding
foreign policy-making has grown and further undermines the neo-realist argument.
Several now classic works on decision-making processes discussed above show the
importance of investigating decision-makers and the internal and external influences
they are facing. 15 Robert Putnam’s influential article on what he refers to as the “twolevel game” describes the influences a government faces when negotiating on an
international level. In his own words:

The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level
game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the
government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing
coalitions among these groups. At the international level, national governments seek to
maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimising the adverse
consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by
central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet
sovereign. 16

12

Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1979, pp. 88-99
Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’, in Controversies in International
Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, ed. C. W. Kegley Jr. St:Martin’s Press, New
York, 1995
14
Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Longman, New York, third
edition, 2001, pp. 20-32 For a further discussion on Liberal Institutionalism, see Edward A. Kolodziej,
Security and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. pp. 150-60
15
Important work on foreign policy making include R. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and B. Sapin,
‘Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics’, and Graham Allison & Philip
Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Addison-Wesley Educational
Publishers Inc., New York, 1999, and Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International
Politics, and Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution,
Washington D.C., 1974,
16
Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’,
International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer 1988, p. 434. Putnam’s concept was further
elaborated on and discussed in Ed. Peter B. Evans & Harold K. Jacobson & Robert D. Putnam, Double13

4

Putnam here clearly shows the importance of looking at both international and
domestic influences in foreign policy decision-making. Joe D. Hagan has similarly
illustrated the links between domestic factors and foreign policy, particularly on the
constraints on government stemming from domestic factors such as coalition building
and the political opposition. 17 The critical role of key decision-makers, or leaders, has
also been highlighted by Margaret Hermann in particular, who has illustrated the
important role a leader plays in the decision-making process. 18 This has also been
developed and included in theoretical models by prominent scholars of foreign policy
change, such as Charles F. Hermann and Jakob Gustavsson. 19 As shown above, in
order to explain foreign policy change, a number of factors and aspects have to be
taken into account. One such aspect is the context within which the decisions are
taken. The Post Cold War environment provides the context to the two case studies
studied in this thesis and its characteristics therefore need to be addressed.

The Post-Cold War Era
The Post Cold War-environment meant that the stability that had characterised the
Cold War era came to an end. The rigid structure that dominated the world for over 40
years ended with the demise of the Soviet Union and as the confines of bipolarity
disappeared, states had more freedom to conduct foreign policy, thus increasing the
likelihood of foreign policy change which further spurred on new research in the area.

Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, University of California Press,
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993
17
See for example, Joe D. Hagan, ‘Domestic Political Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign Policy’,
in Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation, eds. Laura Neack &
Jeanne A. K. Hey & Patrick J. Haney, Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1995 and Joe
D. Hagan, Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective, Lynne Rienner,
Boulder, 1993, and Joe D. Hagan, ‘Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness’, Mershon
International Studies Review, Volume 38, 1994, and Joe D. Hagan & Philip P. Everts & Haruhiro
Fukui & John D. Stempel, ‘Foreign Policy by Coalition: Deadlock , Compromise, and Anarchy’,
International Studies Review, Volume 3, Issue 2, Summer 2001
18
See for example, Margaret G. Hermann & Joe D. Hagan, ‘International decision making: Leadership
matters’, Foreign Policy, Issue 110, Spring 1998 and Margaret G. Hermann & Thomas Preston &
Baghat Korany & Timothy M. Shaw, ‘Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals’,
International Studies Review, Volume 3, Issue 2, 2001 and Margaret G. Hermann & Charles F.
Hermann, ‘Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry’, International
Studies Quarterly, Volume 33, 1989
19
Charles F. Hermann, ‘Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy’,
International Studies Quarterly, 34, pp.3-21, 1990 and Jakob Gustavsson, The Politics of Foreign
Policy Change: Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC Membership, Lund University Press,
Lund, Doctoral Dissertation, 1998 and Jakob Gustavsson, How Should We Study Foreign Policy
Change? Cooperation and Conflict, 34-1, pp. 73-95, 1999

5

The more fluid post-Cold War world likewise meant that states increasingly had to
respond to the challenges or opportunities that presented when states realised their
growing freedom of action in the international political arena. 20 The increasingly fluid
political environment resulted in states having to change their foreign policy faster,
and to be prepared to do so in the less stable world. The immediate post Cold War
time period can serve as an example of this, with states like Sweden, Denmark,
Finland and many others having to adjust to the new reality, resulting in foreign
policy changes. 21 On the other hand, failure to act quickly can have serious
consequences, as was the case with Rwanda in 1994 where more than 800 000 people
died in genocide.

A dominant feature of the post Cold War world has been a shift towards conflict
within states, as opposed to between states. Wheeler shows how a norm of
humanitarian intervention emerged in the 1990s, 22 and it is now increasingly possible
for the international community to act jointly in dealing with these types of conflicts
when Cold War alliances and loyalties no longer have to be taken into account. 23 This
is illustrated by the fact that the number of UN peacekeeping missions dramatically
increased from 18 missions 1948-1991; to 36 new peacekeeping missions between
1991 and 2000. 24

20

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’,
International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001, p. 4
21
For studies on foreign policy change in this time period, see for example, Fredrik Doeser, In Search
of Security After the Collapse of the Soviet Union: Foreign Policy Change in Denmark, Finland and
Sweden, 1988-1993, Doctoral Thesis in Political Science at Stockholm University, Sweden,
Universitetsservice, Stockholm, 2008, and Jakob Gustavsson, The Politics of Foreign Policy Change:
Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC Membership, Lund University Press, Lund, Doctoral
Dissertation, 1998, and Bengt Sundelius, ‘Changing Course: When Neutral Sweden Chose to Join the
European Community’, in eds. W. Carlsnaes & S. Smith. European Foreign Policy: The EC and
Changing Perspectives in Europe, Sage Publications, London, 1994
22
Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty: Explaining the
Development of a New Norm of Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes in International
Society’, in Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, ed. Jennifer M. Welsh, Oxford
University Press, New York, 2004, p. 48, For a deeper discussion by Wheeler on humanitarian
intervention, see Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International
Society, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000
23
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, p.
3
24
United Nations, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping from 1991 to 2000: Statistical Data and Charts’,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/pko.htm [Accessed 2 March 2009]

6

Internal conflict in turn can be connected to weak, failing or failed states 25 and the
possible risks they can constitute to other countries. The September-11 attacks
highlighted this potential threat, with Al-Qaeda using Afghanistan as a base for
training and planning the attacks, and brought with it an increased perception of failed
states as potential threats. 26 The United States and others argued that pre-emptive
actions may now be justified to prevent attacks from occurring. 27 The International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) also emphasised the risk
failed states could constitute:

In an interdependent world, in which security depends on a framework of stable
sovereign entities, the existence of fragile states, failing states, states who through
weakness or ill-will harbour those dangerous to others, or states that can only maintain
internal order by means of gross human rights violations, can constitute a risk to people
everywhere. 28

Debate over “The Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) leading to an overturning of the
norm of non-intervention, took off after the end of the Cold War, leading to calls for
the need to put aside the total theoretical respect for state sovereignty on the grounds
of human rights. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in 2000:

National sovereignty offers vital protection to small and weak states, but it should not be
a shield for crimes against humanity. In extreme cases the clash of these two principles
confronts us with a real dilemma, and the Security Council may have a moral duty to act
on behalf of the international community. 29

25

The terms “weak”, “failing”, and “failed states” carry with them problems of definition and how to
determine if a state falls into any of these categories used interchangeably, depending on the interests
of the particular writer.
26
Chester A. Crocker, ‘Engaging Failing States’, Foreign Affairs,Vol. 82, Issue 5, September-October
2003, p. 35, for further discussions on the danger of failing, or failed states other than Crocker, see for
example, and Stephen D. Krasner & Carlos Pascual, ‘Addressing State Failure’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.
84, Issue 4, July-August 2005, and Robert I. Rotberg, ‘Failed States in a World of Terror’, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 81, Issue 4, July-August 2002
27
See for example, White House, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’,
September 2002, p. 15 http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf [Date accessed 2 January
2009] and G. W. Bush, ‘President Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point, United States Military
Academy, West Point, New York’, 1 June 2002; for comments made by Australian Prime Minister
John Howard around the same time, see J. Howard, ‘Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon John
Howard MP Press Conference, Parliament House, Canberra’, 20 June 2002 and John Howard,
‘Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon John Howard MP Interview with Tony Jones, Lateline’,
ABC, 29 November 2002
28
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’,
International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001, p. 5
29
Kofi Annan, ‘We the Peoples: Secretary-General’s Statement’, The United Nations, 3 April 2000,
http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/state.htm [Date Accessed 2 January 2009]
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The British Prime Minister Tony Blair had a year earlier echoed these words, in light
of the NATO-intervention into Kosovo, but had taken it a step further compared to
Annan, outlining five considerations for future legitimate interventions, including “are
we sure of our case?”, “have we exhausted all diplomatic options?” and “are we
prepared for the long-term?”. 30 These high-level comments indicate a growing sense
of a shift to military interventions as a possible solution when states fail to protect the
human rights of their citizens or are even perpetrating crimes themselves. Blair’s
comment came in relation to NATO’s intervention into Kosovo, which had bypassed
the UN Security Council and as such brought attention to whether military
interventions for humanitarian purposes can be justified or not in the name of human
rights.

Decision-makers and academics debated the issue resulting in several important
contributions, such as the report from the ICISS, which, as the title indicates, argue
that if a state fails in its duty “to protect its people from killing and other grave harm”,
“then coercive intervention for human protection purposes, including ultimately
military intervention, by others in the international community may be warranted in
extreme cases”. The report emphasised that any such action should go through the UN
Security Council. 31

The different post Cold War-environment increased the need to be able to respond to
sudden crises quickly. In the increasingly interdependent world events far away can
have an affect on you and situations closer to home may need a faster response, as the
Australian-led interventions in to East Timor and Solomon Islands illustrate. The
breakdown of states, the outbreak of violence, terrorist-attacks and so on, all heighten
the need to have the capacity to consider changing foreign policy fast.

Australia in the Post-Cold War World
The new post Cold War environment naturally had consequences for Australian
foreign policy as well. Australian policy-makers now more than ever had to be able to
respond quickly to events happening far away, as well as in their immediate
30

Online NewsHour, ‘The Blair Doctrine’, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/janjune99/blair_doctrine4-23.html [Date Accessed 2 January 2009]
31
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ,‘The Responsibility to Protect’,
International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001, p. 69
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neighbourhood. At the same time, the overall focus remained the same – the economy
and security.

Adapting to globalisation began under the Hawke-government (1983-91) in the
1980s. A free trade approach within limits was adopted and the protectionist elements
of the Australian economy began to be dismantled. 32 Both the Hawke and Keating
(1991-96)-governments pursued multilateral venues and the Australian-led initiatives
to create the Cairns Group 33 and, together with Japan 34 , the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) stand as testament to this. 35 The Howard-government came to
power in March 1996, and they argued for a more bilateral approach, and pursued free
trade agreements with the United States, Thailand and Singapore. 36 However, despite
focus on bilateral arrangements, multilateral fora were still used in different
circumstances, such as with the UN in the East Timor-intervention, the yearly APECmeetings, and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in relation to the Regional Assistance
Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)-intervention.

Asia was a strong focus of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) in government due to its
strong economic growth from the 1970s onwards. The Howard-government continued
the emphasis on Asia, and the Australian trade relationships with states such as China,
Japan, Indonesia and India are still just as strong, if not stronger today. 37 Their
importance can be illustrated with the example of when Chinese Premier Hu Jintao
was invited to speak to the Australian Parliament around the same time as the US
President George W. Bush in 2003. The fact that he was bestowed the same honour as
the traditional ally the US, shows the importance Australia places on its relationship
with China. 38

32

Stewart Firth, Australia in International Politics: An introduction to Australian foreign policy, Allen
& Unwin, Crows Nest, second edition, 2005, pp. 114-15
33
S. Firth, Australia in International Politics: An introduction to Australian foreign policy, p. 70
34
Takashi Terada, 'The Genesis of APEC: Australia-Japan Political Initiatives’, Pacific Economic
Papers, No. 298, December 1999
35
S. Firth, Australia in International Politics: An introduction to Australian foreign policy, p. 70
36
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia), In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign
and Trade Policy, White Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1997, pp. iii-iv, see also S.
Firth, Australia in International Politics: An introduction to Australian foreign policy, p. 140
37
Allan Gyngell & Michael Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, Cambridge University Press,
Melbourne, Second edition, 2007, pp. 220-221
38
Paul Kelly, ‘Alliance politics to deliver the goods’, The Australian, 22 October 2003
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The US-alliance enjoys bipartisan support in the Australian federal parliament. It is
fundamental in terms of both economics and security. The Howard-government
emphasised a stronger relationship with the US once they came into power, although
it must be said that the Labor-governments held the US-alliance as just as vital to
Australia’s defence. Prime Minister Hawke’s quick decision to deploy Australian
forces in support of the US-led, with UN authorisation, liberation of Kuwait in the
first Gulf War indicates that the alliance was just as important under Labor. Forward
Defence, as opposed to a more regional focus, was stressed. 39 The new approach
could be seen through the Howard-government’s invocation of the ANZUS-Treaty
immediately after the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, as well as
through Australia’s participation in the US-led invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and
Iraq in 2003. 40 The approaches, thus, may have been different between the Labor and
Coalition-governments but the overall objectives were the same in relation to the
economy, security, relations with Asia, and the US-alliance.

With the terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001 and in Bali in October 2002,
foreign policy focused on the new threats from terrorist networks and the role played
by ‘failed states’ in facilitating bases for such networks. This was particularly
important to Australia, as several states in its immediate neighbourhood were
‘unstable’, possibly even being on the path towards becoming failed states in the
future, in what some labelled as the “Arc of Instability”. 41

The relationship with Indonesia was actually strengthened partly due to the
cooperation on combating terrorism after the Bali bombing in 2002 and subsequent
attacks. It had previously gone from a strong focus on Indonesia in the 1990s under
Keating, as well as initially when the Howard-government took over, but plummeted
after the East Timor-intervention with Australia’s decision to change policy and lead
the operation. Indonesians have since then become concerned that Australia was out
to take advantage of a weakened Indonesia and thus suspicious of Australian actions.
39

S. Firth, Australia in International Politics: An introduction to Australian foreign policy, pp. 160-61
S. Firth, Australia in International Politics: An introduction to Australian foreign policy, pp. 164-65
41
The expression was used, among others, by Kevin Rudd, Geoffrey Barker and Kim Beazley. See
Kevin Rudd, ‘Arc of Instability - Arc of Insecurity’, Sydney Papers, Spring 2002, and Geoffrey Barker,
‘The arc of instability’, Financial Review, 1 August 2002, and Kim Beazley, ‘Arc of Instability’,
National Observer, No. 57, Winter 2003, pp. 17-23, see also A. Gyngell & M. Wesley, Making
Australian Foreign Policy, p. 194
40
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Police and intelligence cooperation against terrorism and Australia’s help after the
tsunami hit Indonesia in December 2004 has however helped to strengthen the ties
between Australia and Indonesia once again. The election of Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono further contributed to an improvement between the two countries,
although tensions due to Australia in 2006 allowing 42 West Papuan refugees to stay
once again strained relations, briefly prompting Indonesia to recall its ambassador to
Australia. 42

Despite the Howard-government’s approach to widen the focus on security and
defence, events close to home forced it to pay much closer attention to its immediate
neighbourhood and tested its ability to respond to crises quickly. For a long time, the
approach by both sides of Australian politics to the Pacific Islands was a “hands-off”
approach, respecting the island state’s sovereignty and being careful not to look like a
“neo-colonial” power in the region. In the Pacific Prime Minister Howard was seen to
neglect the region, one example of which is that Howard only attended four out of the
first seven PIF-meetings after his election. 43

Interest however grew as the situations in Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea
(PNG) came to be seen in the prism of ‘failed state’ status and the Howardgovernment moved to a policy of a more “hands on”- approach, starting with the
RAMSI-intervention into the Solomon Islands in 2003. The official rhetoric
emphasised that Australia could not afford to have a failed state in its midst, due to
the risks it carried with it in terms of the potential of criminal and terrorist networks
setting up camp there, while at the same time it was seen that Australia had a
responsibility as the strongest state in the region to ensure that these states did not
become failed states. 44

42

Jamie Mackie, ‘Reflections on the Bilateral Relationship – and Beyond’, in Different Societies,
Shared Futures: Australia, Indonesia and the Region, ed. J. Monfries, ISEAS Publications, Singapore,
2006, p. 182, and Jamie Mackie, ‘Australia & Indonesia: Current problems, future prospects’, Lowy
Institute Paper 19, Longueville, Double Bay, 2007, pp. 29 & 63, and Damien Kingsbury, ‘Neighbours
have differences from time to time’, in Good Neighbour, Bad Neighbour: Australia’s relations with
Indonesia, Papers from the Uniya Seminar Series 2006, Uniya Jesuit Social Justice Centre, Kings
Cross, 2006, p. 3, and Anonymous, ‘Indonesia recalls Australia envoy’, BBC News, 24 March 2006
43
Geoffrey Barker, ‘Security threat in Pacific unrest’, Financial Review, 12 August 2002
44
See John Howard, ‘Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon John Howard MP Interview with
Charles Wooley, 60 Minutes’, 20 July 2003 and John Howard, ‘Transcript of the Prime Minister the
Hon John Howard MP Address to the Sydney Institute, Intercontinental Hotel, Sydney’, 1 July 2003
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Australia in the Post Cold War illustrates the old saying “the more things change the
more they remain the same”. It is certainly true that the new environment meant that
Australia had to adopt new policies, new approaches and learn to be able to respond to
new challenges faster than before. However, as shown above, the overall objectives of
national and regional security and relationships remain the same to a large extent.
Still, it also shows an environment where Australian foreign policy change has
become more inventive and adaptable now that the static Cold War stability is well
and truly gone.

Methodology
This thesis adopts a case study-approach which has several advantages over other
methods, among them occasions when the researcher has to measure indicators such
as power, influence and perception, an important part of this study, and which can
prove to be especially difficult. Case studies also give the researcher the advantage of
examining in detail the factors and actors in their social and political context, and thus
to appreciate how and why an event has occurred. 45 Further, it permits the reader to
view the effect of foreign policy change in specific situations, not only as abstract
theory. As Yin argues:

In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are
being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is
on contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context. 46

More in-depth case studies can also identify and produce previously unknown, or not
considered, variables, leading to further theory-development. 47 Moreover, case
studies have the advantage of delving deep into each case, exploring how casual
mechanisms operate, thus identifying the variables involved in each particular case.
Furthermore, George and Bennett argue that case studies are generally preferred in
investigating complex casual interactions between factors and actors, and the effects
of these.

It is often found that events display what George and Bennett call

“equifinality”:
45

Alexander L. George & Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2005, p. 19
46
Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and methods, Sage, Thousand Oaks, Second edition,
1994, p. 1
47
George & Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, pp. 20-21
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… that is, they involve several explanatory paths, combinations, or sequences leading to
the same outcome, and these paths may or may not have one or more variables in
common. 48

Based on the above discussion, it is clear that this thesis examining Australian foreign
policy change is enhanced through using case studies. Decision-making processes are
often complex and involve numerous actors and factors, as well as estimation of
indicators such as power, influences and perception. Case studies aim to develop and
test a proposed theory, allow reflection on what fits the model and what does not, and
how to explain both instances.

This study will test a theoretical model of foreign policy change, and as such it fits
well into the theory-testing category of case studies. Among the aims of a theorytesting case study may be to, naturally, “strengthen or reduce support for a theory” 49
which is exactly what is intended here. By investigating two case studies rather than
just one, the theoretical model will be further strengthened and validated if it is able to
adequately explain the how and why, as well as the timing of, the two instances of
foreign policy change chosen.

When conducting a comparative study of two case studies of Australian foreign policy
change, it is important to use a wide selection of primary and secondary sources and
to use similar sources in both cases to ensure comparability. 50 For this study primary
sources used include official documents, parliamentary Commonwealth debates
(Hansard), transcripts of speeches, press conferences and interviews with key
decision-makers, articles from a range of newspapers and other media outlets, opinion
polls from several poll institutes, and biographies on and by key actors.

A number of official documents were used including White Papers from the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and from the Department of
Defence (DOD), as well as annual and specific reports from DFAT. Furthermore,
reports have been used from the parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Foreign
48

George & Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, p. 20
George & Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, p. 109
50
Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks,
second edition, 1994, pp. 78-98 and Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and
Theory Development in the Social Sciences, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 86
49
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Affairs, Defence and Trade. All the above documents were important in establishing
the government’s official policy positions at different times. They were in turn
compared with official statements made by key decision-makers, such as the Prime
Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister.

Transcripts of speeches, media interviews, press conferences and press statements of
the key decision-makers were used to further gain an understanding of the
government’s public statements on the policies investigated. They provided important
details and insights to the government’s policy decisions and changes.

Parliamentary records (Hansard) were useful, in particular, in distinguishing the
opposition parties’ stance on the East Timor-policy and the policy towards the
Solomon Islands.

Important research sources were articles from newspapers and other media outlets.
Three newspapers were selected - The Age, The Australian and the Financial Review for a focused study for the media-section of the analysis. These three newspapers
were selected because they are all key opinion-makers and they target a middle-class
and upper class type audience, which tend to influence government foreign policy
more than the general public. There is also a difference in ownership, as The
Australian is owned by News Corporation, while The Age and the Financial Review
are owned by Fairfax Media Limited. They approach news from different angles, with
The Age being more independent than The Australian, while the Financial Review has
a more economic focus. These three newspapers generally report more often and in
more detail than for example the more tabloid The Daily Telegraph. A large number
of articles were used to establish the course of events in the two case studies. They
provided a wide range of details that were valuable for the different sources of
change. More than 4 000 newspaper-articles were collected for this purpose, 3 422 for
the East Timor case study and 629 for the Solomon Islands case study. 51

51

The key words “East” and “Timor” were used for the first case study and “”Solomon” and “Islands”
for the second case study. The search engine used changed its selective process during the research
process, which altered the amount of articles that came up in searches.
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Transcripts from interviews conducted in television documentaries with key players in
the decision-making processes were also used although to a smaller degree,
particularly the ABC series “The Howard Years”, which negated the need for oral
history or interviews. It is highly unlikely that the key government members, such as
John Howard and Alexander Downer would have agreed to hours of interviews with a
lowly PhD student given their positions, so this documentary series was used to
confirm other findings. A few biographies written by key players were also used,
although one must be careful of bias when using them, as with any sources used.

Finally, opinion polls from Newspoll, A.C. Nielsen and Roy Morgan Research were
used on specific events but also to establish trends in public opinion over time in
relation to the case studies.

As can be seen above, a wide range of primary sources have been used in order to
investigate the case studies. Together with secondary sources such as articles from
scholarly journals and academic books, the aim has been to collect a broad selection
of representative views and various interpretations of their importance.

Aim and Chapter Structure of Thesis
In terms of its theoretical aim, this thesis explores the phenomenon of foreign policy
change through an application of a new model to two instances of actual Australian
foreign policy change: East Timor during 1999 and Solomon Islands during 2003.
The model itself adapts the work of previous scholars and identifies new factors that
influence change in foreign policy, specifically the role of the media and its
interaction with public opinion and interest groups. Each part of the model includes
new aspects compared to previous foreign policy change-models. 52

By examining specific instances of foreign policy change the thesis and the model
proposed contribute to an overall improved understanding of foreign policy analysis.
The case studies combine international and domestic factors and plot the evolution of
the decision-making processes that occurred. Change factors are separated into
domestic and international categories with the emphasis of the thesis argument being

52

The model and its features will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2
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that these have the potential to influence each other. In addition the thesis argues that
within each category there are a range of factors that individually and cumulatively
create momentum for foreign policy change to occur. A key innovation of the thesis is
the “Window of Opportunity”, wherein structural conditions change, but this
opportunity needs to be perceived as such by the key decision-makers. If they do so, a
situation may indeed result in change, but if they do not then no change will occur.
Their perception will determine whether they see a change as beneficial enough to
carry out or whether they believe the cost is too high. A foreign policy change will
only occur when benefits are believed to be greater than the costs of altering a current
policy. The process of change can also begin with key decision makers who can
attempt to create a “window of opportunity” by trying to change structural conditions.
Finally, the proposed model develops a typology of change that recognises and
classifies the degree of change, and examines the consequences of foreign policy
change.

The studies themselves were essentially self-selected as I was studying in Australia at
the time of the 2003 Solomon Islands intervention and became fascinated as to how
such a radical departure of policy had happened so quickly. Previous studies in
Sweden had introduced me to the key concepts and scholarship surrounding foreign
policy change, and when pursuing a PhD in Australia this made Australian foreign
policy change an obvious choice for this thesis due to the availability of source
materials. The 1999 East Timor INTERFET intervention was also a comparatively
recent event, occurring during the second term of the Howard-government, and
marked the only other significant departure from previous foreign policy.

The empirical aim of the thesis is therefore to investigate two cases of Australian
foreign policy change under the Howard-government. The first case study is the
decision to lead an intervention into East Timor in September 1999 which put an end
to Australia’s recognition of East Timor as part of Indonesia. The second case study
looks at Australia’s policy change towards Solomon Islands in 2003, agreeing to
intervene militarily after having declined requests from three previous Solomongovernments. The decision in both cases overturned long-standing policies and had
large consequences for Australia’s role in the region and with the parties concerned.
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The two cases are similar in nature, in that they both involve a decision to intervene
militarily in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood; they both took place under the
same government and with the same key players behind the policy change.53
However, there are also important differences. While the East Timor-intervention was
embarked upon reluctantly under mainly domestic pressure, the Solomon-intervention
was more of an initiative by the Howard-government partly due to the international
context. The differences in the decision-making process together with the similarities
makes these two cases good choices to illustrate the complexities and nature of
foreign policy decision-making.

This thesis is divided into seven chapters, including two case studies. Chapter 2 will
introduce a model of foreign policy change that identifies the relevant independent
variables, i.e. the sources of change. These are Domestic and International factors and
actors that may influence and/or pressure the government on foreign policy. The
model includes the Key decision-makers and the Window of opportunity as
intervening variables in the decision-making process, which are vital for foreign
policy change to occur. Finally, as dependent variables, a Typology of change and a
Consequences of change-category are introduced. It is argued that the new aspects
and development of parts from previous theoretical models are needed to fully
understand the decision-making process that leads to foreign policy change. The
interplay between and within the domestic and international sources of change, and in
turn their interaction with the key decision-makers, help show the complexity that is
foreign policy decision-making.

Chapter 3 discusses the background, as well as general features and patterns of
Australian foreign policy over the years. The actors and factors relevant in Australian
foreign policy are discussed as is the important role that the leader of the government
has and plays in making Australian foreign policy.

Chapter 4 and 5 deals with the first case study – Australia’s foreign policy change
towards Indonesia regarding East Timor in 1998-99. Chapter 4 investigates the
53

This thesis is interested in changes that occur during the same government, not changes that take
place because of new government coming to power, such as the immediate ratification of the Kyotoprotocol by the Rudd-government when it took office in December 2007.
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background and the decision-making process leading up to the change, arguing that
the Howard-government for most parts reacted to events and policy changes in
Indonesia, rather than leading the process themselves. This was also identified as an
important international factor in the analysis in Chapter 5. In this chapter, the
theoretical model is applied to the decision-making process, identifying the influential
actors and factors in producing the change, the role of the key decision-makers, and
ultimately how the change came about. Domestic factors are found to be interacting to
put pressure on the government to finally change its policy, fuelled by the
developments in Indonesia and East Timor.

Chapter 6 and 7 focuses on the second case study – Australian foreign policy change
towards Solomon Islands in 2003. Chapter 6 illustrates how the Howard-government
over a long period of time declined requests from three successive Solomongovernments of direct military and police assistance, citing respect for sovereignty
and Australia not being a “neo-colonial power” as reasons. The analysis in Chapter 7
reveals international factors to be prominent in altering the government’s view of its
Solomon Islands policy. In combination with one particular domestic factor, the
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) whose efforts to influence the government
proved influential, the Howard-government saw the opportunity to act and change
policy.

Finally, chapter 8 provides a discussion wherein the empirical and theoretical findings
are compared. Similarities and differences between the two case studies are discussed
and the model’s empirical and theoretical implications are then outlined. Domestic
factors interacted to put a combined pressure on the government in the East Timor
case study, and together with events unfolding in Indonesia throughout the process led
to a policy change in September 1999. It is also noted that the Howard government
reacted to external events rather than initiating the change itself.

The Howard government was more proactive in the Solomon Islands case study,
although it also reacted to the rapid decline of Solomon Islands. The policy change
was framed in terms of the risk a failed state in the neighbourhood could pose to
Australia. In this case study, it was the interaction between international factors that
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were prominent, together with an interest group that influenced the government
domestically.

The two case studies show the importance of the key decision-makers and their
perception of whether there is a window of opportunity for a policy change to occur.
It also illustrates how domestic and international factors interact to pressure or
influence the decision-makers. This occurs between domestic factors, between
international factors, but also between domestic and international factors.

Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the development of the foreign policy change area of
research from its origins in the early 1980s until today, as well as the contributions to
the new focus on the decision-making process, the perceptions of key decision-makers
and the importance of looking at both domestic and international factors when
investigating foreign policy change. It has argued that the Post Cold War-environment
brought with it increased opportunities for states to change foreign policy, as well as
having to react to events more often due to the less restricted political environment
once the bipolar structure was gone. Australia was no exception and it became
necessary to adapt to the new circumstances, particularly in its own neighbourhood.
The next chapter discusses the Foreign Policy Change area of research and previous
theoretical and empirical contributions. It then goes on to introduce a new model of
foreign policy change to be applied in the case studies that will follow in chapters 4-7.
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Chapter 2: Foreign Policy Change
“Surprise remains one of the few things one can count on.”
John Lewis Gaddis 1

When a state changes its foreign policy it can affect both the state and the
international political system profoundly. It can be disruptive and even lead to
warfare. The underlying causes of foreign policy change are therefore important to
understand and this study attempts to further that understanding. This chapter explains
why foreign policy change is an important area of study. It will examine the research
already conducted on foreign policy change, and what has been lacking in the
research done so far. It will argue that although much progress has been made, there
are still flaws in the theoretical models constructed up until now, leading to the
presentation of a new theoretical model on foreign policy change.

Several theoretical models have been constructed by other scholars, however, each
model is inadequate, as will be shown below, which makes them unable to explain
fully all factors contributing to a foreign policy change. The model of foreign policy
change presented in this study attempts to include the relevant factors that affect a
government’s decision to change its foreign policy, and to incorporate them into a
theoretical model that can be used to explain foreign policy change. This model
includes factors such as the media, which has not earlier been specifically categorised,
takes into account the leader’s ability to seize the initiative and create a “Window of
Opportunity”. It advances also a modified typology of change and further it is the first
model so far researching the consequences of change. One important aspect of this is
that, unlike earlier models, this model has a balanced focus on each feature.

The theoretical aim in this thesis is to devise a model to use as an analytical tool for
the empirical part of the thesis. The model identifies factors that influence change in
foreign policy, divided up in domestic and international factors. It also recognises a
“Window of Opportunity”, wherein structural conditions change, which need to be
1

John Lewis Gaddis, ‘International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War’, International
Security, Vol. 17, No. 3, Winter 1992-93, p. 5
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perceived as such by the key decision-makers, thus creating a situation that may, or
may not, induce change. The process can also begin in this category, if the key
decision-maker attempts to create a “window of opportunity” by changing structural
conditions. The next step in the model deals with the decision-making process,
wherein key decision-makers act upon the created window of opportunity and embark
upon a policy process that results in a foreign policy change. The model recognises
what has changed, how it has changed, and the degree of change. This part is defined
as a typology of change. Finally, the consequences of the policy change are examined.

The model presented below is mainly designed for the study of foreign policy change
in functioning parliamentary and presidential democracies. However, it is not ruled
out that the model may be applicable to other regime types as well. Although several
of the domestic variables might seem unimportant in an authoritarian regime at first,
they can be quite relevant there as well, for example, the military as an interest group,
or public opinion putting pressure on the government/dictator with demonstrations or
other activities.

The purpose of this model is to explain past events rather than predict future foreign
policy change. Earlier models have had a similar focus, with one notable exception;
David A. Welch’s study on foreign policy change. Welch attempts to find the
conditions that may produce a foreign policy change, using prospect theory,
organizational theory, and cognitive and motivational psychology. Welch shows how
the decision-maker’s perception is important in whether there will be a policy change
or not. How the decision-maker(s) view his environment and the relevant factors
involved is of vital importance, particularly in his perception of whether the current
policy is flawed, is not working, may fail in the immediate future, or that a new policy
would produce gains that would produce higher benefits than the current policy; a
cost/benefit calculation on the part of the decision-maker(s) thus. 2

However, in his study Welch completely ignores the rest of the Foreign Policy
Change scholarship. There is not a single reference in the book or in the bibliography

2

David A. Welch, Painful Choices: A theory of foreign policy change, Princeton University Press,
New Jersey, 2005
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to any of the major works on foreign policy change. 3 This begs the question as to
whether David A. Welch should be considered to be part of the foreign policy change
theoretical field, however, he deserves a mention here, even though it is a serious
error to write a book on foreign policy change without consulting any of the scholarly
work already done.

This model cannot predict future foreign policy change. The end of the Cold War
showed just how difficult it is for the existing theories of International Relations to
predict the future.

4

Gaddis’ study on the major theories and whether they had

predicted the end of the Cold War concluded that very few of the existing theories
came even close to do so. Gaddis states:

One might as well have relied upon stargazers, readers of entrails, and other ‘prescientific’ methods for all the good our ‘scientific’ methods did, clearly our theories were
not up to the task of anticipating the most significant event in world politics since the end
5
of World War II.

The words of Robert Conquest uttered in 1991: “If you are a student, switch from
political science to history” 6 , again express the difficulties of predicting the future of
world politics. 7

3

Such as Kalevi J. Holsti, (Ed) Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar
World, Allen & Unwin, London, 1982, or Charles F. Hermann, ‘Changing Course: When Governments
Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1990, or Jerel A.
Rosati, & Joe D. Hagan, & Martin W. Sampson, (eds) Foreign Policy Restructuring: How
Governments Respond to Global Change, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1994, or
Jakob Gustavsson, The Politics of Foreign Policy Change: Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on
EC Membership, Lund University Press, Lund, Doctoral Dissertation, 1998, or Jakob Gustavsson,
‘How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?’ Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 34, Issue 1, 1999, or
Yvonne Kleistra & Igor Mayer, ‘Stability and Flux in Foreign Affairs: Modelling Policy and
Organisational Change’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 36, Issue 4, 2001
4
J. L. Gaddis, ‘International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War’, p. 6
5
J. L. Gaddis, ‘International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War’, p. 18
6
Robert Conquest, cited in J. L. Gaddis, ‘International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War’,
p. 53
7
For a further discussion of the difficulties of predicting future politics, see Robert Jervis, ‘The Future
of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?’, International Security, Vol. 16, Issue 3, Winter 1991-92
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Definitions
Cohen and Harris define the scope of foreign policy in the following manner:

… a set of goals, directives or intentions, formulated by persons in official or
authoritative positions, directed at some actor or condition in the environment beyond the
sovereign nation state, for the purpose of affecting the target in the manner desired by the
policy-makers. 8

This thesis will adopt this definition, since it defines foreign policy in a broad enough
manner and explains the basic meaning of the term, clearly stating that it refers to
actions taken towards actors or events outside of the state in question, thereby
separating it from domestic politics. As Gustavsson argues, it states clearly that
foreign policy is the intentional behaviour of governments of states, thereby clearly
showing who the actor is and that the actions are intentional in nature. 9

Jerel A. Rosati defines change, in the context of foreign policy, as a ‘foreign policy
phenomena that experience broad alteration, ranging from more modest shifts to
major foreign policy restructuring’. 10 This study focuses on foreign policy change as
defined by Rosati, that is, it does not focus only on foreign policy redirection, where a
state changes its foreign policy in a major way. Rather, it leaves open the range of
change from modest to major change. It also distinguishes between foreign policy
changes that occur when a state changes governments and when a change occurs
under the same government. 11 This study focuses on change that occurs while the
same government is in office. Opposition parties argue from outside power for
change, so changes can be expected when they assume office. Foreign policy change
within the same government is less common, and therefore worth investigating.

8

Bernard. C. Cohen & Scott. A. Harris, ‘Foreign Policy’, in Handbook of Political Science, eds. F. I.
Greenstein & N. Polsby, Addison Wesley, Reading, 1975, p. 383
9
J. Gustavsson, The Politics of Foreign Policy Change: Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC
Membership, p. 22
10
Jerel A. Rosati, ‘Cycles in Foreign Policy Restructuring: The Politics of Continuity and Change in
U.S. Foreign Policy’, in Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change
eds. J. A. Rosati, & J. D. Hagan, & M. W. III. Sampson, University of South Carolina, Columbia,
1994, p. 225
11
For another example of this approach, see C. F. Hermann, ‘Changing Course: When Governments
Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy’, pp. 4-5
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The Study of Foreign Policy Change
As discussed in Chapter 1, foreign policy analysis emerged as an area of focus for
International Relations in the 1960s and 1970s. Important studies were conducted,
such as Bruck, Sapin and Snyder’s study wherein they investigate the decisionmaking process in relation to foreign policy 12 , James Rosenaus effort to outline a
‘pre-theory’ on foreign policy 13 , Graham T. Allison’s study on the bureaucratic and
organisational role in the Cuban Missile crisis14 , and Robert Jervis work on
perceptions and misperceptions. 15

Foreign policy change however was still largely ignored and has been a neglected
area of research. Several reasons have been given for this. Robert Gilpin lists a
number of reasons for this neglect, among them the fact that International Relations
research has not been a specific area of research for very long; attention has been
given to what Gilpin calls “middle-range theory”, which has diverted attention from
bigger, more general problems such as change. Furthermore, there has been a Western
focus in the study of International Relations, particularly the static nature of the Cold
War, while the preferred state of academics has tended to be stability, since change
upset accepted norms. Finally, change itself has been viewed as complex, specific to
particular events, and therefore difficult to explain. Thus it was easier to shy away
from it and focus on other areas of research.16

Kalevi J. Holsti has also pointed to the fact that foreign policy change had been
overlooked because of the perception of the Cold War structure as stable. While
neglecting the forces of nationalism, scholars instead saw the new trends of
interdependence as a further stabilizer in international politics. 17
12

Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, ‘Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study
of International Politics’, in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of
International Politics, eds. R. C. Snyder & H. W. Bruck & B. Sapin, The Free Press of Glencoe, New
York, 1962 - Original article first published in 1954
13
James N. Rosenau, ‘Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy’, in ed. R. B. Farell, Approaches to
Comparative and International Politics, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1966
14
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little, Brown,
Boston, 1971
15
Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1976
16
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981,
pp. 4-6
17
Kalevi J. Holsti, ‘Restructuring Foreign Policy: A Neglected Phenomenon in Foreign Policy
Theory’, in Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World, ed. K. J. Holsti,
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Foreign policy change as a research area slowly emerged in the 1980s from work by a
number of scholars, although they were still very much a minority. 18 It then took off,
albeit still on a minor scale, especially in the early 1990s and the end of the 1990s.
Foreign policy change as a field of study developed, through both theoretical
development of new models on foreign policy change 19 and through empirical
applications and studies. 20 It now seems that foreign policy change has become an

Allen & Unwin, London, 1982, p. 8 Also noted by J. Gustavsson, The Politics of Foreign Policy
Change: Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC Membership, p. 3
18
Barry Buzan & R. J. Barry Jones, Change and the Study of International Relations, Pinter, London,
1981, and R. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, and Kjell Goldmann, ‘Change and Stability in
Foreign Policy: Détente as a Problem of Stabilization’, World Politics, Vol. 34, Issue 2, 1982, and K. J.
Holsti, Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World, and Jan Hallenberg,
Foreign Policy Change: United States Foreign Policy Toward the Soviet Union and The People’s
Republic of China 1961-1980, University of Stockholm, Stockholm, Doctoral Dissertation, 1984
19
C. F. Hermann, ‘Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy’, and
Walter Carlsnaes, ‘The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis’, International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 36, 1992, and Walter Carlsnaes, ‘On Analysing the Dynamics of Foreign Policy
Change: A Critique and Reconceptualization’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 28, Issue 1, 1993, and J.
A. Rosati, ‘Cycles in Foreign Policy Restructuring: The Politics of Continuity and Change in U.S.
Foreign Policy’, and David Skidmore, ‘Explaining State Responses to International Change: The
Structural Sources of Foreign Policy Rigidity and Change’, in Foreign Policy Restructuring: How
Governments Respond to Global Change, University of South Carolina, Columbia, 1994, and Sanqiang
Jian, Foreign Policy Restructuring as Adaptive Behavior: China’s Independent Foreign Policy 19821989, University Press of America, Lanham, 1996, and David D. Oldfield, The Restructuring of
Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards Laos, 1988-1991, Northern Illinois University, Doctoral
Dissertation, 1998, and Muhittin Ataman, An Integrated Approach to Foreign Policy Change:
Explaining Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1980s, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1999,
and J. Gustavsson, ‘How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?’, and Charles F. Hermann, &
Robert S. Billings, & Robert Litchfield, ‘Escalation and Modification: Responding to Negative
Feedback in Sequential Decision Making’, Paper presented at the Fifth National Conference on Public
Management Research, December 3-4 1999, Texas A&M University, and Y. Kleistra & I. Mayer,
‘Stability and Flux in Foreign Affairs: Modelling Policy and Organisational Change’, and Tomas
Niklasson, Regime Stability and Foreign Policy Change: Interaction between Domestic and Foreign
Policy in Hungary 1956-1994, Lund University Press, Lund, Doctoral Dissertation, 2006, and Fredrik
Doeser, In Search of Security After the Collapse of the Soviet Union: Foreign Policy Change in
Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 1988-1993, Universitetsservice US-AB, Stockholm, 2008
20
Raimo Vayrynen, ‘Adaption of a Small Power to International Tensions: The Case of Finland’, in ed.
B. Sundelius, The Neutral Democracies and the New Cold War, Westview Press, Boulder, 1987,
Magnus Jerneck, ‘Sweden – the Reluctant European?’, in The Nordic Countries and the EC, eds. T.
Tiilikainen & I. D. Pedersen, Copenhagen Political Studies Press, Copenhagen, 1993, and Bengt
Sundelius, ‘Changing Course: When Neutral Sweden Chose to Join the European Community’, in eds.
W. Carlsnaes, & S. Smith, European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe,
Sage Publications, London, 1994, and Thomas Pedersen, ‘Denmark and the European Union’, in ed. L.
Miles, L. The European Union and the Nordic Countries, Routledge, London, 1996, and J. Gustavsson,
The Politics of Foreign Policy Change: Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC Membership,
Mark. C. Gentry, From Containment to Inclusion: United States foreign economic policy and the
former Soviet Union, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1999, and Hans Branner, ‘Options and Goals
in Danish Foreign Policy European Policy Since 1945: Explaining Small State Behavior and Foreign
Policy Change’, in eds. H. Branner, & M. Kelstrup, Denmark’s Foreign Policy Towards Europe After
1945, Odense University Press, Odense, 2000, and Kevin J. Cooney, Japan’s Foreign Policy
Maturation: A Quest for Normalcy, Arizona State University, Doctoral Dissertation, 2000, and Michael
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area of study on which attention has increased and that it is likely to expand further.
States change their foreign policy all the time, on a small or a large scale, and the
underlying reasons are important to understand, in order to fully comprehend the
actions taken by states in today’s international political system.

The end of the Cold War took most scholars by surprise and it also made painfully
clear the lack of research on foreign policy change. Furthermore, the more fluent
international political system that emerged in the 1990s, as many of the Cold War restrictions for states disappeared, made foreign policy change more possible and
therefore became an area of research to focus further on. The foreign policy change
area of research aims to understand how and when it happens, as well as the
underlying factors behind it. 21

David Huxsoll points to several reasons to why the study of foreign policy change is
an important area of research. First, he argues that “foreign policy changes are often
not only surprising, but disruptive”. It can therefore have a big impact on state
relations, internationally as well as regionally. This disruptive effect can have a
multitude of consequences, such as shifts in alliances, tension building between states,
or it can even lead to warfare in extreme cases. Second, investigating foreign policy
change inevitably leads to an enhanced understanding of the overall field of
international relations, particularly through the theoretical contributions it brings with
it. Third, foreign policy change-research can contribute with important empirical
work on international relations on several levels of analysis. Fourth, it “offers the
opportunity to incorporate multiple perspectives”, 22 which further the research on
domestic and international factors combined affect on decision-makers in the foreign
policy process. Finally, Huxsoll argues that the study of foreign policy change can
Comparing National Policies, eds. B. Huldt & T. Tiilikainen & T. Vaahtoranta & A. Helkama-Ragard,
Swedish National Defense College, Stockholm, 2001, and Hans Loden, “For sakerhets skull”:
Ideologi och sakerhet i svensk aktiv utrikespolitik 1950-1975, Santerus, Stockholm, 2001, and Mark A.
Schuler, Explaining Foreign Policy Change: The Case of United States International Population
Policy, University of Missouri, St:Louis, 2001, and Kjell Engelbrekt, Security Policy Reorientation in
Peripheral Europe: A Comparative-Perspectivist Approach, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2002, and Joshua
Dapaah-Agyemang, Transformation of ECOWAS as a Security Apparatus and Its Implications in
Ghana’s Political Orientation, 1990-2000, in African and Asian Studies, Vol. 2, Issue 1, 2003, and
David B. Huxsoll, Regimes, Institutions and Foreign Policy Change, Louisiana State University,
Doctoral Dissertation, 2003, and Jonathan Rhynold, ‘Cultural Shift and Foreign Policy Change’,
Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 42, Issue 4, 2007
21
D. B. Huxsoll, Regimes, Institutions and Foreign Policy Change, p. 4
22
D. B. Huxsoll, Regimes, Institutions and Foreign Policy Change, p. 17
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contribute with important insights into core issues in International Relations and
foreign policy analysis. He specifically names neo-realism (particularly Waltz) and its
external approach to changes in foreign policy, thereby neglecting domestic factors in
the process. The focus on domestic and international factors as sources of change is
an area where foreign policy change scholars can contribute with important
research. 23 The importance of understanding even the basis of continuity and change
in international politics makes foreign policy change research important to
undertake. 24

Earlier Theoretical Models
Despite the apparent neglect of research on foreign policy change important work has
been conducted. Several scholars have developed their own models that are intended
to explain foreign policy change. Below, models relevant to this study are discussed
using Jakob Gustavsson’s typology of the six models that were in existence at that
time, which he then divided into three categories: checklist models, structural
constraints models, and cyclical models. 25

Checklist models are built on three basic analytical steps – background factors (for
example domestic and international) that could trigger a foreign policy change,
intervening variables (cognitive and decision-making related factors), and the
outcome, i.e. the policy change in a typology of change. Charles F. Hermann’s 26
model follows these three analytical steps. The background factors consist of four
agents of change - Leader driven, Bureaucratic advocacy, Domestic support, and
External shocks. 27 His intermediate step focuses on the decision-making process,
wherein seven steps of the process are investigated in order to understand the road
towards the change in policy. 28 Once the change is a reality, Hermann proposes a
typology of change consisting of four levels that determines the amount of change -

23
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Adjustment changes, Program changes, Problem/Goal changes, and International
Orientation changes. 29

Kalevi J. Holsti also constructed a checklist model, designed to investigate major
changes in foreign policy – foreign policy ‘restructuring’ –, which focused on “the
dramatic, wholesale alteration of a nation’s pattern of external relations”. 30 He
thereby ignores lesser changes that are covered by Hermann’s typology. He identified
a number of background factors: external, domestic, historical, and cultural. The
intermediate step is more detailed than in Hermann’s work, containing not only the
policy-making process but also taking into account three other variables - perceptions,
personality, and elite attitudes. The background factors pass through the intervening
variables, which then result into one of three types of reorientation: disengagement
policies, restructuring actions in external environment, or actions toward external
penetration. 31 In his study, Holsti and seven other authors applied his model in eight
case studies from the First and Third worlds.

Checklist models have been criticised for having poor theoretical underpinnings,
admitted even by Hermann, which affects their explanatory value. However, they are
a useful tool to explain and interpret foreign policy-decisions as they identify the
relevant factors and the steps needed to be taken in the decision-making process. 32
Hermann’s model is also criticised by Walter Carlsnaes for putting leaders as agents
of change while it would be assumed that they would also play an important part in
the decision-making process, creating what Gustavsson refer to as an “analytical
overlap”. 33

Holsti’s model contains three independent variables but with its subdivisions, it
climbs to eight variables in total. Adding the four intervening variables to the
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independent variables and the number of explanatory factors are up to twelve. This
fact has been criticised as too detailed and difficult to apply to empirical cases.34
However, a model with a number of explanatory variables somewhere between
Gustavsson and Holsti can still be useful in empirical studies, if used as a “checklist”,
making the structuring of one’s findings easier to categorise. It also makes it easier to
detect the interaction between the factors in influencing or pressuring the government,
which increases the explanatory value of a model. Moreover, Walter Carlsnaes
criticises the checklist model’s lack of consideration to the agency-structure problem,
which is concerned with building explanations, looking both at the intentions of actors
and structural conditions, as well as the interplay between them. 35

The structural constraints models pay attention to factors that constrain or stabilise
current policies and how, or if, these can be pressured enough and make the decisionmakers undertake a foreign policy change. 36 A common assumption is that a change
of policy brings with it a cost (e.g. financial, political etc), which often can be too
much for policy-makers, thereby making the current policy the least costly alternative
and no foreign policy change will take place. 37 Kjell Goldmann constructed a model
which focussed on “stabilizers” and their effect on the degree of constancy in a
particular policy. Goldmann is interested in “what factors determine whether, when,
and to what extent pressure for change in a policy will in fact produce change?”. 38 He
identifies four types of stabilizers: international, cognitive, political, or administrative.
In order to cause a change in foreign policy, sources of change need to pass through a
filter wherein stabilizers determine both if there is sufficient pressure for change and
if so, the level of change the process will result in. 39
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David Skidmore combines influences from both realist and institutional theory in his
model. He looks at how a state handles changes in the global arena and adapts its
foreign policy accordingly. Acknowledging that there are not just international but
also domestic pressures that need to be taken account, Skidmore argues in his model
that focus is put on a country’s ability to adjust its foreign policy to changes in the
global environment. Skidmore argues that it is subject to both domestic and
international constraints, and concludes that according to his model, a state that is
strong domestically and weak internationally is more likely to change its policy than a
state that is weak domestically and strong (hegemonic) internationally. 40

As Gustavsson has observed, the structural constraints models suffer from a number
of problems. In the case of Goldmann’s model, its focus is on stability, through the
focus on stabilizers, rather than change, and is therefore better suited to use when
studying stability and continuity of a policy. A common problem with these models is
the lack of attention given to the factors that play a vital part in influencing and
pressuring the government towards a change. The focus is on the intermediate step,
especially in Skidmore’s model, which completely ignore the individuals in the
process - i.e. the key decision-makers - as well as the decision-making process. 41

The cyclical models take a long-term perspective compared to the two previous types.
By taking this approach, the focus shifts to find patterns over time that can explain
foreign policy changes, thereby the name “cyclical” models. 42 As mentioned above,
Walter Carlsnaes is concerned with the agency-structure problem and the lack of
consideration to this problem in earlier foreign policy change-models. He therefore
devised his own model, which takes this aspect into account. The model consists of
three “dimensions of explanation”; an intentional dimension, a dispositional
dimension, and a structural dimension. 43 These three dimensions when applied
together in one model incorporate both agents and structural conditions in order to
explain foreign policy change and would therefore do what the checklist models do
not, that is, address the agency-structure problem.
40
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Jerel A. Rosati’s model also focuses on longer periods and patterns over time. In
developing his model, Rosati examines US foreign policy from 1945 up to the 1980s,
arguing for the cyclical approach to understand foreign policy change. He argues that
changes are more likely to occur in times of transition, which are preceded and
followed by times of stability. He emphasises the interaction between the state, the
society, and the environment, in understanding both stability and change. Foreign
policy can therefore be understood to be relatively continuous over time, with periods
when change occurs. 44

The cyclical models contain an aspect that differs from the other models, namely a
focus on long periods of time. However, a few problems remain. Carlsnaes model is
quite detailed and Gustavsson has argued that a good model should be measured
against the results that empirical studies produce. Applying Carlsnaes model on a case
study would require a vast amount of research that might not justify its application.45
Rosati’s model has been criticised for being too general, by simplifying historical data
and saying little about specific processes and sources of change that might trigger
foreign policy change. 46 Rosati himself admits “the model’s fit with reality in
explaining the U.S. foreign policy is not as clean as suggested – the politics of U.S.
foreign policy are complex and messier than portrayed above”. 47 So, while Carlsnaes
model could be considered too complex, Rosati’s model might be seen as too general.

Jakob Gustavsson constructed his own model of foreign policy change in his doctoral
thesis on the Swedish reorientation on EC membership. It is similar to the checklist
models but it has developed it a step further than the other checklist models examined
earlier. He divides the sources of change into International and Domestic factors.
Within each category he introduces two subcategories: political and economic factors.
The intermediate step consists of cognitive factors in regards to an individual
decision-maker. He/she perceives and acts on the sources of change, which result in a
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foreign policy change. Finally, Hermann’s typology of change is introduced as the
final step. 48

Gustavsson’s model is a step in the right direction. Particularly important is cognitive
aspects that he introduces and the focus on individual decision-maker’s perception in
making decisions. He also discusses “policy windows” and timing, as an important
aspect in making a policy change. However, further emphasis can be put on this
window of opportunity and how decision-makers perceive it. 49 Also, the sources of
change could benefit from being more specific, that is, categorised into subcategories,
which would enhance the explanatory value, presentation of one’s findings, and make
easier the gathering of data for the researcher. It would specifically make it easier to
detect the interaction between domestic factors, between international factors, and
between domestic and international factors, enhancing its explanatory value.
Furthermore, the international political subcategory is focused on “power relations
and the traditional military aspects of national security”. 50 In general, Gustavsson’s
model seems to be specifically designed for his case study, although it would most
likely be applicable for other case studies as well but it would benefit from covering a
broader area of international political issues. Moreover, the typology of change step
could be developed further, to address questions such as “what exactly changed”,
“how exactly did it change”, and not just the level of change in general terms.

Yvonne Kleistra and Igor Mayer constructed a model that is relevant to this study. It
contains 11 carriers and barriers for change, divided up on four levels of analysis
(International system, National political system, Organizational system, Individual
policymakers/Leaders). The decision-making process follows them, which then
amount to a change in foreign policy. Their typology of change focuses on three types
of change: Political/Normative foundations, Strategy & Goals, and Instruments.
Finally, these three types of foreign policy change are then viewed in regards to
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organisational change. 51 Kleistra and Mayer’s model focuses on both change and
stability, while this thesis focuses purely on change. Their model also contains a
significant focus on organizational change, while this thesis has a more general focus
on foreign policy change.

There has been further theoretical development in recent years, particularly on the
interaction between domestic and international factors in foreign policy change,
although without developing new models as such. Tomas Nicklasson’s study on
Hungarian foreign policy between 1956 and 1994 focused on both what promotes
foreign policy change as well as what hinders it. In this he acknowledges the vital role
of the key decision-makers in the process. 52 Nicklasson outlines a new framework to
estimate three dimensions of foreign policy change – Degree of foreign policy
change, Time-frame for change, and the scope of change. Furthermore, he introduced
domestic, international and cognitive Promoters and Stabilisers of change. 53 Put
together, Nicklasson’s theoretical framework provides a valuable contribution to the
field of foreign policy change, particularly in showing the domestic and international
factors interaction in producing a change.

Fredrik Doeser’s research on the security policies of Sweden, Denmark and Finland
1988-1993 analyses how these small states coped with the number of changes during
this time period, such as the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union and
the First Gulf War, as well as the deepening integration in Europe and the breakdown
of Yugoslavia. His most important theoretical contribution lies in how he displays that
domestic factors are just as important to decision-makers in small states as
international factors. 54
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Empirical Studies on Foreign Policy Change
Several empirical studies, using a theoretical model, have been done on foreign policy
change; however, none has so far had its focus on Australian foreign policy change.
Applications of the abovementioned models will be examined in this section, which
will then lead to the presentation of my own model in the next section.

Gustavsson investigated the Swedish reorientation towards EC membership in his
doctoral thesis. In applying his model, he reached the conclusion that the end of the
Cold War caused a fundamental change in the international system, which played a
big part in the Swedish reorientation. However, this change wasn’t sufficient in itself.
Sweden’s balance of payments crisis, which occurred around the same time, also
contributed, as did the Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson’s changing beliefs
and strategic behaviour. These factors, in combination, led to the change in Sweden’s
foreign policy towards EC membership. Gustavsson, using Hermann’s typology of
change, classified it as a “problem/goal change”. 55

A number of studies adopt Hermann’s model. Bengt Sundelius applied it on the same
topic as Gustavsson, the Swedish reorientation towards EC membership. In contrast to
Gustavsson, Sundelius found that the change was a “programme change”. He
identified the “domestic restructuring” and “External shocks” agents of change as the
primary sources for the change in policy. The dramatically altered security situation in
Europe after the Cold War plus an anticipated change in preference against the
government, worked together as sources of change, resulting in a foreign policy
change, according to Sundelius. 56

Thomas Pedersen has also applied Hermann’s framework on empirical studies.
Pedersen investigated Denmark’s EC/EU policy at the end of the Cold War.
According to Pedersen, Denmark’s policy changed in economic and political sectors
but it remained more or less constant in the security area. He classifies this as a
“program change”. 57
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Hans Branner also applied Hermann’s model in his study of Danish foreign policy
towards security cooperation in Europe. He concludes that Danish foreign policy has
changed in some regards, since the Cold War, particularly towards security
cooperation in NATO, however, not so much towards the EC/EU, which is explained
by a reluctant Danish public opinion and from seeing NATO as the only provider of
security in Europe. 58 Similarly, Raimo Vayrynen used Goldmann’s theoretical model
to investigate Finnish foreign policy from the late 1970s to the early 1980s. He argued
that its policy could be categorised as ‘passive instrumentality’, and that the continued
stability in Finnish foreign policy was determined by both domestic and international
stabilizers. 59

Jan Hallenberg utilised parts of Goldmann’s model in his study on US foreign policy
towards China and the Soviet Union, 1961-1980. 60 His thesis studied both change and
stability and his main findings show the importance of looking at domestic and
cognitive factors, in order to fully understand change and stability in foreign policy
over time. Apart from its theoretical contributions, this study also comprises a major
contribution to early foreign policy change scholarship.

Hermann’s and Goldmann’s models are the only theoretical models on foreign policy
change that have been tested by other researchers. Several researchers have, however,
tested their own model on single case studies. Kalevi J. Holsti applied his own model
on eight case studies regarding foreign policy change in several states, including
Canada, China and Burma. Several conclusions were drawn. Foreign policy change
was often a response to a threat of some sort, but not necessarily a military threat.
Nationalism was often identified as an important factor in explaining why a state
chooses to change its foreign policy. 61 Yvonne Kleistra and Igor Mayer’s framework
on foreign policy change, specifically organizational change, was applied on the
Dutch foreign policy towards its former colony Surinam. They concluded that the
Dutch foreign policy towards Surinam had “been largely unintentional and
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unmanaged”. 62 Finally, Jerel A. Rosati investigated U.S. foreign policy between the
two world wars. Generalising, he concludes that two generally stable foreign policy
periods could be detected. The first stable period began with the U.S. involvement in
the Second World War and ended with the Vietnam War, and the second stable period
began after the Vietnam War and was still in effect at the time of writing (1994). 63

There are a few other empirical studies on foreign policy change that have been
conducted but they have not used a theoretical model on foreign policy change to
apply on the case in question, or the model used have been their own but has not
received widespread attention in the foreign policy change area of research.64 The
most influential models are the ones discussed here. This leads us to this study’s
proposed model.

An Outline of a (New) Improved Model of Foreign Policy Change
Despite the number of contributions to the theoretical field of foreign policy change,
as shown above, there is still room for improvement. Below, an alternative model is
outlined. It draws inspiration from the Hermann, Gustavsson and Kleistra & Mayer
models. 65 The first step identifies a number of sources of change, which need to pass
through a Window of Opportunity, to the decision-making process, in order to cause a
foreign policy change. The course of action can also take an opposite course, that is, it
can begin with a key decision-maker in the decision-making process, perceiving a
window of opportunity in order to carry out an agenda of his own. If he succeeds, it
then carries back to the decision-making process again. The exact nature and extent of

62

Y. Kleistra & I. Mayer, ‘Stability and Flux in Foreign Affairs: Modelling Policy and Organisational
Change’, p. 410
63
J. A. Rosati, ‘Cycles in Foreign Policy Restructuring: The Politics of Continuity and Change in U.S.
Foreign Policy’
64
See for example,D. D. Oldfield, The Restructuring of Thailand’s Foreign Policy Towards Laos,
1988-1991, and M. C. Gentry, From Containment to Inclusion: United States foreign economic policy
and the former Soviet Union, and K. J. Cooney, Japan’s Foreign Policy Maturation: A Quest for
Normalcy, and H. Loden, “For sakerhets skull”: Ideologi och sakerhet i svensk aktiv utrikespolitik
1950-1975, and M. A. Schuler, Explaining Foreign Policy Change: The Case of United States
International Population Policy, and K. Engelbrekt, Security Policy Reorientation in Peripheral
Europe: A Comparative-Perspectivist Approach, and D. B. Huxsoll, Regimes, Institutions and Foreign
Policy Change
65
C. F. Hermann, Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy and J.
Gustavsson, The Politics of Foreign Policy Change: Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC
Membership, and J. Gustavsson, ‘How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?’, and Y. Kleistra & I.
Mayer, ‘Stability and Flux in Foreign Affairs: Modelling Policy and Organisational Change’

36

change is then determined in a typology of change. Finally, the Consequences of
change are examined.

Sources Of Change
Domestic Factors of Change:
The sources of change are divided into domestic and international factors. Focus is
divided equally on each set of factors, although, depending on the case study, either
factor could be more influential than the other.

Robert D. Putnam has argued that domestic and international politics often affects
each other. The “two-level game”, as he labelled it, refers to how domestic politics
sometimes affect international politics and vice-versa. 66 Joe D. Hagan also argues that
government leaders have to deal with pressures and constraints from domestic
political sources, as well as the international political system. 67 Political leaders will
aim to satisfy their domestic audience as much as possible with an eye to the next
election. 68 Domestic factors must therefore be taken into consideration when foreign
policy change is studied, so any study on foreign policy is not complete without a
comprehensive examination of the domestic factors, as well as international factors. 69

Domestic factors play an important part in influencing and pressuring governments
into a possible foreign policy change. Key decision-makers need to take domestic
factors into account when deciding on foreign policies, since they count on public
support in order to stay in power. Public opinion and media can have a considerable
impact on government policies if dissent or approval is powerful enough; other
political parties, interest-groups and such actors need also be taken into account for
the government to carry out its foreign policies. 70
66
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Five domestic sources of change are identified below; The Bureaucracy, Public
Opinion, The Media, Interest Groups, and Political Parties. By categorising these in
this way, it helps a researcher measure the influence of these different sources of
change, as well as making it easier on the reader in understanding the different
domestic sources of change.

The Bureaucracy: The bureaucracy is traditionally viewed as a source of stability
rather than as a source of change. Bureaucratic inertia and standard operating
procedures has been identified as obstacles needed to be overcome in order to produce
a foreign policy change. 71 Morton Halperin first argues that “One of the truisms of
bureaucracy is that it resists change”. 72 He goes on to claim:

The bureaucratic system is basically inert; it moves only when pushed hard and
persistently. The majority of bureaucrats prefer to maintain the status quo, and only a
small group is, at any one time, advocating change. Time and resources of any one
person in the bureaucracy are limited, and when a participant does desire change, he
must choose carefully the issues on which to do battle. 73

However, as Hermann states in his model, if a particular group within the bureaucracy
is situated in a position wherein they have the ear of the minister, or other highranking officials, they can be effective in arguing for a change in policy. Kalevi J.
Holsti’s study on foreign policy change investigated eight case studies and showed
that in only one case did the bureaucracy play an important role in advocating a
change in policy. This, however, proves that the bureaucracy can have an important
role in foreign policy change. For the purposes of this study, my model draws
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inspiration from Hermann and Holsti and has therefore included “the bureaucracy” as
a source of change. 74

Public Opinion: This category is an important source of change since governments
require support from enough voters in order to pursue their policies and to ensure reelection. As Anthonsen has shown, the public does consider foreign policy when
making up its mind of which party to vote for. 75 If the public becomes dissatisfied
enough with a certain policy conducted by the government, for example expressed
through demonstrations, pressure is put on the decision-makers. A government needs
to take public opinion into account when framing its foreign policy, and to ensure that
opposition is limited as much as possible. Indeed, several studies have shown that
governments certainly act on the opinion of the public in foreign policy, showing the
influence of public opinion. 76

Foreign policy-issues generally suffer from low visibility in media, which contributes
to inactivity in terms of public opinion. The complexity of foreign policy also tends to
keep foreign policy out of public interest, unless it is an event of crisis proportions,
such as the September-11 terrorist attacks, the Bali-bombing, or the Iraq-war. In such
events, public opinion can quickly shift and respond to information provided by the
government or by the media. 77

Public opinion is also important in providing support for interest groups and other
civil society actors in society in their efforts to influence government decisions.
Public opinion is therefore not only a source for the government to draw support for
its policies from; it is also a source of change in itself and for other actors trying to
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achieve a foreign policy change. 78 It has therefore been included in this theoretical
model.

The Media: Arguments have been made of the media as being controlled and/or
steered by the government and thus becoming a promoter of government policy. It is
said that through this control of information they help the government to keep the
public opinion on its side and in support of its foreign policies. 79 However, as Abbas
Malek and Krista E. Wiegand point out, several studies have been done showing the
influence that media can have on foreign policy. Media is the link between the public
and the government, which means that the policy-makers need to take media into
consideration if they want to successfully implement its policies.80

Media serves several purposes in regards to influencing foreign policy change. It can
be an important factor in setting the agenda; in forming public opinion and it provides
information from the government to the public.81 Yet media can also be an
investigator, providing new information for the government and/or the public, which
can cause a change in foreign policy. It can also act as a forum for different actors to
legitimise or pressurise a certain policy. Thus media can play an important influence
in policy issues by endorsing or condemning a certain policy, thereby putting
additional pressure on a government in its decision-making and influencing public
opinion, which in turn can put pressure on the government. Media has therefore been
included as a separate source of change in this model.

Interest Groups: An interest group is defined here, by following Robert H. Salisbury,
as quoted in John W. Dietrich, as: “an organised association which engages in activity
relative to government decisions”. Dietrich continues: “it includes groups formed by
78
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citizens, organised around a particular issue, as well as professional lobbies,
businesses, and public interest law firms”. 82

The influence of interest groups has increased in recent decades. By generally
focusing on single issues that attract attention from voters, which in turn causes
political decision-makers to take them seriously since the alternative could possibly
mean a loss of voters, they are in a position to influence policy-makers. 83

Access and activity are important for interest groups in order to influence policies,
although access and activity are not a guarantee in itself for successful influence.
Moreover, increasing globalisation further enhances the leverage and influence of
interest groups with single issues being linked through activists around the world,
often highlighted, and sometimes supported, by the media. 84 For these reasons,
interest groups have been included as a source of change.

Political Parties: Finally, this category refers to political parties in parliament, mainly
political parties whose support the government needs in order to govern, or in order to
continue/change a specific policy. If the government encounters resistance on a
certain foreign policy, it is likely that it will have to negotiate a compromise or make
adjustments to the policy, in order to get it through parliament, or to have enough
backing to go through with it if parliamentary approval is not needed. 85 Opposition
parties are also included in this category as an influential factor in shaping policy, in
terms of mobilising public opinion on particularly charged issues. If the opposition
has enough clout and/or is vocal enough, it may add significant pressure on the
government to change policy. 86 Furthermore, pressure from the electorate, overall
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public opinion, or the media can generate pressure on members of Parliament that
may lead them to put pressure on the government on a policy issue. Interaction
between political parties and one, or more, of the domestic actors, such as public
opinion, the media and interest-groups may build pressure for a policy change.

International Factors of Change
Today’s international politics is a complex system consisting of states, institutions
and non-state actors, all interacting with each other on different levels. Important
factors to consider when studying the affects of the international factors on foreign
policy decision-making, apart from the actors, are power, norms, and institutions.

According to realists, the international political system essentially consists of a
struggle for the distribution of power. Military power is seen as the main and most
important asset in attaining an edge over other states. Suspicion of other states’ and
your own survival are the main features of states mindsets. There are no authorities
above states that can dictate how states should behave and states are the main actors
in the international arena. 87 Realist theory can explain many situations and events in
today’s politics, usually after the event, however, it still fails to take into account the
increased role played by international institutions and non-state actors.

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye made the argument that realist theory fails to
recognise the importance of other factors that need to be considered in order to
understand all aspects of today’s politics. Keohane and Nye constructed their own
counter-theory, labelled Complex Interdependence, which they argue accounts for
many aspects of international politics that realist theory cannot explain sufficiently. In
their view, international politics is sometimes best explained using realist theory and
at other times better explained by applying complex interdependence. 88
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Keohane and Nye argue that although states are often the main actors, other actors are
also important nowadays. Institutions and non-state actors play a major role, exerting
influence on states, and provide multiple channels for the different actors to use to
achieve their aims. Transnational corporations and other non-state actors, such as
terrorist networks and non-governmental organisations can also influence
international affairs. Security issues are not always on the top of the agenda, as
realists argue, and military force is not always chosen as the best way of achieving a
state’s aims. 89 Therefore, Complex Interdependence can often be used as an
explanatory tool, rather than realism.

In this study, realism and Complex Interdependence will be used in order to explain
the international factors influencing foreign policy decision-making. It will enhance
the explanatory capability of the influences of the international political system on a
government’s decision-making, regarding foreign policy, and specifically on how it
contributes to foreign policy change. The international factors have been divided into
four sources of change; Global factors, Regional factors, Bilateral relations, and Nonstate actors.

The norms accepted by the major actors in the international political system will also
be taken into account. Accepted goals of many or most international actors such as the
expansion of democracy, human rights, non-intervention into sovereign states (with
the occasional exception of humanitarian intervention), and self-determination can
impact on the state’s foreign policy, particularly if pursued by the government in
question, or by actors aiming to influence the government’s foreign policy direction.
Norms will therefore be taken into account when examining the international factors
in this study. Similarly, global and regional policies pursued by great powers will also
have an effect on a state’s ability and willingness to act, such as “the war on terror”,
which had has a profound effect on choices for a majority of states in the international
political system today. 90 Finally, international institutions will be divided up into two
categories. International institutions where states are members will be included in the
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Global and Regional categories, while international institutions comprised by nongovernmental actors will be included in the Non-state category.

Global Factors: This category focuses on changes in the international political system
that has a global impact and that has an effect on a state’s foreign policy-making. The
end of the Cold War would provide an example of a change that fits into this
category. An event or actor in this category could affect the state in question’s policymaking, and may or may not lead to a change in foreign policy, for example, the
September 11 attacks led to the US-led “War on Terror”, which now influences the
behaviour of many states in a variety of ways in today’s world politics.91 International
institutions and accepted norms may also have a large impact on a state’s foreign
policy. The influence of an event, a shift in the balance of the international political
system, a shift in international norms (official or merely accepted), or international
institutions (consisting of states), can all have an impact on a state’s foreign policy.
Global factors have therefore been included as a category in the International factors.

Regional Factors: An event or actors may also have a regional rather than global
impact. An example of this could be the Bali-bombing in October 2002, which
arguably had a profound effect for the area including Southeast Asia, Australia and
the South Pacific. An event in this particular category would affect the regional
political system, rather than the whole international political system. A state’s policymaker within this region would be affected, and it may or may not lead to a foreign
policy change.

Regional actors, such as regional institutions (consisting of states), may have a
substantial impact on a state’s foreign policy-formation. Also, accepted norms within
a particular region may also have to be taken into consideration when a government
outlines its foreign policy. Different regions can have different standards of norms,
stemming from cultural, historical and traditional values. The regional balance of
power must also be considered when conducting a study like this. The power and
capabilities of regional actors will affect regional politics, particularly when a state is
considering its foreign policy actions. It is clear that a global factor-category alone
91
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will not suffice. For all the above mentioned reasons, a Regional factor-category has
been included in this theoretical model.

Bilateral Relations: This category will take into account the government’s bilateral
relations to other actors. These will mainly be states but can also include global or
regional institutions or organisations. This category will only be affected when
contacts or influence is conducted between the state investigated and one other actor.
Actors, such as states and international institutions, can influence another state by
using leverage, such as an alliance, trade, or through military and economic threats, to
pressure them into adopting an adjusted or different foreign policy. Different levels of
incentives and/or threats will have different effects on the policy-makers, but it will
have an effect nonetheless. Bilateral relations are therefore important as a source of
change in this model.

Non-state Actors: Finally, the growing influence of transnational actors in
international politics has been recognised. Transnational actors, such as criminal
networks, terrorist networks, corporations, human rights organisations etc, all play a
role which can shape and influence a state’s foreign policy. Although states are
recognised as the primary actors in the international political system, non-state actors
cannot be ignored in a study of foreign policy change, since they can carry with them
significant influence and power on certain issues. A decision-maker may have to take
the influence of non-state actors into account when deciding on a foreign policy. It
has therefore been included as a category in this model.

Finally, it should be noted that each factor in the domestic or international category
may influence or pressure the government towards a foreign policy change. However,
it is often the interaction and interplay between domestic factors, between domestic
and international factors, or between international factors, that together can sum up
enough pressure or influence to convince the decision-makers to change policy.
Decision-makers can ignore one factor, or even several, but if they interact the
pressure can be too great on the decision-makers and a change is perceived necessary.
The next section deals with the importance of the perceptions of decision-makers on
the sources of change and on the window of opportunity.
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The Window Of Opportunity and Key Decision-Makers
The next step in the model is labelled “Window of Opportunity” and is inspired by
Gustavsson’s second step in his foreign policy change-model and by John Kingdon’s
discussion on “policy windows”, which Gustavsson discusses in his thesis as well. 92
Sources of change need to pass through this step in order to have an impact on the
decision-making process, and ultimately, to cause a foreign policy change. The main
actors in this step are the key decision-makers and their perceptions.

In this category the key decision-makers perceive a policy window, either through
pressure or influence from the sources of change, or realise that there is an
opportunity to push a policy agenda through. The policy process can in other words
begin either with the sources of change or with the key decision-maker himself.
Perception is therefore a key term in this category and needs to be defined, and this
study will adhere to Richard Herrmann’s definition of perception “as a concept that
describes the construction of reality in which an individual makes foreign-policy
decisions”. 93 A key decision-maker’s perception can be affected by a number of
personal characteristics. Margaret G. Hermann has listed six different types of
personal characteristics of a political leader, 94 which are of interest for this study and
model:
•

Beliefs refer to a leader’s basic view of the world and how it works. This in
turn will contribute heavily to how the leader sees his or her environment and
the strategies used in achieving his goals.

•

Motives refer to the underlying reasons for a leader’s actions. Need for power,
need for affiliation, and need for approval are the most common motives.
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•

Decision style looks at how a leader is making his decisions. What is this
particular leader’s preferred style in reaching a decision? Examples of this
could be his preference for certain levels of risk, and how open he is to new
information.

•

Interpersonal style refers to how a leader interacts with other policy makers.
What type of behaviour does he display in these interactions? Hermann points
out two characteristics that stand out, that is, paranoia and Machiavellianism.
Paranoia is defined as “excessive suspiciousness” and Machiavellianism as
“unscrupulous, manipulative behavior”. 95

•

Training in foreign affairs refers to the amount of experience the leader has in
regards to foreign policy. This will affect how the political leader will act and
the strategies he will undertake. The more experience, the more likely a leader
is to be actively involved in the decision-making process.

•

Interest in foreign affairs refers to how much the leader will take part in the
foreign policy making process, which is based on how interested he is in it in
the first place. A leader, who is more interested in domestic policies, is likely
to delegate foreign policy matters to other officials, such as the foreign
minister. If, on the other hand, a leader has a lot of interest in foreign affairs, it
is likely that the leader will be much more on top of issues, with a more direct
role in the process, demanding to be consulted and kept up to date with
developments in foreign policy matters. The leader will then take charge of the
foreign policy making and lead out of his office rather than letting others deal
with the foreign policy issues. 96 This may, in turn, affect the way a leader
perceives structural conditions.

In order to achieve/cause a foreign policy change, structural conditions need to be
acted on by the key decision-makers. Structural conditions cannot in themselves
change a foreign policy, rather, it needs to be perceived and acted upon by key
decision-makers. As Harold and Margaret Sprout argued in an early study from 1961,
“what matters is how the policy-maker imagines the milieu to be, not actually how it
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is”. However, they also acknowledged that when it comes to the actual
implementation and success of the policy, “what matters is how things are, not how
the policy-maker imagines them to be”. 97 Here we are concerned with the first
statement; that is how the decision to change policy is taken in the first place.

In order to constrain or enable a policy change, it needs to be part of the decisionmaker’s thought process. The way matters are interpreted and acted upon then
depends on the perceptions and intentions of the decision-maker. 98 Crucial to this
thought-process is how the decision-maker perceives the costs and benefits of the
current policies in relation to changes in the structural conditions. If the current policy
is perceived as too costly, it may lead the decision-maker to work towards changing
policy. The same is true if the decision-maker sees large enough benefits in changing
the current policy. 99

An integral part of this step in the model is the “policy window”. This is when an
opportunity presents itself and a key decision-maker can push an agenda through.
John Kingdon compares a policy window to a space launch:

The target planets are in proper alignment, but will not stay that way for long. Thus the
launch must take place when the window is open, lest the opportunity slip away. Once
lost, the opportunity may recur, but in the interim, astronauts and space engineers must
wait until the window reopens. 100

This analogy can be compared to the political processes. Timing is of the essence
here. Kingdon point to several reasons to why a policy window may close; 1, the
relevant members may deem that they have acted or decided on the issue and it is
taken off the agenda. 2, the issue may have been acted upon but has failed to produce
results and the attention is turned to other issues on the political agenda. 3, The event
that caused the window to open, such as a particular crisis or event, may be short
lived. Failure to act on it fast enough may lead to a missed opportunity when people’s
excitement fades away. 4, a change may have been caused by a particular person, or
97
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person, and this person’s departure may cause the window to close again, as the
replacement may have a different view on the matter. 5, there may not be another
viable option and so the window closes. 101

It is vital to this study that the key decision-makers perceive the change: the window
of opportunity must be seized and acted upon. If decision makers do not perceive the
possible benefits of policy change, and do not act on it, there will be no decisionmaking process, and subsequently no foreign policy change. Gustavsson touches on
this in his study when he identifies the importance of the timing of a decision. 102 In
this study however, more emphasis is put on this key aspect of the decision-making
process and whether the decision-makers perceive it as window of opportunity or not.
In earlier theoretical models 103 it is assumed that a change in structural conditions is
necessary to cause a foreign policy change. A decision-maker reacts to the sources of
change, which leads to a decision-making process, which in turn leads to a foreign
policy change. However, a key decision-maker can have a political agenda, which he
wants to push through. He may have tried to have done this already but failed, and is
now biding his time. He patiently works toward achieving his agenda, by trying to
change structural conditions himself, building support among the sources of change
by creating an image of a problem in the policy, thereby justifying a policy change.
Basically, he is doing the groundwork, so that when the “Window of Opportunity”
presents itself, he seises it and acts on it. The decision-making process begins, which
could lead to his desired policy change.

John Kingdon discusses how windows open and close constantly and how interested
parties need to seize the opportunity in order to push their agenda through. Timing is
essential, as is the ability to get in on the government’s agenda, in order to achieve
success. However, Kingdon portrays policy entrepreneurs who constantly wait for
their opportunity to push their agenda on to the government, but he does not mention
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the government or the head of government specifically, in his discussion. 104 A
President, Prime Minister, or any kind of head of government, would be in a much
better position to push his own agenda, particularly in getting it on the government’s
agenda, constructing consensus within the government and realising his goal.
Therefore, a leader of a country may well be able to, to an extent, create his own
“Window of Opportunity”, using his position and the resources available to him.

The process can therefore begin in the “Window of Opportunity”-step and go in the
opposite direction, towards the sources of change. There are, in other words, two
different scenarios that can lead to a foreign policy change presented in this model.
Scenario 1 begins with a change in structural conditions, which leads to influence or
pressure coming from the sources of change. This, in turn, is perceived by a key
decision-maker which starts the decision-making process, which can ultimately lead
to a foreign policy change. Scenario 2 differs in that it begins with a key decisionmaker having an own agenda, patiently waiting for the right opportunity which can
present itself through changes in structural conditions. This window of opportunity is
then perceived and acted upon by the decision-maker, using it to push through his
agenda, ultimately leading to a foreign policy change.

The Decision-Making Process
This next step in the model is “the decision-making process”. Key decision-makers
work within established institutional structures to bring about a change in foreign
policy. 105 The sources of change interact with the key decision-makers within the
decision-making process, in order to bring about a foreign policy change.

There are several important parts in this process. Charles F. Hermann has identified
seven stages that, according to Hermann, need to be addressed for a policy change to
occur. They are:

1. Initial policy expectations;
2. External actor/environmental stimuli;
3. Recognition of discrepant information;
104
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4. Postulation of a connection between problem and policy;
5. Development of alternatives;
6. Building authoritative consensus for choice; and
7. Implementation of new policy. 106

In this thesis, Hermann’s seven stages in the decision-making process will be kept in
mind but they will not be followed strictly. There are several important aspects in his
seven proposed stages that need to be taken into account but to follow his stages
strictly, and ‘tick the boxes’, will only constrain the study. Certain flexibility will
benefit this research. His conception of the decision-making process also seems to
focus on a collective factor rather than on key decision-makers. This study will look
at the decision-making process as a whole but at the same time with a particular focus
on the key individual decision-makers.

Charles F. Hermann, Robert Billings and Robert Litchfield produced a paper on
sequential decision-making, that is, when decision-makers engage in a sequence of
decisions regarding the same policy-issue for a longer period of time. The focus of
their study is when leaders will continue the previous policy - despite information
which shows that the policy is not working - and when they decide to change the
policy. 107 Their paper is limited in its focus as in regards to this thesis, since its focus
is only on the decision-making process, and is not concerned with other external
factors. However, it is still relevant to the decision-making part of this model.

Finally, the decision-making process may lead to a foreign policy change. The next
step in the model is therefore a typology of change, that is, the amount of change that
has occurred.
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Typology Of Change
The Typology of Change presented here is inspired by Hermann and Kleistra &
Mayer’s typologies 108 , in that it basically agrees with Hermann’s idea of level of
change but it increases the number of levels of change to seven. It is sharpening the
definitions of how much has changed, compared to Hermann’s model, by adding
goals and instruments to further pinpoint the amount of change.

Stability: No change in policy.

Intensification/Reduction: A quantitative change in instruments used. For example,
to increase or decrease aid.

Refinement: A qualitative change in instruments used with a mixed pattern. Both old
and new instruments used. For example, technical assistance is now incorporated but
aid continues.

Reform: A qualitative change in instruments, where all, or a large majority of, old
instruments are replaced by new instruments.

Redirection: The goal(s) change but with a mixed pattern. New goals are pursued but
some of the old goals remain.

Reorientation: All or almost all old goals are replaced or disappear altogether.

Restructuring: A change in many issue areas, which involve and affect many actors.
For example, for a state to go from neutrality to joining a military alliance.

These seven levels of change allow the researcher to more accurately define the
amount of change and what exactly has changed by looking at goals set and
instruments used.

108

C. F. Hermann, Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy and Y.
Kleistra & I. Mayer, ‘Stability and Flux in Foreign Affairs: Modelling Policy and Organisational
Change’

52

Feedback

The Consequences of Change
It is important to investigate the consequences of the policy change, as the impact of
the change can have important long-term implications. Furthermore, the feedback
resulting from the effects of a policy change may lead to a new round of policy
change, depending on the consequences of the previous change. The main aim here is
to investigate what the immediate consequences were for the actors affected by the
policy change. Which actors were affected and did the relationship improve or
deteriorate as a result of the policy change, or did it have no impact at all? Did the
policy have its intended effect?

Naturally, it is reasonable to set a time limit on how long after the policy change the
consequences will be investigated. As a rough yardstick six months is often enough
time for diplomatic tension to have eased but the period of investigation is up to the
discretion of the researcher. The introduced Foreign Policy Change model can be seen
below in Figure 1.
No Policy change
Sources of Change
Domestic:
The bureaucracy
Public opinion
The media
Interest groups
Political parties
Key Decision
Makers

International:
Global factors
Regional factors
Bilateral relations
Non-state actors

The
Window of
Opportunity

Policy Change

Typology of change:
Stability
Intensification/Reduction
Refinement
Reform
Redirection
Reorientation
Restructuring

Figure 2.1: The new model of foreign policy change
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The arrows within the Sources of Change box indicates that interactions between
various domestic factors affect each other, as do interactions between international
factors. Further, the domestic and international factors also have the capacity to
influence and interact on each other, for example, global events such as September 11
changed the way regional security was perceived and this induced changes within
national states in terms of debates about terrorism and security. These arrows are thus
not causal as there is no definite reaction by policy makers to domestic or
international events. They are rather probabilistic in nature because ultimately foreign
policy change relies on the key decision-makers perceiving and acting on a window of
opportunity, i.e. they must believe that change will be beneficial before change
occurs.

The thick arrow from the key decision-makers back to the Sources of Change box
indicates the importance placed on their perception of changes occurring among the
different factors in the sources of change. If there is sufficient recognition this can
then translate into a window of opportunity as perceived by foreign policy makers,
although this is not inevitable, merely indicative. The thick arrow also indicates that
through manipulation of information key decision makers can attempt to construct a
rationale for foreign policy change, i.e. they actively seek to bring change through
creating a sense of crisis that demands action. In this case, the heightened perception
of a need for change then forces open a window of opportunity, which the key
decision-makers then act upon.

The arrows from the key decision makers to the boxes of no policy change and policy
change are again probabilistic and depend upon the key decision makers believing
that change is either too costly, in which no change will occur, or that it is beneficial,
which enables change to occur. Once change occurs the typology of change classifies
the relative importance of the decisions taken with respect to previous policy (i.e. a
significant departure, a complete volta face, or simply minor modification to existing
policy).
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Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the foreign policy change area of research, the research
conducted up to today, and the relevant factors involved. It has proposed a new model
of foreign policy change which will be applied in two case studies. The next chapter
provides a background to Australian foreign policy for the case studies in chapters 47. It will investigate patters in Australian foreign policy and discuss the main actors in
Australian foreign policy decision-making.
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Chapter 3: Australian Foreign Policy
Introduction
This chapter will give a brief overview of Australian foreign policy to provide a base
to understand the policy decision-making process and its outcomes. The actors and
factors in the process will be discussed in order to delve deeper into what it is that
defines, shapes and determines Australian foreign policy. It argues that there are
certain constants in Australian foreign policy, especially the perceived need of a
powerful ally or protector. Furthermore, Australian governments consciously adopt a
combination of neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches in their attempts to achieve
their aims. Also, when examining Australian foreign policy, it is clear that domestic
factors are often as important, if not more important, than pressures from the
international realm. This chapter argues that commentators on foreign policy have
understated the role of domestic factors in affecting foreign policy change, and
especially neglected the interaction between these factors. Domestic factors are thus
particularly important to investigate in order to understand Australian foreign policy
change, which has to date been rare, but all therefore all the more important as it tends
to have a long-term and powerful impact on Australia’s international relations, and,
given current security and economic challenges, may be less rare in the future.

Background
For the first 40 years of the Commonwealth Australian foreign policy was mostly
conducted by Britain. It was only in 1942 that Australia finally ratified the Statute of
Westminster, which meant that it began to have a truly independent foreign policy. 1
The reason the shift took place at this time is obvious, considering the circumstances.
Britain was the protector of Australia and in a way seen as “part of the empire” but
with the fall of Singapore in February 1942 it became painfully clear that it would not
be able to defend Australia from the Japanese threat. It was time for Australia to take
charge of its foreign policy and seek a new protector. 2

1
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The choice of protector was made clear immediately. The US led the defence against
Japanese aggression, and indirectly Australia’s defence as well. 3 After WWII it was
natural for Australia to look to the US as its powerful ally and the alliance was
cemented with the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS)
of 1951 and with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954.
However, it should be noted that the shift did not take place over night; rather Britain
remained a close ally until the late 1960s when Britain began to withdraw from its
global position. Australia supported the British stance in the Suez-crisis in 1956 and
sent troops in support of the British to put down a communist uprising in Malaya in
1955, and again in 1965 in the Konfrontasi (“confrontation”) between Indonesia and
Malaysia. 4

The need for a protector was grounded in Australia’s place in the world. It had a huge
continent to defend, with only a small population. Australia would therefore not be
able to defend itself and needed a strong ally to help it in times of crises. During the
Cold War the perceived threat against Australia was communism, as according to the
“Domino-theory” one state after the other was in danger of falling to communism
which could then eventually threaten Australia. 5 This helps to explain the “Forward
Defence”-thinking at the time. According to this doctrine, Australia would send
troops to conflicts in other countries to help its ally, i.e. the US, as “insurance” that
Australia would receive assistance when or if the need arose. 6 It sent troops to Korea
in the early 1950s and to Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s, in line with this
thinking. 7 Furthermore, the Australian government actively pushed for American and
Australian involvement even before a request from the South Vietnamese had been
issued, which further indicates how deeply they viewed the importance of forward
defence. 8 The Forward Defence-thinking began to recede when President Nixon
announced the Guam-doctrine in 1969, essentially declaring that US allies in the
3

D. Lee, Australia and the World in the Twentieth Century, p. 71
Gary Smith & David Cox & Scott Burchill, Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian
Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, pp. 54-57 and D. Lee, Australia and the
World in the Twentieth Century, Circa, pp. 107 and 158
5
G. Smith & D. Cox & S. Burchill, Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign
Policy, 1996, pp. 61-62
6
Peter Edwards, ‘History and foreign policy’, in Australian Foreign Policy: Into the new millennium,
ed. F. A. Mediansky, Macmillan Education Australia Pty Ltd. Melbourne, 1997, p. 7
7
G. Smith & D. Cox & S. Burchill, Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign
Policy, ed. F. A. Mediansky, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, p. 57
8
D. Lee, Australia and the World in the Twentieth Century, p. 168
4

57

Asia-Pacific from now on had to depend less on US help and take a greater
responsibility themselves. 9

This required a re-think for Australian policy-makers. Prime Minister Gough Whitlam
began the transition by establishing diplomatic relations with communist China and
East Germany, 10 arguing that there were not any direct threats to Australia at this time
apart from the nuclear threat, in which case the US would come to its aid anyway. 11
However, it was not until 1976 that the first official report was released stating a new
focus on continental defence rather than forward defence. 12 Indeed, it was another 10
years later, in 1986, that the Dibb-report again emphasised the need for a shift to
continental defence. Paul Dibb similarly argued that there were no immediate threats
to Australia and attention should be directed to the defence of Australia rather than
sending troops to foreign lands. 13 Still, despite the shift in thinking, Australia still sent
troops in support of the American led UN-operation to expel Iraq from Kuwait in
1990-91. 14 This can be seen as on one hand part of its commitment to the US-alliance
but also in accordance to the Labor-government’s platform to work closely with
multilateral institutions such as the UN.

The 1980s and 1990s was otherwise characterised for the Hawke and Keatinggovernments by how to respond to the forces of globalisation. The Hawkegovernment began the task of reshaping the Australian economy in order to keep up
with and benefit from the new situation. Protectionist policies were altered and the
economy shifted towards a more open economy and free trade. The Howardgovernment continued this trend of liberalising the Australian economy. 15 As Gyngell
and Wesley have stated, globalisation has meant that the international arena and
domestic politics are now closer than ever and they are now affecting each other in
9
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more ways than was previously the case. 16 Australian governments therefore have to
be increasingly ready to adjust and change foreign policies, since events globally now
may have stronger effects on Australia itself.

Foreign policy under the Howard-government shifted back to a Forward Defence
approach. As the Defence White Paper in 2000 mentions, the third priority for the
ADF “is supporting Australia’s wider interests and objectives by being able to
contribute effectively to international coalitions of forces to meet crises beyond our
immediate neighbourhood.” 17 This can be seen as an example of the new attitude
which was further underlined in the 2003 Defence Update, addressing the new focus
on the threats from WMD’s, rogue states and terrorism, stating:

The Australian Government may need to consider future requests to support coalition
military operations to prevent the proliferation of WMD, including to rogue states or
terrorists, where peaceful efforts have failed. 18

Arguing for a strengthening of ties with the US meant that Australia sent troops to
Afghanistan and Iraq in support of the US-led operations there. A more interventionist
attitude was taken from 2003 to its immediate neighbourhood with the intervention in
the Solomon Islands as the prime example. Before that, though, Australia had led the
intervention under the UN flag in to East Timor in 1999. Military intervention had
become a useful tool for the Howard-government. 19 Generally, a more bilateral
approach was pursued under Howard and an overall stated pragmatic manner in which
to conduct foreign policy. 20

16

Allan Gyngell & Michael Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, Cambridge University Press,
Melbourne, Second edition, 2007, p. 296
17
Department of Defence, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, White Paper, Commonwealth of
Australia, 2000, p. xi
18
Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003, Commonwealth of
Australia, 2003, p. 16
19
S. Firth, Australia in International Politics, An introduction to Australian foreign policy, pp. 162-65
20
Greg Sheridan, ‘All the World’s a Stage’, in The Howard Factor: A Decade that Changed the
Nation, ed. N. Cater, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 2006, p. 150

59

Labor/Non-Labor Ideology
Australian foreign policy can be understood as a mix of neo-liberal and neo-realist
approaches throughout its history. 21 Successive governments have pursued national
interests using a blend of the two theories.

Neo-realists emphasise the state’s need for security in an anarchic world and its
constant struggle for power in order to ensure its survival in this hostile international
arena. “Trust no one” is the catchphrase for a neo-realist, as states cannot be trusted
not to cheat to obtain their own interests; self-help is therefore the required means by
which to achieve security and survival. 22 They acknowledge the possibilities for
cooperation but only when it is in the self-interest of the state. Institutions for
example, are set up to further the goal(s) of a state and by participating in regimes
states look towards relative rather than absolute gains. 23 Alliances likewise exist for
the mutual benefit of the participating states. For the great powers it serves to increase
the balance of power to their favour and for smaller (and middle power) states it
ensures protection against stronger, threatening states. 24

Neo-liberal institutionalists on the other hand emphasises the importance of
international institutions and multilateral approaches, arguing that they increase
cooperation, which in turn leads to increased peace and stability. Neo-liberal
institutionalists accept that the international arena is anarchic but see greater
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possibilities for states to cooperate in a friendly and positive atmosphere. 25 Contrary
to neo-realists, neo-liberal institutionalists “assume that states focus primarily on their
individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains of others”. 26 The different
strategies adopted by Labor-governments and Coalition-governments will now be
investigated and then discussed in relation to the two theoretical strands. Australia’s
Middle power status serves as a good example to show the different approaches taken
by Australian governments. The Foreign Minister in the Hawke and Keatinggovernments (1988-96) Gareth Evans described Australia in the following manner:
“Australia is a middle power. We are manifestly not a great or even major power; nor,
however, are we small or insignificant.” 27 Traditionally the “middle power”-concept
has been linked most closely with the ALP but it has featured under Coalitiongovernments as well. Gareth Evans points to “coalition-building with ‘like-minded’
countries” as the main feature of middle power diplomacy. 28 This multilateral
approach fits in well with Labor’s three pillar foreign policy platform of priorities: 29

1. The US-alliance
2. Australia’s UN-membership
3. The relationship with Asia

All post World War II Labor-governments have actively pursued the first two of these
three pillars, and since the 1970s all three. H.V. Evatt, the Minister for External
Affairs was an important player in establishing the United Nations. 30 The Whitlamgovernment moved closer to Asia by establishing diplomatic relations with China 31
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and indirectly by formally abolishing the White Australia policy.32 The Hawke- and
Keating-governments likewise took a multilateral line and sought closer relationship
with Asia. The Cairns Group was established to put pressure on the US and the
European Union (EU) to lower their trade subsidies; Australia played a pivotal role in
setting up APEC together with Japan as a multilateral trade organisation pursuing free
trade arrangements in the Asia-Pacific; and its significant role in promoting and
participating in the Cambodian peace talks and process serve as illustrative examples
of this. Gareth Evans played an important role here as the Foreign Affairs Minister
pursuing Middle power strategies, such as building coalitions, focusing on specific
issues where Australia could have an influence, and ensuring an activist Australian
stance in international politics. 33 Laurie Brereton as Shadow Foreign Affairs Minister
continued this tradition 34 and Kevin Rudd is now advocating a foreign policy based
on the same three pillars, with the signing of the Kyoto Protocol as part of this policy
platform on combating climate change 35 and the proposal of an Asia-Pacific
Community going along these lines. 36

However, as Carl Ungerer argues, the Middle Power approach is not exclusively
owned by the Labor party. Rather, Ungerer show how both sides of politics have
acted according to the Middle power principles, more or less, under different
governments but it is a question of emphasis. 37 Still, it is clear that post-war Labor
government emphasise multilateral approaches and a closer focus on Asia than
Coalition governments. When the Howard-government took power in 1996, it moved
away from the previous Labor-governments focus on multilateralism and instead put
32
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focus on bilateral relationships, particularly with the United States.38 This became
clear with the release of the 1997 White Paper on Foreign and Trade policy, which
outlined that foreign policy would now be conducted according to Australia’s national
interests and the best way to do this was through an emphasis on bilateral relationship,
albeit alongside “a selective approach to the multilateral agenda” and stating that
“Australia must be realistic about what multilateral institutions such as the United
Nations system can deliver.” 39 This approach was acted upon through a number of
bilateral economic and security agreements, such as the free trade agreements with
Thailand and Singapore in 2003 and with the United States in 2004. 40

In a further move away from the Middle Power concept, Foreign Minister Downer
declared Australia to be a ‘Pivotal power’, rather than a Middle power, although as
Ungerer points out, the Howard-government also responded to foreign policy
challenges through coalition-building with like-minded states. 41 Consider, for
example, the East Timor-intervention in 1999 (under UN flag) and the RAMSIintervention in 2003 (under the PIF), both conducted by gathering like-minded states
in coalitions rather than by going it alone, just as Evans has described the middle
power approach. This is further evidence of Ungerer’s argument that both sides of
politics use Middle power methods when needed.

The US-alliance in turn illustrates that both sides in Australian politics fundamentally
believe in the need for a protector against potential external threats, which essentially
is a neo-realist concept. The Howard government may have emphasised the alliance
more than Labor 42 but on a fundamental level, they both use a neo-realist approach
here. On the other hand, both sides employ multilateral approaches to achieve their
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aims. 43 The Labor Party may emphasise multilateralism more, and use it more than
the Howard-government, particularly in regards to the UN 44 , but as shown above,
both sides use neo-liberal approaches as well. The Howard-government pointed out in
the two DFAT White Papers that they supported the UN but reserved the right to act
without UN support if it was in Australia’s national interest, as stated in the 2003
Foreign and Trade White Paper:

But when the United Nations has not been able to respond, as in the case of Kosovo, it
has fallen to states with the capacity and the willingness to take action to preserve peace
and security. In deciding whether to participate in such coalitions, the Government will
be guided by whether an Australian role will advance Australia’s national security and
our global interests. 45

The clearest example of this approach is of course the invasion of Iraq in March 2003,
in which Australia took part, without UN backing.

Ultimately, Australian foreign policy is conducted through a mix of neo-realist and
neo-liberal underpinnings. In doing so, both sides exemplify a pragmatic approach in
their search for the best outcome for Australia – for the national interest.

Making Australian Foreign Policy
Australia has obvious limits in what it can do on the international arena and the
makers of foreign policy in Australia have to take in to account both international and
domestic factors. International restraints, international and domestic pressure, internal
and external events and influential domestic actors all play in to the decision-making
process and need to be analysed in order to understand why decisions are made.
Australia’s territorial, military, and economic size, as well as geographical position all
impact on what it can and cannot do. As Firth states, “Australia, for example, can do
little to enhance global security, while it may do much to enhance regional
security”. 46 This sums up Australia’s position in international politics. On the one
43
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hand, it is a state with little say in world politics but when it comes to its own
neighbourhood it is something of a superpower. Events with global implications will
therefore have a great impact on Australia’s capacity to act (or lack thereof), while it
can be extremely influential in regional affairs and act without as much constraint. In
contrast, Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley point to Australia being quite active in
specific areas, rather like the middle power-definition offered earlier by Evans.
According to them, there has been a sense that Australia “needs to shape or be
shaped”. 47

Stewart Firth provides a good overview of the aspects relevant to Australian foreign
policy. His approach in a theoretical sense is closer to a neo-liberal view than neorealism, or as he writes; “The theoretical assumptions…are closest to those of
scholars working in the field of international political economy from a liberal, though
critical, perspective”. 48 Keohane and Nye’s “Complex Interdependence” approach49
share similarities with Firth’s view on international politics and foreign policy.

Gyngell and Wesley “Making Australian Foreign Policy” also covers the relevant
areas affecting Australian foreign policy but they focus more on the bureaucratic
machinery than Firth. This focus provide a valuable insight to how important it is in
the day to day operation of foreign policy but leaves the reader with an impression of
the bureaucracy as perhaps more influential in foreign policy outcomes than is really
the case. 50 Tony Kevin refers to it as “complacent”, which accurately describes their
account of Australian foreign policy. 51 Both Firth and Gyngell & Wesley
acknowledges the importance of taking into account domestic factors in foreign
policy making in Australia. However, Gyngell and Wesley argue that domestic
influences are mostly “dormant, significant only in terms of their potential to be
aroused and to set parameters of foreign policy makers’ freedom of action” and
further stating that “for the most part, however, there is no significant change in the
relationship of foreign policy making to the domestic environment. This allows the
great bulk of foreign policy to be formulated and carried out beyond the attention of
47
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all but its practitioners”. 52 Firth agrees, stating that “the making of foreign policy is
far from being a democratic process if by ‘democratic’ we mean ‘determined by the
people’”, indicating that most of the foreign policy decisions are taken without
influence from the domestic environment.53

While these authors suggest some that domestic influences are limited in the
construction of foreign policy this thesis argues that domestic factors do in fact play a
more important role in foreign policy at times. This may be seen through an analysis
of the decision-making process in regards to the East Timor-intervention, where
public opinion, interest-groups and the media played an important part in forcing the
government to adopt a change that it had been resisting for many years. Similarly
without understanding the role of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in
its analysis of the problems in Solomon Islands, and its suggested approach to ‘fix’
the problem, one would not comprehend how DFAT was able to present such a
radical solution to government so quickly. Once again this suggests that domestic
factors — the bureaucracy, political parties, interest groups, the media and public
opinion — can be vital in understanding how foreign policy is created. A more
detailed description of the importance and interplay between different domestic
factors follows below.

Political parties in opposition have limited influence in directly influencing the
government’s foreign policy, however, they can play a role through the parliament
and statements and questions asked there. By highlighting a particular issue,
opposition parties can put pressure on the government by mobilising the media, public
opinion and interest groups. The Labor Party’s changed stance on East Timor in 1998
is an example of such pressure being brought on a sitting government.

Generally though, the parliament itself, and in extension the opposition parties, has
little influence on foreign policy. The government can go to war without the
parliament’s support and the parliamentary committee’s scrutiny does not have to
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bear consequences for government decisions. 54 Furthermore, as Firth states; “Tight
party discipline ensures that the Cabinet rather than parliament has power over
decisions”. 55 Its main power lies in its potential to rouse public and media attention to
specific issues.

The bureaucracy plays an important part in the Australian foreign policy process in
the daily management and implementation of the decisions made by the decisionmakers. 56 Gyngell and Wesley call it “the essential core of the foreign policy making
process in Australia”. 57 DFAT 58 is currently the most influential department within
the bureaucracy in relation to foreign policy. 59 The bureaucracy may influence
decision-makers by deciding which information to give the minister and to an extent
set the agenda. 60 However, a “strong” foreign minister may exercise strong control
over these potential influential areas. Despite the importance of the bureaucracy in the
daily life of foreign policy, both Firth and Gyngell & Wesley states that the real
power lies with the ministers. 61 The key decision-maker’s power has increased further
due to high-ranking officials now being appointed directly by the government itself,
and not necessarily coming from the bureaucracy, which has led to an increased
expectancy for them to adhere to the government line. This discourages bureaucratic
officials from offering imaginative policy proposals, in fear of upsetting their

54

The limited influence of parliamentary committee’s in Australia is highlighted in Capling and
Nossal’s study on Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. See Ann Capling & Kim Richard Nossal,
‘Parliament and the Democratization of Foreign Policy: The Case of Australia’s Joint Standing
Committee on Treaties’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, Issue 4, September 2003, p.
851
55
S. Firth, Australia in International Politics, An introduction to Australian foreign policy, p. 81, see
also A. Gyngell & M. Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, pp. 145-49
56
See for example, Russell Trood, ‘Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy’, in Australian Foreign
Policy: Into the new millennium, ed. F. A. Mediansky, Macmillan Education Australia Pty Ltd.
Melbourne, 1997
57
A. Gyngell & M. Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p. 58
58
What is today the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade originated in 1901 as Department of
External Affairs, which changed to External Affairs managed by Prime Minister’s Department in 1916,
and changed back to Department of External Affairs in 1921. It then changed name in 1970 to
Department of Foreign Affairs, and it was finally given its current name Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade in 1987. See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘History of the Department’,
http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/history.html [Accessed 23 March 2009]
59
R. Trood, ‘Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy’, p. 33
60
S. Firth, Australia in International Politics, An introduction to Australian foreign policy, p. 77
61
A. Gyngell & M. Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p. 58 and S. Firth, Australia in
International Politics, An introduction to Australian foreign policy, p. 76

67

superiors. 62 It is clear that the bureaucracy have limited opportunity to significantly
affect big foreign policy making decisions. However, the bureaucracy, as the
implementers of policy can still influence the process by pointing out aspects of
proposed policy that does not work. It can also exercise influence when asked by a
Minister to look into a particular issue and deliver policy proposals which can change
policy in a minor or even major way.

Interest groups can have an influence on the foreign policy process, although the
extents of influence vary. Gyngell and Wesley point to business as having “significant
input into Australian foreign policy” in the areas in which foreign policy could affect
trade and Australian business. 63 It is difficult to measure the extent of their influence
though. They may also serve to keep an issue of their interest alive and raise
awareness of it. In combination with public opinion and the media, it can have a
significant impact on the decision-makers. Furthermore, think tanks are another
source of influence in this category. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
is a good example of a think tank having a direct impact on the government’s thinking
when they proposed a framework for the RAMSI-intervention in 2003. 64

The media and public opinion can be a powerful force if combined. Policy makers
keep a close eye on what is reported in the media and are aware of its potential
impact. A “good story” can engage the public and lead to pressure being put on the
government to “do something about it”. 65 It needs to be acknowledged that for the
most part, the media and public opinion arguably remain uninterested in foreign
policy, unless it concerns warfare and external threats. 66 Smith estimates that only 510 % of the population keep close attention on foreign policy on as regular basis. 67
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Each of the above discussed domestic factors can have a limited influence on foreign
policy decision making. However, they are more powerful if they interact and
combine forces. The media and public opinion often influence each other. Interest
groups in turn can bring a particular issue to the media’s attention, which in turn can
invigorate the public. The bureaucracy is certainly aware of its potential influence and
so are the political parties in opposition. True, domestic factors may be silent on most
foreign policy issues, however, for major international issues the decision makers will
have to consider these factors views and may experience considerable pressure from
them.

Finally, the role of the key decision-makers, especially the prime minister and the
foreign minister, must be discussed. A considerable amount of academic literature has
shown the importance of individuals in leadership positions on decision-making. 68
From this research it is clear that a powerful individual can play a crucial role in
setting the direction of foreign policy and in convincing others to follow. In an
Australian context, Alison McPhail has shown the critical role John Howard played as
a leader in the East Timor-intervention and the decision to go to war in Iraq. 69
Australian prime ministers have involved themselves deeply into foreign policy and
have through their involvement exercised considerable influence over the decisionmaking process. Prominent prime ministers such as Robert Menzies and Gough
Whitlam come to mind – both for a period of time assuming both the prime
ministership and the foreign affairs ministership at the same time. 70
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By applying Margaret Hermann’s six personal characteristics – beliefs, motives,
decision style, interpersonal style, training in foreign affairs, and interest in foreign
affairs - discussed in the previous chapter, to Prime Minister John Howard and
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, a picture can be sketched of their personalities,
which can provide a foundation to understand their part in the two case studies.

Beliefs
John Howard has been ascribed a number of core beliefs that can be seen throughout
his prime ministership (March 1996-November 2007). He believes the US-alliance is
the most important relationship for Australia, that the previous Prime Minister Paul
Keating focussed too much on Asia, and that foreign policy should be conducted as
much as possible in agreement with public opinion, as well as in accordance with the
national character, values and identity. 71 Far from an idealist, he is also commonly
referred to as a pragmatic leader, someone who is more concerned about results rather
than big ideas and rhetoric. 72 He has continuously argued the advantages of
bilateralism over multilateralism to achieve results, for example on human rights in
Indonesia, reflecting his pragmatism. 73 This was clearly outlined early on in the
DFAT White Paper of 1997 as government policy as well. 74 The pragmatic belief
held by both Howard and Downer is further displayed in their willingness to build
“coalitions of the willing” when they believe action is necessary, as they did when
they argued that the UN had “completely failed to meet the world’s need over Iraq”. 75

71

G. Sheridan, ‘All the World’s a Stage’, p. 150, see also Paul Kelly, ‘How Howard Governs’, in (Ed.)
N. Cater, The Howard Factor: A Decade that Changed the Nation, Melbourne University Press,
Carlton, 2006, p. 4
72
Paul Kelly, ‘Re-thinking Australian Governance – The Howard Legacy’, Cunningham Lecture 2005,
Occasional Paper Series 4/2005, Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, Canberra, 2005, p. 2, G.
Sheridan, All the World’s a Stage, p. 150, see also Wayne Errington & Peter van Onselen, John
Winston Howard, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 2007, p. 402, and Mike Steketee, ’The Carrot
and the Stick’, in The Howard Factor: A Decade that Changed the Nation, ed. N. Cater, Melbourne
University Press, Carlton, 2006, p. 77, and Kim Murray, ‘John Howard’s policies: formed over a
lifetime, so why were we surprised?’ Paper given at The Howard Decade Conference, Canberra, 3
March 2006, p. 4
73
G. Sheridan, All the World’s a Stage, p. 150 and for Howard’s views on bilateralism and human
rights see John Howard, ‘Transcript of the Prime Minister The Hon John Howard MP The 1997 Sir
Robert Menzies Memorial Lecture ‘Australia and Britain; The Contemporary Partnership in a new
International Environment’’, 23 June 1997
74
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, In the National Interest, p. 53
75
John Howard, ‘Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon John Howard MP, Address to the Sydney
Institute, Intercontinental Hotel, Sydney’, 1 July 2003.

70

Downer claimed that “Iraq was a clear example of how outcomes are more important
than blind faith in principles of non-intervention, sovereignty and multilateralism”. 76

An important part of a leader’s beliefs is his “interpretation of his environment”
which will affect the choice of strategy. Margaret Hermann mentions nationalism and
the perceived “ability to control events” as examples in relation to this.77 Nationalism
has been used by Howard as a divisive strategy. Paul Kelly argues he has made “our
governance more nationalistic”. 78 Judith Brett states that “Howard has re-positioned
the Liberal Party as a party of popular nationalism”, showing how he used symbols
and values tied to Australian nationalism and culture to help him remain in power. 79
Carol Johnson in turn has shown how Howard has linked Australian identity and
values to its Anglo-celtic roots and how it had an impact on foreign policy decisions.
She claims that this perceived special connection to the US and Britain helps explain
Australia’s willingness to cooperate closely in the “War-on-Terror” and the invasions
of Afghanistan and Iraq. 80

Nationalism easily links to the threat of the “other”. Howard successfully linked these
two in regards to illegal immigration and the September-11 attacks. He then becomes
the “rescuer” in the words of Leonora Ritter, creating a “climate of fear”. Portraying
himself as the “protector” of the people allowed Howard to assume more control, and
to become a “true leader” of his people. 81

These actions fit in to James Walter’s “strong leader”-model. Walter argues that
events occurred at the perfect time for Howard, beginning with the Tampa-affair 82
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and September-11, allowing him to create this climate of fear by pointing to the threat
to Australia’s sovereignty and values. 83 As Walter has shown, the Tampa-affair was
painted as an assault on Australian sovereignty and the terrorist attacks on September
11 2001 further emphasised the threat from the “other”. In this climate Howard
stepped forward as “a crisis-leader who began to identify threats, articulate the need to
fight, institute divisions between ‘them’ and ‘us’ and rally ‘the troops’ well before
international events accentuated the negatives”. 84

Becoming the “strong leader” in the times of crisis allowed Howard to increase his
personal power in order to fight the challenges he thought faced Australia. Walter
shows how it fits in to Howard’s personal characteristic and belief of the need for him
to be the “strong leader”. His world-view acknowledges hostile actors that could
threaten Australia which need to be fought through strength, and which require
resolute action. The Tampa-affair and September-11 attacks fitted right in to
Howard’s world-view, as did the following October 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings
and perceived threat from Iraq. 85 It is no surprise given this that Howard turned bad
polls to victory in the election in October 2001. The world had finally arguably come
to fit Howard’s world-view.

Motives
The most common reasons for why a leader is doing what he is doing is the need for
power, affiliation, or approval, according to Margaret Hermann. 86 It would appear
that in Howard’s case the need for power was his main motive for his actions.

He immediately set out to take control over the bureaucracy by getting rid of six of
the departmental heads in 1996, instead installing his own preferred candidates. 87
Ever since then, Howard has politicised the bureaucracy and the focal point for power
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has instead become the government, specifically the Cabinet.88 Since Howard is
chairing the Cabinet, it grants him a certain level of power, allowing him to “set the
direction and tone of policy”. 89 This is particularly true in matters of national security
which is handled in the National Security Committee of Cabinet which was set up by
Howard himself.

The National Security Committee of Cabinet consists of six people that always attend
meetings

- the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Attorney-General, Defence

Minister, Treasurer, and the Deputy Prime Minister 90 – so a selected part of the wider
regular Cabinet. Its smaller form gives Howard even further control over defence and
security policy and allows him to dominate decision-making to a greater extent. No
wonder it has sometimes been described as “Howard’s pride and joy”. 91

The need for affiliation and the need for approval seems less of motivational factors
for Howard. The need for approval can be seen to an extent in his belief that foreign
policy should be conducted as much as possible in lieu with public opinion. 92
However, he clearly was not afraid of making decisions that went against public
opinion either, as with the Iraq-invasion in 2003, so the need for power arguably
appears to be a stronger motivational factor than the need for approval. 93

Decision Style
This section refers to the key decision-maker’s preferred methods of making
decisions. Howard preferred to make decisions at the Cabinet, or the National
Security Committee of Cabinet, through which he could exercise a higher degree of
control and influence over decision-making. 94 Weller argued that Cabinet was
“controlled” by Howard. Cabinet rarely displayed division and not much leaked from
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the Cabinet proceedings. 95 Paul Kelly describes it as “tight, secret and collective”. 96
This clearly was been Howard’s preferred process in terms of making decisions.
Although Howard has been described as “an unusually dominant leader” 97 , he
nevertheless consulted often with other ministers, sought advice and listened to what
they had to say. 98 He let his ministers “have their say” and they “may run their own
empires”. 99 He displayed openness to new information in this way; however, control
ultimately laid with the Prime Minister stemming from his influence over the Cabinet.

Part of a leader’s decision style is to what level he is willing to take a risk. Howard
was a pragmatic politician, willing to take a risk when he felt the need to do so.
Errington and van Onselen give the examples of the East Timor-intervention, the
Tampa-affair and the decision to go to war against Iraq in 2003. 100 So, Howard could
definitely take a risk if he considered the occasion worth it and when it fitted in to his
belief system. However, he was not a politician that constantly took risks. Instead he
bided his time, waiting for the right window of opportunity or was forced to act by
events. 101

Interpersonal Style
John Howard’s interpersonal style has been interpreted in different ways by different
sources. Several sources describe him as a leader who approached policy making with
a professional attitude, polite and he did not make decisions personal. He listened to
the different views before bringing it to a decision. 102 He was also attentive to his
MPs, spending time in contact with them, seeking views and opinions from his
ministers and offering guidance to less experienced MP’s, 103 which also served to
create a

formidable power bloc. The above description points to a leader who
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engineered a good relationship with his colleagues. The fact that he had the same
Treasurer and Foreign Minister throughout his government suggests a good working
relationship with his closest colleagues. However, the description also suggests a
politician that wanted to be in control by sounding out the said colleagues. Howard
has been described as a man with attention to detail and a man that wanted control of
his government’s actions. 104 This allowed him to steer policy-making to his preferred
direction, helping him to push his agenda through. This behaviour has also been
described as manipulative. Clive Moore argues that Howard is a “manipulative
politician” and Mungo MacCallum agrees with that assessment. 105

Training in Foreign Affairs
Howard and Downer’s background in foreign policy are very different. Howard did
not have a lot of experience in foreign policy, although Greg Sheridan argued that
Howard as a member of Malcolm Fraser’s cabinet as treasurer had participated in
foreign policy decision-making at the time. 106 How much Howard himself was
actually involved is unclear, though, but it is likely to have been limited. Errington
and van Onselen describe Howard’s first two terms as “inept in the extreme”,
referring to his governing in general, not just foreign policy. 107 Howard did not have
much experience in foreign policy and was criticised for performing poorly in this
area by many up until at least the Tampa-affair and the September-11 terrorist attacks
in Washington and New York in 2001. 108

These two events appear to have put Howard more as a driver in the centre of foreign
policy-making. Howard’s ability to learn as he went along can be seen as one reason
why Howard was now ready to take a more decisive role. 109 Foreign policy was
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initially mainly managed by Foreign Minister Downer, 110 but Howard gained
experience by learning from his mistakes made in regards to the East Timor-issue, the
“deputy-sheriff”-debate that followed, and his failure to move quickly to counter the
emergence of the overtly racist One Nation party and its founder Pauline Hanson. The
fact that Howard was in Washington on the day of the September-11 terrorist attacks
would have had a profound effect on him and with the “War-on-Terror” context
emerging, Howard took more control over foreign policy, mainly through the
National Security Committee of Cabinet, which has moved focus of from DFAT to
the government and in turn – Prime Minister Howard. 111 By 2003 Howard had taken
control over national security. Walter has argued that Howard gained from the
“securitisation agenda” that emerged with the Tampa-affair and the terrorist attacks
on Washington and New York, and further emphasised by the Bali bombing in
October 2002. He was now, in Walter’s words, “a crisis leader”, and identifying
threats within the “War-on-Terror”-framework. 112

Alexander Downer’s background is quite different from John Howard in regards to
foreign policy training. Downer spent years as a diplomat gaining first hand
experience of foreign policy in action. He worked for DFAT in different positions in
Europe 1976-1982 and he was also the Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs from
1995 until he became Foreign Affairs Minister in 1996. 113

According to Ricklefs, Downer mostly took care of foreign policy-issues himself in
the first years of the Howard-government. 114 As Howard became more experienced in
the area and national security took over the agenda more and more after 2001,
Howard and Downer developed a close relationship over foreign policy. Pearson
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described it as having “an unusual level of co-ordination between their offices”.115
Downer himself agreed:

I have a very close relationship with John Howard, as I think people know. We are in
constant contact with one another and I suppose we have always been close and I
suppose the last three or four years have drawn us extremely close as we have wrestled
with these enormous issues…we instinctively approach these issues in much the same
way. 116

Therefore, while Downer had foreign policy experience, Howard acquired his
knowledge of the workings of the international political environment mostly through
“on the job training” and only later came to play a larger role in creation of Australian
foreign policy.

Interest in Foreign Affairs
Clearly John Howard’s interest in foreign affairs seems to have increased over time.
Sheridan has pointed out that Howard has a genuine interest for military history and
defence policy. Nevertheless, Sheridan agrees that the he began poorly in the foreign
policy area as Prime Minister, even describing him as clumsy. 117 The interest may
have been there on some level but Downer was very much the main foreign policy
person in the early Howard-government. Howard’s interest may have increased with
the September-11 attacks, perhaps due to him being in Washington at the time of the
attacks, and perhaps due to his personality - as the “crisis leader”(see above) – and
him being ready to become the international statesman after five and half years in
government. The times also suited him better with the external threat of terrorism
suddenly topping the agenda. By his third term as Prime Minister (2001-2004),
Howard seemed to have finally found his place in the foreign policy arena. 118 He
became the actual leader of national security, having earlier taking control over the
decision-making process mainly through the National Security Committee of Cabinet
which gave him “a much stronger grip on the details of defence and security policy”.
This increasing participation in every day foreign policy-making began probably with
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the East Timor-crisis in 1999, when the NSC of Cabinet at times met on a daily basis
and some days even more than that. 119 By 2003, Barker says that Howard “seems to
exercise more assiduous and sustained day-to-day control over defence and foreign
policy decision-making than any of his peacetime predecessors”. 120 With crises
Howard’s interest increased and the “War-on-Terror” would have appealed to his
personality. It is quite a change however, going from being clumsy and leaving most
of the work to Downer, to taking an interest in the daily decision-making process.

It would appear that Alexander Downer had a great interest in foreign policy from
early on owing to his university studies in Britain and later his work as a diplomat in
Europe, both of which enabled him to acquire his knowledge of international
politics. 121 Due to his background, he reportedly considered himself being somewhat
of an expert in the area. 122 It was only natural then that Downer took the reins of
foreign policy early on in the Howard-government.

Australia in the Immediate Neighbourhood
Based on the above discussion it is clear that in the Australian foreign policy making
several actors and factors need to be investigated in order to fully appreciate and
understand how decisions are made. International restraints and domestic actors and
factors both play a role, as well as the key decision-makers, in shaping Australian
foreign policy.

Australia’s policies towards its immediate neighbourhood focus on two main areas –
Indonesia/East Timor and the South Pacific. These two strategic foci have been dealt
with in different ways. Relations with Indonesia have for the most part looked to
maintain a good and close bond with its giant neighbour to the North, while relations
with the island states in the South Pacific went from a “hands-off” approach after their
independence to a more direct interventionist policy, starting with the RAMSIintervention in 2003.
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Indonesia and East Timor
As James Cotton has stated, a peaceful and stable Indonesia is crucial for Australian
security from a realist point of view. 123 This line of thinking has dominated Australian
governments for decades and has had a crucial effect on Australia’s foreign policy in
its immediate neighbourhood.

Australia was the main supporter of Indonesia when it moved towards independence
after WW II and the relationship was initially cordial. 124 However, the relationship
grew tense in the 1950s as the Communist Party of Indonesia grew stronger, which in
the Cold War context worried the Australian government. Disagreements over the
future status of West Papua also added to the now strained relationship. 125 Still, the
overall objective was to have as friendly relations with Indonesia as possible and
when the Malayo-Indonesian Konfrontasi over Borneo 1962-66 risked deteriorating it
even further, Australia took a low-key stance. Despite sending troops in support of
Britain to Malaya, against Indonesia, they managed to avoid direct clashes with
Indonesian military. 126 Partly due to this stance and to the fact that a new leader had
emerged in Indonesia – Suharto, who became President in 1967 and whose policies
was closer to that of Australia - the overall relationship improved. 127

However, the Indonesian invasion, and subsequent occupation, of East Timor in
December 1975 was to become a constant thorn in the side of Australian-Indonesian
relationship for the next 25 years. As the main objective was to have the best
relationship possible with Indonesia, it became bipartisan policy to grant Indonesia de
jure recognition over East Timor, Australia being the only state to do so
internationally. Despite continuous reports of human rights violations in East Timor
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during the Indonesian occupation, 128 successive Australian governments pursued a
bipartisan policy of putting East Timor second behind the overall objective of
maintaining good relations with its northern neighbour, which in turn, it was believed,
would help Australia influence Indonesia towards improving human rights in East
Timor. 129

It was not until the Labor Party changed its long-standing position on East Timor in
January 1998 and demanded self-determination for the East Timorese that the
bipartisan policy was broken. 130 When President Suharto stepped down in May 1998,
events opened up for a possible solution to the East Timor-issue. The Howardgovernment held on to its policy though, with the exception of a slight change in
December 1998 when Howard sent a letter to the Indonesia President Habibie,
suggesting an act of self-determination after a process of 10-15 years. 131 Events
escalated fast and in UN talks Indonesia and Portugal agreed in May 1999 to hold a
ballot on East Timor’s future in August 1999 under UN supervision. The Howardgovernment continued to try and again maintain as positive relationship with
Indonesia but with escalating violence in the lead-up to the ballot, and particularly
after the ballot, Australia-Indonesian relations plummeted. Australia then led the UNintervention INTERFET into East Timor in September 1999.

Despite bipartisan efforts to keep up good relations with Indonesia for 25 years, it was
now at its worst. 132 However, over time it improved slowly, and after the Bali
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bombing in October 2002, the cooperation in combating terrorism and the goodwill
shown by Australia in the humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of tsunami in
December 2004, has helped improve the relationship again.133 Although, the West
Papuan asylum seekers arriving in Australia in 2006 caused another diplomatic tiff
and strained relations between Australia and Indonesia, this shows the sensitive nature
of the relationship. 134 The main objective in relation to Indonesia remains: A stable
and friendly Indonesia is seen as vital to Australian security. Indonesia will therefore
always take a large part of Australian foreign policy maker’s focus.

The South Pacific
The South Pacific is likewise an important strategic area. As O’Keefe has stated; “It is
in Australia’s self-interest to ensure that order is maintained” in the South Pacific.135
Australia is by far the most dominant and powerful state in the South Pacific. As such,
it plays a significant role in the region, overseeing it as its strategic area, providing
help and assistance in different ways because of its superior size in economic power,
and intervening to promote stability in the region when necessary. 136 Australia did not
intervene militarily in the region until the newly independent island states began to
show sign of unrest in the late 1980s. Australia intervened by using its navy in Fiji in
1987 and Vanuatu in 1988 and foreign minister Evans indicated that Australia might
intervene if a situation became serious enough. However, they did not actually land
troops on the ground. 137

A crisis in Bougainville also called for Australian attention in the early 1990s. A rebel
group aimed at breaking Bougainville away from PNG and Australia supported the
government with military hardware and policy aid but did not, once again, provide
troops on the ground. Australia sent unarmed monitors to Bougainville in 1997 to
oversee a peace agreement concluded after negotiations in New Zealand after the
“Sandline-affair”, which involved mercenaries being hired by the PNG government
133
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and which prompted the Australian government to act. After Australia threatened to
cut its aid to PNG, the whole affair resulted in a peace agreement. 138

Australia’s policy towards the South Pacific to 2003 has been referred to as a “handsoff” approach, wherein it provided financial aid and technical assistance to the island
states but did not intervene directly with military troops, despite repeated calls from
several Solomon Islands governments after 2000. 139 Australia was accused of not
paying enough attention to the South Pacific at this time, highlighted by Prime
Minister Howard having only attended four out of seven of the Pacific Islands Forummeetings between 1996-2002. 140 Foreign Minister Downer kept repeating that
“Australia was not a neo-colonial power” and would not intervene into the Solomon
Islands. 141 A valid argument but it was also a convenient excuse not to intervene and
risk getting bogged down in Solomon Islands.

Australian policy towards the South Pacific changed with its decision to lead the
RAMSI-intervention into the Solomon Islands in July 2003. The region had
increasingly become referred to as the “Arc of Instability”, as several island states
were experiencing internal strife 142 A new interventionist approach was launched and
the intervention into the Solomon Islands was followed by the Enhanced Cooperation
Program agreement with PNG, which included a more direct approach in the aid
program with Australian police officers being sent over to PNG and Australian
advisors taking part in the PNG administration. 143 Through the continuing RAMSI-
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operation in the Solomon Islands, Australia had taken a more interventionist stance in
the South Pacific – more of a “hands-on” approach.

Australian Foreign Policy Change
Major Australian foreign policy change is rare but there are a few notable exceptions.
The first, and the one with perhaps the most long-term impact on Australia, was the
shift of major ally from Britain to the United States. This shift occurred gradually
over time but there is a clear beginning that can be pinpointed to the fall of Singapore
to the Japanese in 1942 and the realisation that Britain could not provide Australia
with the security and defence guarantees it sought. 144

The new great ally was a logical choice, as the US led the war against Japan in the
Asia-Pacific, thereby indirectly defending Australia as well. What began during WW
II was soon established as a permanent alliance under the 1951 ANZUS-treaty and
both sides of politics today hold it as fundamental to Australian foreign policy. The
change in alliance was a pragmatic decision, as it was widely believed that Australia
needed a “protector” against the Japanese threat at the time, against communist
countries possibly threatening Australia during the Cold War, and now against
external threats such as terrorism.

Another important foreign policy change was the Whitlam-governments decision to
establish diplomatic relations with China and East Germany in 1972. 145 Recognition
of China had been ALP policy since 1955, which Whitlam supported, and
implemented once in government, which at the same time was a pragmatic decision,
based on the shift in US policy through the Guam-doctrine in 1969. 146 With the US
now essentially declaring that its allies had to do without direct American military
assistance, it was sensible to establish friendlier relations with the major communist
state in the region. Furthermore, The US was following the same policy at the time,
with President Nixon having gone to China in February 1972 making it even more
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sensible for Australia to do so. 147 Australia, however, opened up full diplomatic
relations with China in December 1972, while it took the US until January 1979 to do
so. 148 It was an important change for political, security and economic reasons, as it
opened up relations between Australia and China and allowed the two countries to
deepen their relationship over time. It reduced tensions in the region at the time and
China is now Australia’s biggest trading partner when combining total import and
exports. 149

The East Timor-intervention will be dealt with thoroughly in this thesis; however, a
brief mention is needed here, as it is an important example of Australian foreign
policy change. It broke a 23 year policy, bipartisan for most of that period, and it did
so despite the obvious risk of damaging relations with Indonesia. However, it was a
pragmatic decision, in the sense that there was not much else the Howard-government
could do in light of the human rights atrocities taking place in East Timor in
September 1999, the strong domestic pressure to “do something”, the international
condemnation of the violence, and Australia being the logical and obvious country to
lead an intervention into East Timor.

The RAMSI-intervention in to the Solomon Islands will likewise be dealt with in this
thesis. It was an important change in that it signalled a new more direct Australian
approach in how to deal with “weak” states in the South Pacific. The long standing
policy of not intervening directly in the internal affairs of the island states was altered,
and it continued with a stronger stand toward PNG as well. RAMSI was not so much
humanitarian decision as it was pragmatic. Failed or failing states, in its immediate
neighbourhood could threaten Australia’s security, especially as perceived in the new
War-on-Terror context. It was also important to stop other states to step in and
interfere in what Australian policy makers perceive as their strategic area.
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Finally, Alison McPhail has argued that the decision to join the “Coalition-of-theWilling” in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was another major foreign policy change. In
the words of McPhail; “For the first time, an Australian Government embraced the
concept of pre-emptive strike on a sovereign nation without the support of the
Opposition or a majority of the Australian people and without the sanction of the
United Nations”. 150 The main underlying reason for this change was, as McPhail
states, to show the US that Australia was a committed ally in the War-on-Terror
context and which would bring the two countries even closer together. 151 This would
then be beneficial for Australia in the long run, based again on the notion that
Australia commit troops now and get “paid back” at a later time when Australia need
the US help. McPhail argues this is major foreign policy change in that it sought to
attack a sovereign state without explicit UN backing, but this rather is a refinement of
existing policy as there was a qualitatively different method of achieving the same
goals, specifically strengthening the US alliance while guaranteeing Australian
security, through the doctrine of pre-emption. However, it does not appear to be a
major foreign policy change, as it follows the pattern of supporting the US. Rather, a
bigger change would be if they had decided to go against the US policy and not
participate in the invasion of Iraq.

The running theme in these foreign policy changes is the pragmatic basis on which
they have been made. Therefore, for Australian foreign policy change to occur, it
seems that strong pragmatic reasons need to be at the heart of discussion and
perceived as such by the key decision-makers.

Conclusion
Australian foreign policy has been characterised by its perceived need of a powerful
ally, based on its geographical position and its small population. Being a middle
power leaves Australia too weak to defend itself from a strong aggressor but allows it
to conduct “middle power-diplomacy” and have an effect on decisions within specific
areas. Australia can, and has, played an important role on the international arena.
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Foreign policy makers, regardless of their party affiliation, base their decisions on
pragmatism, i.e. what they perceive as best for Australia – the national interest. They
use a combination of neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches in doing so, depending on
what is seen as the suitable and practical option at the time.

The making of Australian foreign policy is therefore interesting and important to
investigate, in order to understand the policy decisions. Yet to fully grasp the
decision-making process it is vital to take into account not only the international
factors that shape Australia’s responses to imminent threats crises and, but the very
strong and often powerful role of domestic factors. Relevant domestic factors can
exercise strong pressure and influence, especially when in combination, for example
media focus on an event and is supported and reinforced through public meetings and
demonstrations, organised by interest groups. Political leaders however remain key
actors, especially in terms of how they perceive these international and domestic
factors and in how much influence these factors carry in the decision-making process.
The interaction between all these actors and factors determines Australian foreign
policy. Major changes in Australian foreign policy may be rare but because of this
they are even more important, as they often have long-term and fundamental impacts
on how Australia behaves in the international arena. To understand the process
leading to change is therefore vital to understand Australia’s actions and place in the
world today. Chapter 4 examines Australian foreign policy towards Indonesia over
East Timor up until 1999, before applying the proposed model of foreign policy
change in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 4: Australian Foreign Policy Change towards East
Timor
Introduction
This chapter will investigate the background to the Australian foreign policy change
towards Indonesia regarding East Timor in September 1999. It discusses the invasion
and incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia, the Australian responses to these
events and the major political developments on East Timor and the Australian
governments’ policies during the 25 years leading up to the policy change. It argues
that Australian governments from 1974 to 1999 continuously adopted a policy that
prioritised a strong and stable relationship with Indonesia over issues concerning the
invasion and occupation of East Timor. Moves towards a change in policy did not
begin until 1997 when Labor altered its East Timor-policy and when the Asian
Financial Crisis began affecting the leadership of Indonesia, resulting in the
resignation of President Suharto. Beginning with Habibie taking over as President of
Indonesia in May 1998, Australian policy-makers most often reacted to, rather than
pre-empted, events in the lead-up to the final policy change in September 1999. The
one exception to this argument was when Prime Minister Howard sent a letter to
Habibie in December 1998, however, it led to unexpected consequences, and the
Howard-government yet again had to react to Indonesian initiatives.

Australian governments abandoned morality in favour of the lure of good relations
with Indonesia, which were seen as more important than the lives and futures of the
people of East Timor. The bipartisan Australian governmental obsession with
appeasement stretched as far as its formal recognition of Indonesia’s de facto control
of East Timor. Other states recognised the reality of the situation and the unlikelihood
of any alteration in Indonesia’s position, however Australia alone among all the
nations the world took the unprecedented and controversial step of recognising the
legal incorporation of East Timor into the Indonesian state. Under the governments of
Fraser, Hawke, Keating and Howard this commitment remained solid. Despite
continued reports of human rights abuses Australia insisted the best way to handle the
problem was to practise “quiet diplomacy”, and it maintained this position until it
became quite clear that whatever influence the Australian state believed it had with
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Indonesia was now gone. Only then was the government pressured by the Australian
public and the media into a position where it reinvented itself as a champion of the
human rights of the oppressed, led the INTERFET force, and quietly disavowed its
previous policy.

Background
East Timor 1 finally became an independent state on 20 May 2002, almost three years
after Indonesia handed it over to a UN-administration. East Timor is located about
480 kms Northwest of Australia and has an estimated population of about 1 100 000.
Total land area amounts to almost 15 000 km2 and East Timor’s main industries and
exports are coffee, natural gas and oil. The main religion is Roman-Catholic (96.5 %)
and there are two recognised languages – Tetum and Portuguese, with several
dialects. 2
East Timor was colonised by Portugal in the early 16th century, 3 but it took another
two centuries for a proper colonial administration to be set up. What attracted the
Portuguese initially was sandalwood for trade and to spread the Christian faith to
Timor. 4 The Portuguese held control over East Timor until the Indonesian invasion in
December 1975, with the exception of 1942-45 during WW II when Japanese forces
occupied the island. East Timor went back to Portuguese control once more when
Japan surrendered in 1945, but by then around 60 000 East Timorese had already lost
their lives as a result of the war and occupation. 5 Decolonisation swept the world after
the Second World War; however, East Timor was denied any moves towards selfdetermination by Portugal. Going against the wishes of the UN, Portugal declared

1
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East Timor an “overseas province” and made no attempts to begin a decolonisation
process.
Map 1. Timor-Leste. 6

The Portuguese administration over East Timor had left much to be desired in terms
of development. Dalrymple describes East Timor at this time “as one of the most
backward and neglected colonial backwaters in the world”. 7 The Portuguese
government was more interested in its more resource-rich African colonies than in
East Timor. Portugal was also one of the poorest states in Europe at this time which
further contributed to the neglect of the distant East Timor. 8 Lack of development was
evident in health and education, very few could read and write, infrastructure left
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much to be desired, and the economy overall needed much improvement to allow for
a decent standard of living for the East Timorese. 9

From the coup in Portugal to the Indonesian take-over of East Timor
Such was the situation in East Timor at the time of the coup in Portugal in April 1974
through which the authoritarian Portuguese government was deposed by the so-called
Armed Forces Movement (AFM). Once in power it immediately set out to introduce
democracy in Portugal and to cut off Portugal’s colonies. They were simply not worth
holding on to in light of the wars that were raging in Mozambique and Angola, as it
was draining Portugal’s finances and resources. East Timor was also swept up in the
de-colonisation process that had now begun. 10

Political parties formed in East Timor and the process began towards selfdetermination for the East Timorese. Two parties emerged as the main contenders
once the decolonisation-process had begun – Uniao Democratica Timorense (UDT),
the Timorese Democratic Union, and Frente Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste
Independente (FRETILIN), or the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor. 11
Still under Portuguese authority, preparations for decolonisation continued with
elections for a Constitutional Assembly planned to come together in October 1976.
The UDT and FRETILIN formed a coalition to work towards independence for East
Timor but the UDT eventually left the coalition in May 1975 after falling out with
FRETILIN. Relations deteriorated even further between the two parties, leading to the
UDT attempting a coup in 11 August 1975, which in turn led to conflict between the
two factions with up to 3 000 people killed. FRETILIN came out the winner after
three weeks of conflict and took control over East Timor. It later declared
independence for East Timor on 28 November 1975. 12
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The political developments in East Timor meanwhile led to considerable concern
within the Indonesian government. It was feared that FRETILIN’s left-wing stance
may result in a communist government in East Timor, making East Timor a
communist enclave in the region, which could potentially become an allied state of
one or both the two major communist states at the time, the Soviet Union and China.
In the Cold War context, such a source of instability was not an acceptable outcome
for the anti-communist Indonesia. 13

Indonesia meanwhile had already begun operating to prevent such an outcome early
in 1974. According to Dalrymple, the Indonesian government did not have any plans
of incorporating East Timor before the coup in Portugal; rather, it was the
developments in East Timor from 1974 that led them to reconsider its strategy. 14 The
Australian government received indications already in July 1974 of Indonesian plans
for covert operations, which would lay the foundations for an eventual take-over of
East Timor. 15 Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam meanwhile indicated his
preference for East Timor to be incorporated into Indonesia in a meeting with
President Suharto on 6 September 1974, thereby removing an important obstacle for
Indonesia’s plans, although “this should happen in accordance with the properly
expressed wishes of the people of Portuguese Timor.” 16

Indonesia used the smaller pro-integrationist political party Associacao Popular
Democratica Timorense (Apodeti), the Timorese Popular Democratic Association, to
promote Indonesian interests in East Timor. The party itself had limited success but
kept being a voice for the Indonesian agenda. 17 The attempted subversion was
launched by the Indonesian government in October 1974 and was named Operation
Komodo. Indonesia was now firmly set on course to make East Timor a province. 18
13
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Initially it aimed at strengthening Apodeti but by February 1975 increasing spread of
propaganda and misinformation was fed through Operation Komodo to the East
Timorese people, as preparation for an eventual Indonesian take-over. 19 In October
1975 Indonesian military troops began to make covert attacks into East Timor.
Batugade and Balibo were among the villages attacked in an attempt to create the
illusion of a continuing civil war in East Timor. 20 Finally a full-scale invasion was
launched by Indonesia on 7 December 1975 and Dili fell the same day. 21 East Timor
was now under occupation.

The Indonesian occupation of East Timor 1975-1999
The Indonesian military quickly ensured the Indonesian take-over of East Timor;
however, FRETILIN continued to resist. The Indonesian military (TNI) kept meeting
serious resistance for years, even having to launch a substantial campaign against
FRETILIN six years after the occupation had begun. 22 Until at least 1977, the
Indonesian military did not control large parts of East Timor. 23 The resistance against
the Indonesian forces continued throughout the occupation and was led from 1981 by
Xanana Gusmao. 24
East Timor was formally incorporated as Indonesia’s 27th province on 17 July 1976,
after a People’s Assembly in East Timor had voted for integration with Indonesia and
President Suharto had signed it in to law. 25 The People’s Assembly’s vote was widely
seen as a poor attempt to legitimise the incorporation and not representing the wishes
of the East Timorese population. 26 As they had done in West Papua with the Act of
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Free Choice (see below) Indonesia selected the 28 members of the Assembly, making
sure they did not have any connections to FRETILIN or the UDT, and ensuring by
any means that the vote would be for integration to Indonesian wishes. 27

The United Nations (UN) organisation was the main actor that did not recognise the
legality of Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor. In a series of resolutions 1975-82
the General Assembly “deplored” the Indonesian invasion and urged Indonesia to
allow an act of self-determination for the people of East Timor28 but the votes became
less and less in favour of supporting the resolution up to 1982 when only 49 supported
it, 44 abstained and 41 voted against it. 29 The UN Security Council likewise echoed
the General Assembly with two resolutions in 1975, soon after the invasion, and in
1976. 30 There was an attempt to resolve the issue after the last resolution in 1982 but
even though talks went on for the next 15 years it did not make any headway, as both
Portugal and Indonesia were in entrenched positions. 31

Meanwhile, during Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor, many horrific accounts of
human rights violations were reported. John Taylor describes several massacres,
among them one in Lacluta in September 1981 with 400 killed, in Kraras where 200
people died (date unknown), around Bibileu with 500 killed (date unknown), and
another 20 people dead in Bere-Coli in April 1989 to mention just a few of the cases
he relates. 32 The human rights violations in East Timor received moderate attention
internationally; however, it was not until the so-called Santa Cruz massacre on 12
November 1991 that the human rights abuses in East Timor received more widespread
recognition from the international community. 33 The massacre began when a large
27
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crowd walked in a procession in memory of a pro-independence supporter and some
began making calls for independence. The Indonesian military responded by firing
shots at the crowd, killing a large number of people. The number of dead is disputed
but estimates range between 50 and up to 400. 34

Max Stahl captured the massacre on film and managed to have it smuggled out of
East Timor. When it reached the international media it caused outrage around the
world and put East Timor and Indonesian atrocities committed there, back on the
international political agenda. 35 The response to the Santa Cruz massacre showed
itself in the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament, both officially condemning
the massacre, while Congress also put a halt to the cooperation that had been
conducted with Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI)), the Armed Forces
of Indonesia, up to that point. As a further response, development aid was stopped to
Indonesia by a number of countries. 36

Even with the East Timor-situation back on the international agenda, nothing
substantial occurred that led to change, apart from the suspension of aid and military
aid mentioned above. However, the East Timorese struggle was once again
highlighted in 1996 when Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta were jointly awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize. As pointed out by Adrian Guelke, this award was an important
symbolic gesture which ensured that the question of Indonesia’s occupation of East
Timor would not go away. 37 Through all this Indonesia could really count on the
support of one state – Australia.
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Australian Foreign Policy Towards Indonesia Regarding East Timor up to 1996
Australia and Indonesia have had a difficult relationship from the formation of the
Indonesian state. From the beginning the focus was on having a strong and stable
relationship with its northern neighbour which, at times, proved a challenge. This
section of this chapter will investigate Australia’s foreign policy towards Indonesia up
until 1997.

Australia supported the independence movement in Indonesia in its struggle against
the Netherlands after the end of WWII. Indeed, Australia emerged as the main
supporter for an independent Indonesia, mainly by arguing their case in the UN and
by putting pressure on the Netherlands to give up its colony.38 Margaret George refers
to the Australian government’s record of support as “indisputable” and Australia “the
most prominent diplomatic protagonist of the Indonesian Republic during 1947-49”. 39

The relationship became tense from 1950 onwards. The communist party in Indonesia
grew stronger and President Sukarno indicated support for communist China,
worrying Australian decision-makers in the Cold War-context. Adding to the tensions
was the future status of what was left of the Netherlands East Indies - West Papua which had remained under Dutch control. Australia under Menzies was against
Indonesia gaining sovereignty over West Papua, which further strained the AustraliaIndonesia relationship. In the end, Indonesia gained sovereignty over West Papua in
1963 and aimed at legitimising that sovereignty through an often criticised “Act of
Free Choice” in 1969, but the relationship had been damaged. Australia’s stand on
West Papua had extinguished the initial good relationship stemming from its support
of Indonesian independence in the 1940s. Relations between Indonesia and Australia
in the early to mid-1960s were strained indeed. 40 The Konfrontasi 1962-1966 had the
potential to seriously deteriorate relations even further, possibly escalate to warfare
38
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between the two countries. 41 The formation of ASEAN in 1967 helped ease this
tension and increase cooperation between the former antagonists Indonesia and
Malaysia. 42

However, as it was important to the Australian government to maintain as good a
relationship as possible with Indonesia, a low key-stance was taken. While sticking to
principle, Australia nevertheless did its utmost to avoid military clashes between
Australian and Indonesian troops. 43 At the end of the confrontation, Australia had
managed to uphold cordial relations with Indonesia, partly due to its low-key position
towards Indonesia during the conflict but also because the leadership in Indonesia had
changed in 1965 after a failed coup attempt. In the aftermath, General Suharto
emerged as the new leader by 1966 and brought with him policies much closer to
Australia than the former leader Sukarno. Having been leaning towards the
communist side of the Cold War under Sukarno, Indonesia was now much more proWest under Suharto. As a consequence, relations between Australia and Indonesia
improved 44 and Indonesia became second only to Papua New Guinea in terms of aid
received from Australia. 45

Australian policy towards Indonesia in the years after Suharto came to power
disregarded the large-scale killings in Indonesia of anyone believed to be a
communist. As many as between 200 000 and 250 000 people are estimated to have
died at the hands of the new Indonesia regime, according to McDougall, however,
Kingsbury suggests up to 400 000 people killed in the immediate aftermath, and with
a total of 1.5 million dead between 1965 and 1970. 46 For Australia however, it was
more important that Indonesia now was much more Western friendly and to have
gotten involved in Indonesia’s internal politics would risk damaging the relationship
with its Northern neighbour. This stance was later echoed in relation to East Timor.
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From 1967 when Suharto established his rule in Indonesia, until the 1975 invasion,
there were few disagreements between Australia and Indonesia. The Vietnam War
caused some disputes but apart from that relations were cordial. 47 The Australian
government provided aid to Indonesia and began to negotiate a seabed border in 1972.
This was important as there were oil and gas deposits in the area and it was necessary
to determine who could extract them. 48 The underlying policy that would dominate
Australia’s relationship with Indonesia in the next few decades was already there: to
maintain a good relationship with Indonesia at almost any cost. The next major issue
to confront Australia and Indonesia was to be over East Timor.

1974-75
The Australian government’s immediate response to the coup in Portugal in 1974 was
to send a fact-finding mission to East Timor as the regime change in Portugal might
have an impact on East Timor as well. Three possible solutions for East Timor soon
emerged – to remain under Portuguese rule, to become independent, or to become part
of Indonesia. 49 The Whitlam-government came to the conclusion that the overriding
priority for Australia would be a good relationship with Indonesia. 50 Whitlam
therefore devoted extra effort to the relationship with Indonesia so as to achieve this
end. 51 This involved in part Whitlam establishing a close personal relationship with
President Suharto. 52

The policy focus was therefore based on maintaining good relations with Indonesia,
more so than on supporting the wishes of the East Timorese people for selfdetermination. In 1974, Whitlam’s position on East Timor was as follows:
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Mr. Gough Whitlam is understood to have indicated that Australia felt an independent
Timor would be an unviable state, and a potential threat to the stability in the area. But he
is also thought to have made clear that the people of the colony should have the ultimate
decision on their own future. 53

Whitlam indeed made this stance clear when meeting with President Suharto in
September 1974, stating that “he believed that Portuguese Timor should become part
of Indonesia” and that “this should happen in accordance with the properly expressed
wishes of the people of Portuguese Timor”. 54 So, the aim for Whitlam was thus for
East Timor to become part of Indonesia, which would occur with the agreement of the
East Timorese. Although perhaps a contradictory position, it appears that the
Australia-Indonesia relationship was the priority in the end.

Michael Salla shows how Whitlam was against East Timorese independence for a
number of reasons. Whitlam did not believe in the viability of small states and the
creation of an independent East Timor would establish just that close to Australian
shores. Moreover, a small state such as East Timor could easily be influenced by other
great powers, thereby destabilising the region. Whitlam did not believe this to be in
Australia’s interest. Finally, Whitlam looked at a divided Timor as a remnant of
colonialism, to which he was personally opposed, and which he committed to ending
in PNG. To him, it made more sense for the whole of Timor to be under one rule.
That rule, logically to Whitlam, would be Indonesian. 55

Whitlam’s view on the East Timor matter is all the more important for two reasons.
First, Whitlam conducted and construed most of the policy-making himself in regards
to East Timor. 56 He shaped the policy according to his own world view, against
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advice given by the Department of Defence, 57 and it was to have a great impact on
Australian foreign policy towards Indonesia and East Timor. Second, Indonesia took
Whitlam’s comments to Suharto at their meeting in September 1974 as a sign that
Australia would accept an Indonesian incorporation of East Timor. 58

A letter sent by Whitlam to Suharto in February 1975 stressed the Australian
government’s view that a possible incorporation of East Timor had to be supported by
the East Timorese people. According to James Cotton, the letter has been interpreted
as Whitlam wishing it to appear that their wishes had been taken into account, but not
necessarily to be so in reality. 59 Furthermore, it has been suggested that Whitlam
privately had downplayed the demand for East Timorese self-determination in
discussions with Suharto. 60

Throughout 1975 it became clear that good relations with Indonesia were deemed as
more important than the wishes of the East Timorese people. Dalrymple defends the
Australian government’s view at the time. He argues that it fitted in with Australia’s
attempt to fit in to the region; an independent East Timor was believed to be a source
of instability internally as well as under influence from external great powers; and
they held the belief that East Timor soon would integrate smoothly into Indonesia.
Dalrymple argues that the Australian government, however, could have taken a
position in between the East Timorese and Indonesia by not taking sides and acting as
a kind of mediator instead, and still not damage the relationship with Indonesia. 61
However, such a balancing act would have been difficult to achieve, considering the
probable pressure Indonesia would put on Australia, and also considering the
prevailing mentality of keeping a good relationship with Indonesia at almost any cost.
Instead, a pragmatic and realist position was taken.
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The pragmatic position was enhanced further over principle during 1975. An
important person in this development was Richard Woolcott – who after Whitlam was
possibly the most influential person on the East Timor-issue at the time. Woolcott
argued, first as a senior official with the Department of Foreign Affairs and then as
the Australian ambassador to Indonesia from March 1975, that it would be in
Australia’s interest that East Timor be incorporated into Indonesia. Any action against
such a move would only hurt the relationship with Indonesia and would not result in a
different outcome anyway. An independent East Timor would be unviable and
unstable, which would not be in Australia’s interest. It was thus better to support an
Indonesian take-over and take a pragmatic and ‘realist’ position on the matter. 62
Woolcott also argued on 17 August 1975 that a benefit of Indonesia taking over East
Timor was that it would be easier to negotiate the sea border between Timor and
Australia with Indonesia, stating: “I know I am recommending a pragmatic rather than
a principled stand but this is what national interest and foreign policy is all about”. 63
This policy had been expressed by Whitlam in his meeting with President Suharto in
Townsville in April 1975, adding that an incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia
should be conducted in a way that “would not upset the Australian people”. 64

The Whitlam-government aimed on one hand to balance its interest in maintaining a
good relationship with Indonesia and supporting an Indonesia take-over of East Timor
and, on the other hand, not to alienate the Australian public against Indonesia at the
same time, which were mostly against such a move. 65 This balancing act can be seen
in the events unfolding in the latter part of 1975. The Australian government was
aware of Indonesia’s plan to invade East Timor already in August 1975, according to
James Cotton. 66 When Indonesia began with the intrusions into East Timor in October
1975, the Australian government had previous knowledge of Indonesia’s covert
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Operation Komodo and planned Indonesian troop deployments into East Timor.67 The
Australian government was also informed about the attack against Maliana/Atsabe
and Balibo three days before it was carried out on 16 October. 68 Despite the
information received, the warning did not reach five foreign journalists that were in
Balibo at the time of the attack. All five Australian-based journalists were killed by
Indonesian covert troops during the attack, despite at least one of them indicating that
he was an Australian. 69

The killing of the “Balibo 5” as they came to be known generated a debate that is still
ongoing today as to whether the Australian government failed in its duty to notify the
journalists of the Indonesian attack, as they had prior knowledge of it. 70 Gough
Whitlam claims he met one of the journalists not long before the killings and had told
him that “he was going to a highly dangerous situation and that the Australian
Government had no way of protecting him or his colleagues”. 71 The accounts differ
but the fact remains that the “Balibo 5” affair continued to be an irritant for the
Australian and Indonesian governments and affected their relationship.

The Coalition was appointed as a caretaker government after the controversial sacking
of Gough Whitlam’s Labor government on 11 November 1975. 72 Fraser’s coalition
went on to win the election of 13 December 1975 and essentially continued
Whitlam’s East Timor-policy. The incoming government laid some of the blame on
the Whitlam-government but continued the balancing act of trying to please the
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Australian public as well as not opposing Indonesia too much. 73 This policy very
much continued after the Indonesian invasion of East Timor on 7 December 1975.

Australia supported the UN-resolutions in the Security Council and in the General
Assembly that criticised the Indonesian invasion. Moreover, the Fraser-government
continued the Whitlam-government’s calls for an act of self-determination. However,
it also responded to the invasion with a carefully worded statement which expressed
understanding of Indonesia’s position, while criticising the use of force rather than
using diplomatic means. 74

Indonesia officially proclaimed East Timor a part of Indonesia on 17 July 1976. An
“official” vote had been undertaken on 31 May 1976 by the ‘People’s Assembly’ in
East Timor, but as discussed previously, its legitimacy was very much in doubt. Even
Australia refused to recognise it as such with Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock
stating: “Australia cannot regard the broad requirements for a satisfactory process of
decolonisation as having been met”. 75 The Fraser-government realised however that
the situation would not be reversed and so went on to grant de facto recognition to
Indonesia, as the authority over East Timor, in January 1978. This was soon followed
by de jure recognition in December 1978. Peacock argued that it was to acknowledge
the reality of the situation. The de jure recognition was, in Peacock’s view, for the
purpose of beginning negotiations of the seabed border between Timor and Australia
and in order to accommodate international law a de jure recognition was required. He
emphasised that it did not mean that Australia accepted the manner in which
Indonesia took over East Timor. 76 Australia however was the only state that went the
extra mile to appease Indonesian expansionism.

The sea bed negotiations began in February 1979 and continued during the Hawkegovernment (1983-1991) until it resulted in the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation73
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treaty, signed in December 1989, over ten years after the start of talks. 77 The treaty officially entering into force on 9 February 1991 - detailed “the allocation and sharing
of resources in the Timor Gap Zone”, rather than just dividing the area between
Australia and Indonesia. 78

The Labor Party had criticised the Fraser-government while in opposition on its East
Timor-policy, criticising Indonesia’s human rights-record in East Timor, stating that
they did not acknowledge the Fraser-government’s de facto and de jure recognition of
Indonesia’s takeover of East Timor, and demanding a “genuine act of selfdetermination. 79 However, once in government in 1983, the Hawke-government
changed its view on East Timor, instead more concerned with having a stable and
positive relationship with Indonesia and therefore not letting East Timor become an
obstacle to that goal. 80 Again, the overall relationship with Indonesia trumped any
violations of international law and human rights abuses.

In the decade after the Indonesian invasion stories emerged of serious human rights
violations in East Timor committed by Indonesian forces. An Australian Senate
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence conducting an investigation in to
the matter in 1983 concluded that:

It is clear that the people of East Timor have been denied the exercise of the most
fundamental of human rights under Indonesian rule. They have not been permitted a
genuine act of self-determination nor can they exercise the freedoms of speech and
assembly which are the foundations of a free political community. The protections of the
law and an independent judicial system are absent and the people of East Timor have
been subject to arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and summary execution.
Freedom of movement within the territory, within Indonesia and internationally are
severely curtailed. The cultural life of the community is also threatened by the imposition
of the Bahasa Indonesia language and apparent attempts to suppress traditional forms of
religion in favour of monotheistic religions. 81
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The Australian government’s policy towards the human rights issues in East Timor
under Hawke was that the best way to influence Indonesia on human rights was to
have a strong and stable relationship with them. Through that, Australia could work
with Indonesia to improve its human rights record. 82 The Keating-government held
the same basic view but put more emphasis on “self-determination issues”, or in the
words of the then Foreign Minister Gareth Evans “some greater degree of political
autonomy” 83 , as a way of improving the human rights situation of the East Timorese.
They also aimed at showing Indonesia how its human rights record in East Timor hurt
its reputation internationally.84 This view was supported by a report by the Joint
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in November 1993,
which stated that despite clear and horrific violations of the human rights of the East
Timorese, with up to 200 000 East Timorese dead “from causes directly or indirectly
attributable to integration with Indonesia”, the report states that calls for Australia to
be more active by for example bringing the matter forward to the UN or “suspending
diplomatic relations with Indonesia” would not have a positive effect on the people of
East Timor. 85

During Paul Keating’s prime ministership East Timor was pushed even further back
in the government’s focus. Keating and his Foreign Minister Gareth Evans made it
clear that he wouldn’t allow the East Timor-issue to become a strain on the AustraliaIndonesia relationship. 86 Both the ALP and the Coalition favoured the Timor Gap
Treaty in 1989, subsequently ratified by parliament. Again, the overall importance of
a good relationship with Indonesia overshadowed the human rights violations in East
Timor. Continuous Australian governments, both Coalition and Labor-governments,
had come to this view. 87 The bipartisan view on the East Timor-issue remained
unchanged with the Howard-government coming to power in March 1996. 88
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The Howard-government and Australian Foreign Policy towards Indonesia
Regarding East Timor 1996-1999

The Howard-government came to power in March 1996 and to a great extent
continued the previous government’s East Timor-policy. The Foreign Affairs and
Trade’s White Paper of 1997 – “In the National Interest” – acknowledged the
importance of East Timor in Australia’s relationship with Indonesia. Human rights in
East Timor were a prime focus as a way to reach “an overall resolution of the issue”
and to improve “Indonesia’s international relationships”. The Australian position is
then made clear, stating that “the overall administration of the Province is primarily a
matter for the Indonesian Government to determine”. 89

Howard and Downer argued that it would be more beneficial to discuss human rights
issues, and by implication East Timor, bilaterally with Indonesia rather than taking the
multilateral approach. Howard stated that East Timor had to be considered “in the
context of a broad-based relationship”, and emphasised “understanding and a sense of
perspective”. 90 Howard further declared that, although “concerned about the human
rights situation in East Timor”, he did not think that “a confrontational approach”
would benefit the East Timorese and that there was a need for them “to accept its
place as an integral part of Indonesia”. 91 The overall approach to issues concerning
human rights was further confirmed in the government’s approach towards China in
the matter, with Howard stating his preference “to have our own dialogue” instead of
lecturing them. 92 Downer finally confirmed this policy approach by stating the
government’s two major elements in foreign policy: “Public diplomacy and
constructive initiatives”. 93
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The policy towards East Timor more specifically included Howard bringing up the
issue with Suharto and Downer discussing it with Foreign Minister Alatas on several
occasions. 94 There appears to have been no immediate effect from this “quiet
diplomacy”, as the overall situation in East Timor remained the same. 95 Downer
defended Australia’s East Timor-policy, stating that Australia had done a number of
things to improve the situation in East Timor: This included 1, “a contribution of $300
000 for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to continue their human
rights monitoring work in East Timor”; “a continuing development assistance
program for East Timor”; and by sponsoring and supporting talks under UN
supervision. 96

It was no wonder Downer felt the need to outline and defend Australia’s position on
East Timor as there was the added pressure that the awarding of the Nobel Prize for
Peace in 1996 to Jose Ramos-Horta and Bishop Carlos Belo brought with it. The
award put the spotlight on East Timor again and added renewed international pressure
on Indonesia but also on Australia as the one country that had extended de jure
recognition to Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor, despite the UN opposing the
legality of this incorporated status. 97

The Howard-government’s response to the Nobel Peace Prize awards to Ramos-Horta
and Belo was muted. The Prime Minister did not even meet with Ramos-Horta,
despite the fact that Ramos-Horta resided in Australia at this time. Foreign Minister
Downer had a brief meeting with Ramos-Horta for half an hour in his Adelaide
office. 98 Howard and Downer’s actions towards Ramos-Horta fitted their overall
stance on the East Timor-issue. It also indicated to Indonesia that Australia’s position
on East Timor remained unchanged. Further critique against the government’s human
rights policies was apparent a year after they came to power, particularly in regards to
94
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East Timor and Burma. 99 Thus it was a case of “Business as usual” in terms of the
Australian government’s stance on East Timor.

The road towards Australian Foreign Policy Change
The first steps towards a change in policy towards East Timor began in late 1997 but
it was not initiated by the Howard-government. The ALP under the direction of
Shadow Foreign Minister Laurie Brereton drafted a policy-proposal for the upcoming
ALP national conference in 1998. The process began in late August 1997 and by
October 1997 the policy change had reached the media. According to the proposal the
ALP would, if in government, call for a negotiated process leading to an act of selfdetermination for the East Timorese people. 100 This proposal represented a change in
policy position for the ALP and added extra pressure on the Howard-government in
light of the Nobel Peace Prize awards a year earlier. It was also the most radical
change in position of either of the major parties since the 1975-invasion.

The proposal was adopted at the ALP’s national conference in January 1998, stating
“that no lasting solution to the conflict in East Timor is likely in the absence of a
process of negotiation through which the people of East Timor can exercise their right
to an act of self-determination”.101 Fernandes referred to the change in ALP policy as
the end of the government’s “comfort zone” and that “henceforth, there would be no
rest for the Howard government”. From now on, pressure would come not only from
East Timorese advocates but from the Opposition as well. 102

Meanwhile, the financial crisis hit Indonesia in mid-July 1997. Australia was not very
affected by the crisis and could therefore respond with contributions to the IMF
rescue packages to three of the most affected countries – Indonesia, South Korea, and
Thailand. Australia also provided further assistance to Indonesia by arguing for less
stringent conditions on the IMF’s rescue package. 103 Downer referred to Australia’s
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assistance as “responding to the region’s ‘SOS call’ by demonstrating what I have
called ‘regional mateship’’ and describing Australia as an “all-weather-friend”. He
outlined how Australia was contributing to the IMF package to Indonesia, as well as
50 million AUD in “humanitarian response”, having an “on-going aid program”, and
giving “up to 900 million AUD in trade insurance cover”. 104 The Howardgovernment’s response to the Asian Financial Crisis, and Indonesia in particular, was
indeed strong but reactive, and shows its overall desire for a politically and
economically stable Indonesia.

The 1997 Asian financial crisis triggered events that ultimately led to Suharto
stepping down as President of Indonesia which in turn opened up the possibility for a
solution to the East Timor-issue. As Elson argues, the crisis itself did not cause his
downfall but served as catalyst for a number of factors that together garnered enough
force and momentum to leave Suharto no other alternative in the end but to resign as
President. 105 Elson points more specifically at corruption as an important factor, with
the wealth that the Suharto-family had built up through its corruption-practices,
angered many Indonesians particularly at a time when they felt the strain from the
deteriorating economy. Furthermore, the economic and social progress made in
Indonesia under Suharto’s rule contributed to the undoing of the military regime.
Elson quotes Derek Davies who stated in 1970 that “Prosperity is the greatest
liberalising force. A modern industrialised Indonesia would not long tolerate a
military oligarchy”. 106

Geoffrey Forrester points to a combination of reasons for Suharto’s fall. First, the
weakening economy that began with Thailand’s currency collapse, which then spread
to Indonesia. Combined with Suharto experiencing health issues in December 1997
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“Suharto’s increasingly erratic behaviour” as another factor, causing doubts within the
Indonesian civilian and military elite of his continuing ability to be Indonesia’s leader,
while pointing to decisions seen as him preparing for his family to take over. Finally,
student opposition grew steadily. 107 It was reported in December 1997 that according
to a survey conducted at the University of Yogyakarta; 80 % were against Suharto
being elected for another term as president. 108 The student protests increased during
1998, particularly after Suharto’s re-election in March 1998 for another term as
President. 109

What seems clear is that it was a combination of political and economic factors that
led to the downfall of Suharto. The Asian Financial Crisis and the drought that hit
Indonesia at the same time meant that the economy was suffering badly, leading to
increasing protests, which in turn put further pressure on Suharto. Loss of faith with
Suharto among important elites further destabilised his grip on power. When the
Suharto-government announced that they would remove the subsidies on fuel,
electricity and transport costs 110 , protests grew bigger and fiercer. Four students were
shot in demonstrations on 12 May 1998. Continued protests and rioting followed the
shooting and in the next three days led to more than 1 000 people being killed. 111
Demonstrations continued unabated despite the rising death toll and with the pressure
building, Suharto finally resigned as President on 21 May 1998, in face of continuing
demonstrations and weakened support of the military. Vice-President B. J. Habibie
was sworn in as the new President of Indonesia the same day. 112

This extraordinary change of leadership also opened up for a solution to the question
of East Timor. Habibie began early to consider a change in the Indonesian
government’s position on East Timor. In a sign that President Suharto had indeed
been an obstacle to an Indonesian change in policy on East Timor, the Cabinet
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discussed a possible change of policy in late May, soon after taking over
government. 113 Officially though, the policy remained the same. Habibie had strongly
supported it in the past and initially there were no hints of a change. 114 The model
proposed in this thesis could be applied to this Indonesian change also, even as it was
emerging from Suharto’s strong centralised government.

However, in an interview with the BBC on 9 June 1998 Habibie suddenly made an
attempt to solve the East Timor-problem. A “Special Status” could be considered if
the international community, including Portugal and the UN, would recognise
Indonesia as the sovereign over East Timor. 115 The idea had been discussed in the
cabinet’s political and security committee a few days earlier and presented to Habibie
shortly afterwards. 116 It was not clear exactly what this “Special Status” would entail;
however, it did represent a break with the long-standing policy under Suharto,
although referendum and/or independence were rejected as an option. Furthermore,
Habibie declared that he would release 15 East Timorese prisoners 117 , which in this
context can be seen as another gesture aimed at the East Timorese population. The
release of Xanana Gusmao, the East Timorese resistance leader jailed in Indonesia,
was rejected, for the time being, by Habibie, and Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, but it
was not ruled out in a future “overall, comprehensive solution”. 118 In a further sign of
a change in attitude, President Habibie met with Bishop Carlos Belo in late June 1998,
discussing the situation in East Timor. 119 Furthermore, Habibie announced the
withdrawal of 1 000 troops, out of an estimated 10-15 000 in total, from East Timor as
a first step to limit the military presence there. Around 400 combat troops pulled out
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during the week following the announcement. 120 Overall, the change in leadership had
proven that there now was a possibility to address and perhaps solve the East Timorsituation.

The reaction from the East Timorese themselves was simply “it’s not enough”. Jose
Ramos-Horta, the East Timorese leader in exile, referred to it as “not a serious
proposal” and rejected it. 121 In East Timor, a student demonstration in Dili on 10 June
called for “a referendum, the right to self-determination and a withdrawal of the
troops”. 122 Portugal likewise rejected the proposal, stating that it would not make
much difference in the negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal regarding East
Timor. 123 These negotiations had commenced in 1983 under the supervision of the
UN although not much progress had been made until Kofi Annan became UN
Secretary-General in 1997. Upon taking over the post, Annan set forward to revive
the talks between Indonesia and Portugal, with the hope that it would eventuate in a
lasting solution to the East Timor-issue. Annan met with Ramos-Horta and shortly
after the meeting the Pakistani diplomat Jamsheed Marker became his Personal
Representative in regards to East Timor. 124

The negotiations did not really take off until after the change of leadership in
Indonesia. The previous state of the negotiations can be illustrated with the meeting
chaired by Annan between the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Portugal in June
1997 being referred to as “talks about talks”. 125 Marker reported in January 1998 a
“substantial progress” in the intensified talks but also said that there at this stage was
a possibility that a solution could be found. 126 Despite Marker’s positive view on the
negotiations, nothing substantial came out of it until after Suharto stepped down as
120
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President. A new sense of optimism regarding East Timor followed the change of
leadership and Habibie’s proposal of “Special Status” for East Timor in June 1998.
Even though Portugal rejected the “Special status”-proposal, it still gave the UN an
opportunity to increase its effort to produce a solution through the negotiations
between Indonesia and Portugal. Jamsheed Marker visited Jakarta and East Timor in
July 1998 to prepare for talks by meeting with key players of the process. 127

The outcome of Marker’s visit was a meeting in New York on 4-5 August between
the Portuguese and Indonesian foreign ministers on Annan’s invitation. It also meant
a revitalisation of the negotiations with the possibility of linking the talks with
Habibie’s earlier proposal, despite scepticism still being felt. 128 The talks in August
were presented as a “breakthrough”, as it produced an agreement wherein Indonesia
and Portugal was “to concentrate on the details of an autonomy package rather than
basic differences over the disputed province’s sovereignty”. 129 Despite the initial
optimism, the talks eventually stranded in November 1998 without an agreement on
autonomy for East Timor being reached. 130 Lack of commitment and flexibility on
Indonesia’s part has been cited as a major reason for the failure to reach a solution
before the end of 1998. Key East Timorese actors, such as Conselho Nacional da
Resistencia Timorense or National Council for Timorese Resistance (CNRT), were
also not consulted in the process, undermining the possible support for a plan by the
East Timorese themselves. 131 Furthermore, reports that the announced withdrawal of
Indonesian military troops from East Timor had not been carried out, but rather
increased instead, further fuelling suspicions that Indonesia was not fully committed
to the process. 132
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The issue of a potential release of the East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao from
Indonesian jail was also in the background of the talks. If released, it was considered
to be an important gesture made by the Indonesian government - a show of goodwill.
However, Indonesia consistently argued that Gusmao was a criminal and had no place
in talks about East Timor’s future.133 Only after an agreement had been reached could
he be freed. 134 Calls for his release came from a wide range of international sources,
such as South Africa’s President Nelson Mandela, the United States, UN’s SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan, and a number of European countries. 135 Mandela met with
Gusmao in prison in July 1997 and Marker in December 1998, which demonstrates
Gusmao’s perceived importance to the process. 136

A week before Suharto’s resignation in May 1998, there were signs that the Howardgovernment realised what would happen and began preparing itself for a leadershipchange. Howard stated that “our relationship is important beyond the tenure in office
of any particular individual” 137 , which was interpreted as Australia distancing itself
from Suharto. 138 In regards to East Timor, Howard noted on 25 May 1998 that moves
towards self-determination for East Timor would be “well received” but he did not
outline in more detail what those might be. 139 Downer urged Indonesia now cut down
its military presence in East Timor and let them have “a much greater say in the
management of their own affairs”. 140 From these comments it can be deduced that the
Howard-government slightly altered its policy and now sensed a possible opportunity
to resolve a 25 year old problem between Australia and Indonesia. Although, it should
be noted that this alteration in policy was very minor considering that the overall
policy essentially remained the same – East Timor should remain within Indonesia.
133
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Habibie did indeed suggest some sort of greater autonomy for East Timor in an
interview with the BBC on 9 June 1998. He stated that “I am ready to consider giving
East Timor special status”, some sort of semi-autonomy if Indonesia was finally
recognised as the sovereign over East Timor internationally and by Portugal in
particular, 141 thereby linking it to the negotiations under UN-supervision between
Indonesia and Portugal over East Timor. The Australian government cautiously
welcomed Habibie’s suggestion of ‘special status’ for East Timor. Ambassador to
Indonesia John McCarthy went to East Timor for a first-hand look at the situation
there. He also visited Gusmao twice in the Indonesian prison in which he was held,
which was a dramatic move by the Australian government, as the previous policy had
been not to talk to FRETILIN/FALINTIL - the East Timorese guerrilla movement.
Downer visited Indonesia in July 1998 and East Timor was naturally high on the
agenda for discussion. He pointed out the Australian government’s view that a
solution to the East Timor-problem would enhance Indonesia’s international standing
and it was therefore in its interest to reach an agreement on East Timor. 142 He also
stated that his government wished in regards to East Timor “to see an early reduction
in the military presence, a dramatic improvement in human rights, and a situation in
which the East Timorese people manage their own internal affairs”. 143

There were no changes in position regarding East Timor having a referendum on selfdetermination, though. Downer’s view was that such a move could instigate a civil
war in East Timor between the opposing sides, and that “the losers will just take to the
hills”. He emphasised his point that “It wouldn’t solve the problem”. 144 At Habibie’s
announcement of troop reductions in East Timor, Downer said “it’s a step in the right
direction” and welcomed further withdrawals. 145
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The next few months saws little progress in the negotiations over East Timor. In an
effort to break the dead-lock, the Australian government began to consider a minor
but important policy change regarding East Timor. 146 Downer had already in
February 1998 asked DFAT for “an options paper on Australian diplomatic objectives
for East Timor. 147 After Habibie made his announcement in June, on possible
autonomy for East Timor, indications to that end could be seen through Ambassador
McCarthy’s visits to Gusmao in prison and the “consultation exercise” conducted by
the Australian government involving discussions with East Timorese on their views of
the autonomy-proposal. 148

Slowly, it became clear to the Australian officials that the East Timorese leaders,
particularly Xanana Gusmao, had to be included in any process toward an agreement
that was to be accepted by the East Timorese themselves. 149 Officially, the Australian
government did not back the unconditional release of Gusmao yet, 150 but the result of
the “consultation exercise” was notable in a speech delivered by Downer on 19
August, wherein he stated that the government “firmly believe that the East Timorese
people themselves must be involved in the issue’s resolution”. He went on to refute
the claim in The Age that they did not support Gusmao’s release, saying that “we
would favour the release of Xanana Gusmao in the context of a process of
reconciliation and settlement in East Timor” and that “Australia recognises that
Xanana Gusmao has a central role in the resolution of the East Timor issue”.151
However, still no call for his unconditional release, which many other countries such
as the United States and Britain, had urged.152 It was not until mid-October 1998 that
Downer called for Gusmao’s release without adding any conditions. 153
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After the Coalition had won the Federal election in October 1998 Alexander Downer
began reviewing the Australian policy regarding East Timor. The reports suggesting
that the official staged withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor was in fact
not happening may have contributed to the overall sense that no major progress was
forthcoming from Indonesia on the East Timor-issue and that something had to be
done. 154 In fact, the Australian Defence Signals Directorate overheard Indonesian
ships reporting how they took troops on board on one end of the island and in secret
put them back on land again in a different part of East Timor. 155 The Defence
Minister John Moore’s announcement that Australia had suspended military exercises
between Australian SAS-troops and Indonesian Kopassus Special Forces was seen as
a step to distance itself from Indonesia’s human rights violations in East Timor and
Aceh, although it was officially denied as such by Moore. 156

The talks had stranded between the autonomy-proposal suggested by Habibie and the
fact that the East Timorese did not seem satisfied with anything less than a genuine
act of self-determination. The conclusion reached by Downer was therefore that it
would not lead to a long-term solution for East Timor. This led to a suggestion which
had been floated informally already in late August by Australian officials that a letter
be sent to Habibie from the Prime Minister. 157 Headed by Dr. Ashton Calvert, DFAT
in November 1998 came up with a proposal which was discussed on 1 December in
the National Security Committee. The idea shared many features with the Matignon
Accords in New Caledonia and included an act of self-determination of the East
Timorese, but only after a lengthy period of time of autonomy. 158 The idea was to
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give the East Timorese time to get used to, and hopefully agree to, the autonomyproposal. 159

On 19 December a letter containing this idea was sent from Howard to Habibie. The
letter stressed that the Australian government still wanted East Timor to be part of
Indonesia and that it recognised Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor. However, it
did point out that the process was not proceeding as they would have liked and
therefore it proposed a plan along the lines of the Matignon Accord, which “would
allow time to convince the East Timorese of the benefits of autonomy within the
Indonesian Republic”. 160 The fact that a plan was proposed is interesting, as Downer
was quoted to have said in July that “we’re not leaping in there with a blueprint that
we are trying to impose on people from the outside”. 161

Habibie reacted immediately in a talk with Australian ambassador McCarthy. The
Matignon-Accord suggestion was rejected outright since Habibie saw it was
comparing Indonesia to a colonial power. He also explained that the lengthy period
suggested was not an option for him – he wanted the matter dealt with within a year,
once and for all. Besides, Habibie could not see the benefits of having to fund East
Timor for another 10-15 years, just to have them choose independence in a later
referendum. Habibie stated that “he would not be dictated to on East Timor” but
appreciated Australia’s interest on the matter. He told McCarthy that he would begin
talks with two East Timorese bishops but not with Gusmao. 162

The news of Australia’s new approach on East Timor reached the media on 12
January 1999. 163 As a response, Downer announced what he called the “historic
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policy shift on East Timor”, outlining the position stated in Howard’s letter. 164
Downer later described it as a “major shift” in policy towards East Timor. 165 This was
ambiguous, if not deceitful, as the basic foundations of the policy remained the same
– continued Australian support for Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor and a
stated preference for East Timor to remain within Indonesia.

The Indonesian government declared “we are certainly concerned and deeply regret
that the Australian Government has changed its policy on East Timor, which we think
constitutes a substantial change on its earlier position”. 166 Xanana Gusmao
commented: “We will not be throwing a party to celebrate” and he continued: “The
change was good and could erase the political sins of past Australian governments,
but Australia is following, not leading, international opinion on East Timor”, while
reminding everyone of the East Timorese sacrifice during World War II saying:
“Many, many of our people died helping the Allied forces”. 167 Meanwhile, the
Indonesian government decided to move Gusmao from Cipinang jail, in which he
served his sentence, to house arrest. 168 Alatas announced the decision on 27 January
1999. 169 In a media release, Downer stated “I welcome the Indonesian Government’s
decision to move Xanana Gusmao from the prison where he is currently
incarcerated”. 170 It was another step in Indonesia’s new stance on dealing with the
East Timorese directly in the process.

Despite the official Indonesian reaction to Australia’s change in position, Indonesia
announced a major shift in its stance on East Timor on 27 January 1999. Foreign
minister Ali Alatas stated that if autonomy within Indonesia was rejected by the East
Timorese, independence was for the first time an option instead. The announcement
was positively and cautiously met by most, for example the UN Secretary-General
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Annan, the East Timorese bishop Belo, and the Portuguese government. 171 Howard
responded by saying that “we are pleased with the change of heart in Jakarta”. He also
praised what he saw as his own government’s contribution to the Indonesian shift,
saying “We played a no small part in that. As you know I wrote to President Habibie
before Christmas indicating that we thought the time had come for a change in
Indonesian policy”. 172 The Australian government did however show caution, waiting
to see exactly what this proposal meant. For example, would it be decided through a
referendum or by any other means? 173

So why the sudden change in Indonesia’s East Timor policy? It appears that Howard’s
letter to Habibie had some effect in speeding up Habibie’s decision at least but there
are indications that Habibie were already moving in this direction. He was reported to
have said “Why should we remain a captive of East Timor? Why don’t we just let
them go if they no longer want to stay with us?” 174 Throughout the years, East Timor
had proven costly to Indonesia – politically, militarily, and economically – which also
would explain why Habibie wanted a quick solution rather than a lengthy process that
Howard had proposed. 175 Alatas told the press at the announcement of the shift how
Indonesia would have to fund 93 % of East Timor’s budget if the autonomy-proposal
had been accepted, 176 an unnecessary cost if East Timor would become independent
at the end of it anyway. Indonesia struggling to get back on its feet after the Asian
financial crisis could do without that. 177 The DFAT-report on East Timor’s road to
independence also notes how Habibie’s personality played a role and how he was
“determined to make his mark in history”. 178
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The East Timorese leaders Gusmao and bishop Belo also both expressed a desire for a
period of autonomy before eventual independence, as East Timor was not ready for
rapid independence. 179 However, they would accept independence quickly if that was
what the Indonesia government wanted. 180 Jose Ramos-Horta was rather more
optimistic in regards to rapid independence, saying that “it’s said we should be
worried about Indonesia dumping us, but we will be very pleased if they dump us”. 181
Almost a week later came details on the autonomy-package offered by Indonesia to
East Timor. Indonesia would still be in charge of defence, finance, and foreign affairs,
however, East Timor would be allowed to sign certain agreements with other
countries. East Timor would have its own police, judicial system and parliament, as
well as a flag and an anthem. Some Indonesian military would remain in East Timor
but would only be allowed into public areas on orders by the new East Timorese
authority. 182

The Howard-government had expressed its support for East Timor remaining under
Indonesian sovereignty and kept repeating that stance in the following months.
Howard and Downer did however state that the Australian government would accept
and help an independent East Timor but it was clear to them what was the preferred
option. 183 Throughout March and April the tone changed slightly from Howard. He
kept repeating the government’s preferred option but taking care to say that he was
not opposed to East Timor becoming independent, just that he preferred autonomy
within Indonesia, and for a longer period of time before possible independence. Some
of the Australian media appeared to consider independence as almost inevitable, or at
least likely, which may have influenced Howard’s choice of words. 184 The meeting in
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March of 60 East Timorese resistance leaders who rejected the autonomy-proposal
may have further indicated that East Timor was headed towards independence and
may have had an effect on Howard subtle change. 185

At this stage it became clear that Australia’s position regarding East Timor had to be
clarified and decided upon in more detail. To that end, meetings were held with
ministers and senior officials throughout February and March 1999. The outcome was
four key objectives for Australia regarding East Timor:
•
•
•
•

East Timor should remain part of Indonesia.
The Relationship with Indonesia was more important to Australia than the future of East
Timor, so that we should avoid outcomes which damaged or jeopardised that relationship.
The relationship with TNI was especially important, because of its expected role in
Indonesia’s political future, so special care should be taken to protect that relationship.
We should avoid having to deploy a large Australian Defence Force (ADF) contingent to East
Timor if at all possible. 186

Furthermore, through the discussions came the realisation that it was quite likely that
a peacekeeping force may be necessary at some point in East Timor. If that became
the case, it was in Australia’s interest to take charge of that force.187 As a result of this
realisation, it was decided to ready an extra brigade (in addition to the one already on
notice for deployment within 30 days) for the possibility it may be needed in a future
peacekeeping force. 188 This was announced to Parliament by Defence Minister John
Moore who aimed for it to be ready by 30 June 1999. Moore stated that this was not
done directly in relation to recent events in regards to East Timor but as part of the
Defence Reform Program and to be prepared, as “further contingencies could arise in
our region, including in East Timor”. 189
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The UN-led negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal now focussed on defining
and detailing the autonomy-package proposed by Indonesia. Indonesia was still firmly
against a referendum at this stage and intended to consult the East Timorese through
other means, arguing that such an act could cause a civil war in East Timor. 190
Throughout March and April, the negotiating parties came to an agreement - the socalled 5 May-Agreement. The agreement between Indonesia and Portugal established
the process leading up to the ballot in East Timor initially set for 8 August 1999. The
East Timorese people would be asked to choose between two questions: “Do you
accept the proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the
Republic of Indonesia?” or “Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East
Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia?” 191

If the East Timorese voted for autonomy it would mean that Indonesia would control
external policies, such as foreign, defense, currency, finance, monetary and fiscal
policies, while the new East Timorese Regional Council would have legislative rights
in other areas, police and judiciary would be under East Timorese control, leaving
East Timor with some measure of autonomy within Indonesia. 192

However, one particular aspect of the agreement – security – became the main
discussion point when the details were made official. During the final negotiations of
the Tripartite Talks, events made it clear that security in East Timor would be an
important aspect of the coming months. According to the 5 May Agreement,
Indonesia was to provide security and to ensure that the ballot, and the lead-up to it,
would be peaceful and without intimidation. 193

The situation in East Timor deteriorated notably in April with two massacres taking
place. The first, in Liquica, took place on 6 April at a church where roughly 2 000
190
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people taken refuge after having been terrorised by pro-integrationist militia in
surrounding areas. Police and local militia forced them out of the church, using
teargas, and began to kill them as they exited. The estimates of number of killed at
this attack ranges between 25 up to 57. 194 The second massacre took place 11 days
later in Dili. About 12 to 14 people were killed in the attack by pro-integrationist
militia on the home of Manuel Carrascalao, a noted advocate of separatism, whose
son was one of the killed, to where people had fled from the militia. 195 Even after the
5 May-Agreement had been signed the violence continued unabated. In an attack on
the Atara village by militia and Indonesian soldiers on 16 May, 16 people were killed
and 21 were reported missing and possibly killed. 196 Considering the last month’s
events, there would have been concerns regarding Indonesia providing the security in
the lead-up to the ballot.

In addition to the later worries, Australian intelligence had known for a while that
pro-integration militia had been armed by the Indonesian military. Already at the end
of 1998, it was clear to them that this was the case. They continued to report more
instances of ABRI personnel supporting or actively working with pro-integrationist
militia in March/April and the connection between the Indonesian army and the
militia seem clear. 197

Officially, however, the Australian government did not let on that they knew about
this connection, although some of this information had already leaked to Australian
media. 198 Australian officials denied such links, instead suggesting it came about
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through individual soldiers providing them with weapons rather than as an actual
Indonesian policy. Ambassador McCarthy in turn said there was no evidence of ABRI
having such a policy. 199 Downer conceded that “rogue elements” in the Indonesian
military might be involved but would not state that the Indonesian army ordered the
arming of militia, as he had been specifically told this was not the case by the
Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas. 200 General Wiranto, commander of the Armed
Forces in Indonesia stated “I reject any suggestions that [the military] was siding with
a particular group in the conflict”. Alatas in turn said “We don’t buy this observation
that the Indonesian army and police just stand by”. 201 The Australian media continued
to report on the connection, though, telling how Indonesian soldiers had reportedly
not taken any action and simply let the massacres happen. 202 Presumably, the
Australian government did not want to let on that it had this information, due to
concerns of the effect it would have on the relationship with Indonesia in these tense
times.

Meanwhile, several commentators made the point that security needed to be provided
by a UN peacekeeping force or much more pressure needed to be exerted on the
Indonesian government and military in order avoid further bloodshed in East Timor in
the lead up to the ballot. 203 Threats had been made by pro-integration militia in East
Timor of violence if East Timor was looking like becoming independent. 204 The
threat of violence unless a peacekeeping force or a neutral security force was present
was certainly there. The events on the ground in East Timor suggested that the
Indonesian authorities were unable, or unwilling, to stem the violence and as tension
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was likely to increase once East Timor headed towards the ballot, so the risk of more
violence would also increase.

The Government’s policy was that Howard would not intervene on East Timor
directly unless as a last resort. 205 However, after the two April-massacres, it was
deemed necessary to do so. Howard spoke to Habibie directly and expressed how “I
and the Australian Government were very deeply concerned about recent
developments in East Timor, particularly the recent killings”. Furthermore, he told
him “that ABRI had primary responsibility for maintaining security in Indonesia and
that quite plainly that responsibility in East Timor had not been properly discharged”.
Acknowledging the reports of ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia —
Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) arming militia, he stated “that there was
an unmistakable impression in Australia that ABRI was turning a blind eye”. 206

It was agreed that Howard and Habibie would meet at Bali on 27 April to discuss
security in East Timor. This can be seen as part of the government’s policy to try to
use its influence over Indonesia, through what Howard claimed was “a very strong
and durable relationship”, rather than using aggressive language and actions. Howard
stated “The only feasible thing for Australia to do, the only sensible thing, the only
appropriate thing…at this stage is to try and use whatever influence it has to persuade
the Indonesian Government to exercise greater constraint over the armed forces, to
ensure that as far as it can the bloodshed is stopped”. 207 Downer had earlier said “all
we have is diplomatic persuasion and that is what we are using”. 208 The day before
the Bali summit he added “I can’t think of anything more counterproductive to what is
to take place tomorrow than for me to start talking about bargaining chips and putting
this or that aspect of the relationship on the table”. 209
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However, in the week leading up to the Bali summit the security issue under the 5
May Agreement had been decided by Indonesia and Portugal in New York, which
limited Howard’s prospects to influence Habibie regarding letting foreign personnel
in to East Timor to help provide security. Instead, under the agreement, Indonesia was
to provide security in the lead-up to and during the ballot. When Howard asked
Habibie to accept an international peacekeeping force, it was immediately rejected
with Habibie referring to the 5 May agreement. Habibie did however agree to an
increase in international police being present before and during the ballot. 210 As Paulo
Gorjao states, “Australia grossly over-estimated the amount of political and military
influence it could exert on Jakarta”.211 It appears that Habibie would not have budged
on the peacekeeping issue; Downer certainly argued later that that was the case. 212
Howard repeatedly stated that it was not possible to send peacekeeping troops to East
Timor unless Indonesia invited them. 213 The foreign affairs spokesman for the
Opposition Laurie Brereton argued that Howard could use the Australia-Indonesia
security treaty as leverage to get Indonesia to accept peacekeeping troops in the lead
up to the ballot. Defence Minister Moore did declare, however, that Australia was
open to provide peacekeeping troops for a post-ballot UN mission, if that was to
occur. 214

Howard declared that Australia would contribute AUD$20 million to the UN
consultation package and regarding Australia sending police as part of the package
that Australia would “of course consider sympathetically a request from the United
Nations”. 215 However, Howard failed to get Habibie to officially agree to disarm the
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militia in East Timor which brought about fears of violence in the upcoming period to
the ballot. 216

After the 5 May-agreement entered in to force, Australia’s main concern was with
security. Australia was unofficially asked in early May by the UN to plan and lead an
evacuation-plan if Indonesia failed to uphold security and the Howard-government
agreed to do so. An attempt to influence the TNI to downgrade its support for the prointegrationist militia was also done in June/July but with not much concrete result on
the ground in East Timor. 217

The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established through UN
Security Council Resolution 1246 on 11 June 1999. It was at first intended to end on
31 August 1999 but was later extended twice to 30 November 1999. 218 UNAMET’s
role was:

… to organize and conduct a popular consultation, scheduled for 8 August 1999, on the
basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot, in order to ascertain whether the East
Timorese people accept the proposed constitutional framework providing for a special
219
autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia.

In effect this meant register voters, instruct them of their two choices, conduct the
actual ballot and announce the result. Ultimate power lay with the UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan in terms of moving the dates for the ballot or suspending it all
together if necessary. 220 The UN volunteers consisted of 500 personnel - 275 police,
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out of which 38 were Australian 221 , and 271 administrative and support staff. Another
4000 local people were to help with the registration and the ballot. 222

Violence by pro-integrationist militia continued despite UNAMET being present in
East Timor. When pressed on whether the Indonesian army had ceased its support for
the pro-integrationist militia, Habibie responded “I don’t know. I have asked them,
please stop fighting. Ok?” 223 . Meanwhile, General Wiranto, had said, according to
Alatas, “that he didn’t believe the stories and would check with his own people”. 224 A
number of attacks against East Timorese independence supporters occurred
throughout May to August, all the way up to the ballot on 30 August 1999. For
example, on 16 May 1999 at Atara about 16 people were killed 225 , a UNAMET office
in Maliana was attacked with rocks and stones by militia on 29 June 226 , an attack on
an UN convoy in Liquica on 4 July, 227 a militia attack on 11 August in Viqueque
resulting in one dead, 228 a militia attack in Dili on 26 August resulting in 3 dead, 229 a
militia attack on 27 August in Memo resulting in two killed, 230 and a militia attack
killing two local UNAMET staff in Baboe Leten on 30 August. 231
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There were also many reports of intimidation of pro-independence supporters by the
pro-integrationist militia in the lead-up to the ballot, despite the UN presence. 232
Allegations of kidnappings and rapes by the militia and the Indonesian military also
came to light. 233 It was estimated that between 45 000 to 60 000 East Timorese were
displaced as a result of intimidation and violence. 234 Accusations of the Indonesian
military’s support of the militia continued to surface all the way up to the ballot.235
Even though the security situation had improved compared to April, Annan decided to
postpone the ballot from 8 August to a few weeks later, citing logistical difficulties
and the security issues. 236 It was clear that part of the postponement was due to the
security situation in East Timor as well. 237

Downer expressed his view that elements within the Indonesian army were clearly in
favour of the autonomy-side to win the ballot and that “…they have a variety of
different strategies for trying to achieve that outcome”. 238 As intimidations against
UNAMET personnel continued with the attack on the UN office in Maliana on 29
June, Downer urged Indonesia to increase efforts to ensure the safety of the UN staff
from now on and said that they now “realise the consequences for Indonesia’s
international reputation if incidents of this kind are going to be repeated”. 239 The
Head of UNAMET Ian Martin on 5 July pointed to a “pattern of incidents and threats
from the militias to UN personnel. It’s a major concern for us”. There was
furthermore “an inexcusable lack of action” on behalf of the Indonesian police,
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according to Martin. 240 The Carter Centre backed up these claims in a report in
August, stating “The Carter Center notes no significant improvement in the security
situation in East Timor or fulfilment by the Government of Indonesia (GOI) of its
security obligations under the May 5 agreements”. 241 Even UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan stated in his report to the Security Council that Indonesian military
helped and supported the militia. 242

In Australia, John Howard declared that “Indonesia’s security forces so far have failed
to provide the level of security needed for a fair ballot”. He continued “Our message
to the Indonesia government is very clear. The world expects that its armed forces
will keep faith with Indonesia’s commitment to allow a vote free of violence. The
intimidatory behaviour of the militias in particular must be stopped.” 243 In midAugust reports reached The Age that an Australian official let it be known that
Australia had “raised issues at all levels from the President down in Indonesia 120
times” regarding East Timor. 244

Foreign Minister Downer travelled to Jakarta on 28-29 July and then on to Dili to
assess the situation on 30-31 July 1999. He outlined Australia’s position at this time
that Australia remained neutral in the East Timor referendum, that security needed to
be improved further in East Timor, the TNI had to be neutral in the process and the
militia had to be “brought under real control”, and that Indonesia’s reputation would
suffer if they failed to take measures towards these aims. 245 The Australian
government had now stepped up its criticism of the Indonesian government and its
handling of security in East Timor. This provoked an angry response from Dewi
Fortuna Anwar, foreign policy adviser to Habibie, who said “Australia cannot act as a
godfather…it is just part of UNAMET, which should remain neutral”. Australia-
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Indonesian relations were worsening, despite the cautious approach taken by Howard
and Downer up until now. 246

After a few weeks of relative calm, violence and intimidation increased again in midAugust. 247 Five people were killed in attacks that aimed to intimidate proindependence voters. The head of UNAMET Ian Martin could at this stage name
specific soldiers that had been involved in helping the militia in carrying out
attacks. 248

The Australian government was mildly optimistic in mid-August for calm and
violence-free ballot, as well as for the time immediately after. 249 DFAT’s own
account of the Australian government’s handling of the East Timor issue - “East
Timor in Transition 1998-2000” – states that there was “tension” when it was time for
the ballot and that UNAMET expected “a good deal of turbulence”.250 Downer said in
a speech on 19 August that “we can surely be proud of our commitment to a peaceful
and orderly decision on East Timor’s future” but acknowledged that the time directly
after the ballot will be “extremely delicate”.251 A few days later, on 23 August, he
said that conditions in East Timor were “significantly better” and “that all the signs
are that we will get a reasonably free and fair vote” but that the period after the ballot
would be “difficult and tense”. 252

Howard sounded slightly more cautious, saying “It is still our hope that there will be a
relatively peaceful ballot, that the result of that ballot will be accepted”. He referred to
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the situation as “volatile” and “tense and difficult”. 253 In an earlier question of what
Australia would do if the UN pulled out of East Timor Howard said

Well I don’t accept that that is going to happen. Australia wants a free and open vote and
then we want everybody to respect and support the outcome of that vote and that means
that if the people of East Timor vote for independence then that should be respected and
supported in an orderly way by the Indonesian government. 254

However, Defence Minister Moore came out and warned that “there is a real risk that
the violence could become more widespread in the lead-up to [Monday’s] ballot and
thereafter”. 255 Howard called Habibie on 29 August to “ensure that Indonesia’s
military and police forces act to control violent pro-integrationist militias in the
province”, indicating that despite his official rhetoric, he was still worried about postballot violence. 256

However, with the escalation in violence on 26, 27 and 30 August, the signs were
there that the aftermath of the ballot could be violent as well. Warnings had been
issued earlier that this might be the case. Reports of a leaked Indonesian government
plan saying that "the evacuation routes must be planned and secured, possibly
destroying facilities and other essential objects", indicated organised destruction after
the ballot. 257 Pro-independence leaders had also warned of the possibility of a
“bloodbath” and “massacre” if security was not maintained after the ballot, fearing a
violent response from the militia if the pro-independence side won the ballot.258 The
leader of the pro-integrationist militia Enrico Guterres openly said “that East Timor
would be turned into a ‘sea of fire’ if the people voted for independence from
Indonesia”. 259 In the days just before the ballot The Australian Defence Intelligence
Organization (DIO) overheard discussions wherein Indonesian officers and militia
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leaders planned attacks and which the people to kill or apprehend after the result of
the ballot would be announced. 260

Meanwhile, both Howard and Downer made the point that theirs and the international
community’s hands were somewhat tied as to their options if violence did break out,
arguing that sending troops in to East Timor without Indonesian invitation would be
“an invasion of Indonesian territory”. The only reasonable way to send peacekeeping
troops in to East Timor would therefore have to be through Indonesian consent. 261

The ballot regarding East Timor’s future took place on 30 August 1999. Some 438
517 East Timorese had registered to vote and a further 13 296 registered outside of
East Timor. 262 In this first democratic experiment 98.6 % of those registered, cast
their votes despite the intimidations. 263 The vote proceeded relatively calmly
considering the violence leading up to the ballot, however there were some incidences
of intimidation at polling stations and three local UN staff members were killed in
Gleno by militia. 264

Alexander Downer complimented the Indonesian police for how they upheld security
during the voting. He also defended the government’s position not to demand
peacekeeping troops for the ballot, saying “If we had gone out and hysterically started
demanding a peacekeeping force be inserted, then I doubt we would have ended up
with a ballot at all”, although he did warn about “a continuing rather difficult security
environment”. 265
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However, on 31 August the militia began to set up roadblocks in several places in
East Timor. To get through, people needed either written permission by the militia or
police escort. 266 Violence broke out on 1 September in Dili where militia attacked
people and burned buildings, resulting in 3 dead. 267 On 2 September fighting
continued with at least another five dead in Dili and another two dead in other areas
around East Timor as the violence spread. 268 Later however, it would get much worse.

The emerging violence led to calls by Portugal to the UN Security Council to prepare
for a peacekeeping force in case Indonesia failed to uphold security.269 Human Rights
Watch in turn called for Australia to stop all military links with Indonesia and all aid
money from around the world should be withheld until the militia-led violence had
ended in East Timor. 270 Howard expressed his “great alarm” in a phone conversation
to Habibie over the increased violence, emphasising “that it was the responsibility of
Indonesia and the Indonesian armed forces and police to restore order and maintain
it”. 271

Downer stated in Parliament on 2 September in response to a question whether “it is
now time to send in a United Nations peacekeeping force?” that Australia “obviously
are prepared to participate in that security operation (a UN security presence) at
whatever level is felt appropriate” and that the timing of that “depends on discussions
with and the agreement by the key players”. 272 He thereby indicated for the first time

266

J. Nevins, A Not-so Distant Horror: Mass violence in East Timor, p. 99 and Lindsay Murdoch,
‘Militias On The Prowl Day After Timor Vote’, The Age, 1 September 1999
267
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timor in Transition 1998-2000. An Australian
Policy Challenge, p. 123 and J. Nevins, A Not-so Distant Horror: Mass violence in East Timor, p. 99
and Lindsay Murdoch, ‘Dili Residents Attacked By Militia’, The Age, 2 September 1999
268
D. Greenlees & R. Garran, Deliverance: The inside story of East Timor’s fight for freedom, pp. 19394 and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timor in Transition 1998-2000. An Australian
Policy Challenge, , p. 123 and Tim Dodd, ‘UN Flees New Militia Terror As Count Begins’, Financial
Review, 4 September 1999
269
Mark Riley, ‘Jakarta Faces UN’s Wrath’, The Age, 3 September 1999
270
Gay Alcorn, ‘Rights Group Urges Canberra To Halt Military Links With Jakarta’, The Age, 3
September 1999 and Joanne Gray, ‘US Censure Of Jakarta Falls Far Short Of Intervention’, Financial
Review, 3 September 1999
271
John Howard, ‘Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon John Howard MP, Radio interview with
Matt Peacock PM Programme, ABC Radio’, 3 September 1999
272
Australian House of Representatives, Parliamentary debates, Thursday, 2 September 1999, pp.
9802-9803

134

that this might take place before the Indonesian parliament endorsed independence for
East Timor and that Australia could take part in it. 273

The result of the ballot was announced officially by Ian Martin and Kofi Annan
simultaneously in Dili and New York on 4 September Dili-time. The autonomy
proposal received 21.5 % or 94 388 votes for the proposal, but 78.5 %, or 344 580
votes against, and it was thus rejected. Essentially this meant that almost four-fifths of
East Timorese voters wanted independence from Indonesia. 274

In response to the announcement, violence broke out in Dili in the afternoon of 4
September and continued on 5 September. UNAMET compounds were attacked and
looting, burning and gunfire were widespread in Dili and several other towns.
Thousands of civilians fled and UNAMET had to evacuate in many places. 275 The
level of violence was increased on 6 September through an attack on Bishop Belo’s
residence where many refugees had fled to and an unknown number was killed. 276
Another attack occurred on the same day in Suai with at least three priests being
killed and an unknown number of refugees killed or abducted. Later, 27 bodies were
found in a mass grave dug up by the Investigative Commission in November. 277 In
light of the increased violence, the international media left East Timor. On 5
September CNN, Reuters, APTV, and the Australian networks all left, as reporters
were at risk of becoming targets by the militia and the situation was getting too
dangerous. 278
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The Australian government was obviously concerned about the upsurge of violence.
The idea of Australia leading a peacekeeping force slowly emerged. Downer proposed
on 5 September that Australia could lead a “coalition of the willing”, if asked, and if it
had a UN Security Council resolution authorising them to do so, and if they had
Indonesia’s consent. 279 As late as the day before, Howard had stated that Australia
could “play a positive and significant part” in a peacekeeping force but only if it was
asked by the UN and if Indonesia allowed it. He pointed out though, that “the
Indonesian Government’s position as of now is that it does not want foreign
peacekeepers in East Timor until a formal vote on separation has been taken by the
Indonesian legislature”. 280 The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan formally asked
Howard the next day if Australia would be willing to lead a multinational
peacekeeping force into East Timor. 281 Howard affirmed Australia’s willingness to do
so and offered up to 2 000 troops to such a force that could be deployed in 2-3 days
when needed. 282

Howard expressed deep concern over the violence and stated that they were trying to
“persuade the Indonesians of the seriousness of the situation and how badly they will
be condemned around the world if they don’t get control of the situation”. However,
Howard now spoke of using “other methods of pressure” if they were unsuccessful in
getting Indonesia to take control over the deteriorating security situation in East
Timor. 283 He further stated regarding a peacekeeping force that “we are putting
maximum pressure, the international community is. Our simple message now is to
Indonesia, you must put your house in order by stopping the violence and if you can’t
or won’t then you must let in an international force that will do that”.284 Downer used
phrases as “absolutely outraged” regarding shots being fired on Ambassador
279
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McCarthy in Dili and “completely unacceptable” on the situation in East Timor and
the lack of Indonesian control over security. 285

So within a matter of days the Australian government had abandoned its long standing
policy of insisting that Indonesia being solely responsible for security in East Timor
and had openly begun to discuss leading a peacekeeping force. Only three days
earlier, on the day of the ballot, Downer had made the point that peacekeeping forces
had not been necessary and indicated that he felt vindicated. However, with the
violence breaking out after the result of the ballot was announced, the Australian
government changed its position dramatically and with publicly harsher words
towards Indonesia.

In a meeting of the National Security Committee of Cabinet on 7 September it was
decided on four conditions that had to be met for Australia leading a multinational
force:

1.

Indonesian agreement;

2.

Clear UN Security Council mandate providing Chapter 7 authority to use ‘all necessary
means’;

3.

Substantial active support from regional countries, especially major ASEAN members;
and

4.

Support from the United States. 286

Meanwhile, the mass killings continued on 8 September with “the massacre at the
Maliana police station” where 70 or more refugees were murdered by militia using
mainly meat cleavers. 287 Over 3 days mass murder was carried out in the area of
Oecussi with reportedly roughly 14 killed on the 8th, about 70 executed on the 9th, and
an unknown number killed on the 10th. 288
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The Howard government continued to apply pressure on Indonesia, as did the UN, the
US, the IMF and many other actors in the international community. 289 Annan
condemned Indonesia’s failure to uphold security on 8 September and declared on 10
September that “the time has clearly come for Indonesia to seek help from the
international community in fulfilling its responsibility to bring order and security to
the people of East Timor”. 290

Australia gained limited US support for a peacekeeping-mission, however, the US
ruled out committing any ground troops, instead providing only logistical support. 291
It caused slight tension between Australia and the US with Downer saying “We’ve
given very strong support to the US over and over again in many different
conflicts….Australians would have a sense of comfort if the US were to be
involved”. 292 Defence Minister Moore said “You’d always like to see them come up
and put their hand up first and say ‘sure, we’re there’”. 293 The lack of commitment
from the US led to questions of the strength over the Australia-US alliance. 294 It was
now clear that Australia had to be the one taking full charge of the upcoming
peacekeeping operation.

Work continued to set up a multinational force and pledges of troop contribution
came from Canada, New Zealand, Malaysia and Thailand. Non-troop support was
also forthcoming from Britain and the US. 295 Howard in turn more than doubled
Australia’s contribution to a possible upcoming peacekeeping force from 2 000 to 4
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500 troops. 296 Indonesia meanwhile continued to refuse peacekeepers. Alatas said
“Don’t give us ultimatums, don’t talk to us about peacekeepers”.297

APEC’s annual leader’s summit was scheduled for 11-12 September in Auckland,
New Zealand, providing a forum where additional pressure could be applied on
Indonesia and attended by many important actors, but unfortunately not Habibie.
President Clinton announced that the US would end military aid to Indonesia and
threatened economic sanctions unless the violence stopped and Indonesia accepted
peacekeeping troops. 298 It appears that this was the final straw. US sanctions against
Indonesia could have serious effects on its fragile economy and could possibly
jeopardise any chance of recovery following the Asian Financial Crisis. Quite simply
East Timor was not worth the risk.

Finally in the evening of 12 September, President Habibie announced that Indonesia
would allow for an international peacekeeping force to enter East Timor. Howard
expressed his joy that Indonesia finally had bowed to international pressure, calling it
“a tremendous step forward”. He also said “Dr Habibie deserves credit, great credit”
for taking this decision but “now there’s a lot of work to be done”. 299

After this crucial decision had been met, the next step was the UN Security Council
resolution 1264 on 15 September which authorised “the establishment of a
multinational force…with the following tasks: to restore peace and security in East
Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force
capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations, and authorizes the States
participating in the multinational force to take all necessary means to fulfil this
mandate”. 300 The mission was named International Force East Timor (INTERFET)
and consisted of a coalition of 22 countries. Australia provided the largest troop
numbers – 5 000 out of a total of roughly 11 000 troops, while Thailand contributed
296
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with 1 603, New Zealand with 770, Jordan with 707, the Philippines with 597, Italy
with 518, Canada with 470 and South Korea with 436. A number of other coalition
nations contributed with smaller numbers of troops to INTERFET. 301

On 20 September, the first 1 100 troops landed in Dili and a day later the number was
up to 2 300 troops. They commenced securing key buildings, began to disarm and
detained militia members. Some three weeks later about 5 650 troops had entered East
Timor and most of the country had been secured. 302 Even after INTERFET had
arrived in East Timor, large scale killings by the militia occurred. For example, 12
were killed in Maununu on 23 September, 9 in Los Palos on 25 September and 7 in
Hata Hudo on 3 October. 303 In total, according to one estimate, up to 2 000 East
Timorese may have been murdered in 1999 by the militia. 304

Besides the killings there were hundreds of cases of torture, rapes and abductions.
One source reported 182 “gender-based human rights violations” 305 and there were
many examples of rapes, enforced prostitution and sexual slavery. 306 Furthermore,
three quarters of the total population of 800 000 had abandoned their homes by 14
September. Around 250 000 of these had been forcibly moved to West Timor by prointegration militia, with the assistance of Indonesian military. 307 The humanitarian
cost for East Timor’s independence was indeed terrible and would take years to
recover from, if it ever can.

Conclusion
Australian foreign policy towards Indonesia regarding East Timor up until the
INTERFET-intervention was characterised by reacting to events rather than acting in
301
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advance. A strong and stable relationship was always the foremost objective, all the
way up to the post-ballot violence. Aiming to influence Indonesia through using its
supposedly strong and stable relationship can be seen time and time again – with
Howard’s letter to Habibie in December 1998, with the Bali summit in April 1999,
and throughout the lead-up to the ballot on 30 August 1999 – but it rarely produced
the intended result. Finally, the policy of not being too aggressive and not pressuring
Indonesia too much was abandoned when violence broke out after the ballot in early
September. It was now clear that Australia had been overestimated its own
importance and capacity to influence the Indonesian government. It was now deemed
necessary to put extra pressure on Indonesia to accept an international peacekeeping
force, and again Australia found its efforts in vain until much stronger allies,
particularly the United States, weighed in to force Indonesia to accept INTERFET.
The policy change that removed the underlying rationale for all those years of quiet
diplomacy came about rapidly in the span of a few days, roughly 3-7 September 1999.
It was the final example though, of how the Australian government reacted to events
rather than trying to prevent them through forceful action. The next chapter will apply
the theoretical model of foreign policy change on to the case study in order to identify
the main actors and factors behind the policy change.
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Chapter 5: Analysis of the East Timor Case Study
Introduction
This chapter will analyse the actors and factors behind Australia’s foreign policy
change towards Indonesia regarding East Timor in 1999. It will investigate Domestic
Factors (The bureaucracy, public opinion, the media, interest groups, political
parties), International Factors (Global factors, regional factors, bilateral relations,
non-state actors), as well as the key decision-makers, the window of opportunity and
the consequences of change. It argues that domestic factors put direct strong pressure
on the Howard government, often in combination with each other. Indirect
international pressure also added to the pressure felt by the government but the
window of opportunity, which was wide open, was not perceived as such and thus not
acted upon, which meant that no major change occurred until the government was
essentially left with no other choice.

Domestic Factors

The Bureaucracy
The bureaucracy served as an obstacle to change of policy rather than as a source of
change. The main actor in this category was DFAT, normally the department with the
most potential influence on foreign policy making. DFAT often reinforced
Government policy rather than acted for change. The first Howard government in
1996 took the DFAT advice to carry on the previous government’s East Timorpolicy. 1 If DFAT had any inkling to alter the policy, this would have been a good
time to do so, but that did not occur at that time. DFAT was involved in the first real
move towards change in Australia’s East Timor policy in the second half of 1998.
However, its involvement came only after foreign minister Alexander Downer had
instructed DFAT to look into what could be done to further the process on East
Timor. 2 The initiative thus did not come from DFAT but from Downer.
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Senior officials informally concluded in August 1998 that a new, more direct
approach was needed, one which would involve the East Timorese themselves in the
process towards autonomy for East Timor. 3 The head of DFAT, Ashton Calvert,
suggested sending a letter directly from Howard to Habibie, wherein it was proposed
that the East Timorese would be granted an act of self-determination but after a
substantial period of time, similar to the Matignon Accords in New Caledonia. 4
Although the suggestion came from DFAT, it came after Downer specifically asked
for options to further the process, and the basis of the East Timor-policy remained – it
was still the Howard government’s preference that East Timor remained within
Indonesia. As Downer himself stated: “It wasn’t a 180 degree change of course, it was
a 30 degree change”. 5 Still, DFAT came up with the idea of a letter, which would
include a new approach to the issue, so some influence can be detected here if only as
to the method.

After Indonesia announced in January 1999 that it would resolve the issue once and
for all and grant East Timor quick independence if they rejected the autonomyproposal, DFAT did not push for a further change of policy. Rather the opposite
occurred, fearing instead that Australia would be heavily involved financially for a
long time, as the main aid donor to a future independent East Timor, and also possibly
militarily since it saw the chance of a civil war breaking out in East Timor as quite
high. Australia would then have to assume a large responsibility in terms of
peacekeeping. 6 Autonomy within Indonesia for East Timor was definitely still the
preferred option for DFAT. 7 There is nothing to suggest that DFAT tried to push the
government into a change in policy as events unfolded during 1999. Instead, it
appears that changes in policy were initiated by politicians, rather than bureaucrats. 8
3
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Their largest contribution came with the proposal for a more direct approach in
sending the letter from Howard to Habibie in December 1998. DFAT suffered
criticism for its part in the East Timor policy-making process. 9 As it turned out,
DFAT was more of an obstacle to change throughout the decision-making process on
East Timor than a proponent for change.

Public Opinion
In the first two weeks of September 1999 people reacted to the images and reports of
violence coming out of East Timor. Previous to that, public opinion showed itself
mainly through letters to newspapers but did not in itself consist of enough pressure
on the government to have an effect on its East Timor-policy.

Letters to the editor were published regularly throughout 1997-99 in The Australian.
However, upon investigation, a large portion of them appears to have been written by
people from human rights organisations and other organisations in support of East
Timor, as well as academics. They will therefore be discussed in the Interest Group
section instead.

Opinion polls from A.C. Nielsen, Newspoll, and Roy Morgan at the times of key
events relating to East Timor prior to September 1999 do not indicate any major
change in support of the government. Even when the Howard-letter to Habibie
became public knowledge in January 1999, or when the government’s reaction to the
massacres in April 1999 resulted in the Bali summit, or during voter registration in
East Timor during June-August 1999. Opinion poll figures for the government appear
largely steady for the time periods investigated and do not show a swing in support
for the government that can be directly linked to events in East Timor. There is a
slight change in September when Labor narrows the gap in federal voting intentions
from being 10% behind to only 4 %, However, the Coalition only lost 2 % in support
during those two turbulent weeks. 10 Public opinion was not expressed so much
9

See for example William Maley, ‘Australia and the East Timor Crisis: Some Critical Comments’,
Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2000, pp. 158-160
10
See for Newspoll, ‘Polls for Federal Voting Intentions January/February 1999’ and ‘June-September
1999’ http://www.newspoll.com.au/cgi-bin/polling/display_poll_data.pl [Accessed 10 August 2008];
Roy Morgan Research, ‘Little Change In Support For Major Parties ALP Remains In Front In Late
January 1999’, 16 February 1999, http://www.roymorgan.com/news/polls/1999/3165/ [Accessed 10
August 2008] ; Roy Morgan Research, ‘Coalition In Front On Primary Vote And Would Have Won If

144

through voting preference in opinion polls as it was in more direct actions, such as
demonstrations, writing letters, emails and making phone calls to politicians.
A large majority of the Australian public supported the Australian-led intervention
into East Timor, as can be seen in the two opinion polls from 10-12 September 1999
below with a sample size of 1200. 11

Table 5.1: Opinion Polls on the situation in East Timor

Some 77 % of those surveyed were in favour of the intervention and only 15 % were
against. In addition, 41 % felt that the Australian government could do more, while 45
% said they were doing enough. This survey was conducted only days before Habibie
succumbed to pressure and allowed for a peacekeeping force to enter East Timor.
Election In August’, 31 August 1999, http://www.roymorgan.com/news/polls/1999/3220/ [Accessed 10
August 2008] ; ‘Labor Stretches Two-Party Preferred Lead As Troops Go Into East Timor’, 12 October
1999, http://www.roymorgan.com/news/polls/1999/3240/ [Accessed 10 August 2008], for A.C.
Nielsen, see A. C. Nielsen, ‘Estimates of Federal Voting Intention & Leadership Approval’, 1999
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11
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Interestingly 31 % stated that they wanted the government to do a “lot more”, thereby
putting pressure on the government.

Demonstrations in Melbourne and Sydney added to the pressure on the government.
Between 600 and 1 000 people demonstrated in Melbourne on 6 September, 12 1 000
in Sydney on 7 September, 13 1 000 people in Melbourne on 8 September with further
protests around Australia, such as people bursting into a DFAT building in Brisbane
and protests occurring outside Indonesian consulates in Darwin and Perth, to name a
few, 14 and about 4 000 people demonstrating in Sydney on the same day. 15 By 10
September it had escalated to between 20 000-25 000 in Melbourne 16 and somewhere
between 20 000 and 30 000 in Sydney. 17 The public also made its voice heard by
calling in to talkback radio, writing letters to newspapers and calling and emailing
members of parliament. Politicians reported hundreds of people contacting them,
demanding that they do more to pressure Indonesia. 18

The degree of protests did not go unnoticed by the government. Downer commented
that “the Australian public were screaming out, everybody was – I mean it wasn’t a
party thing, Left-Right thing – screaming out to do something to stop it. People were
ringing up, crying over the phone, we had more calls on that issue than I’ve ever had
in my life on anything”. 19 Surprise was expressed by many parliamentarians on the
sheer scale of public outcry. 20 Prime Minister Howard several times acknowledged
the publics concern of the situation in East Timor, saying “I know how distressed
12
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people are in Australia. I know how gruesome the TV images are”21 and “I share the
sense of frustration that the Australian people feel. I share the sense of anger that the
Australian people feel about what has happened”. 22 However, while acknowledging
the public concern, he repeatedly defended his government’s method of trying to
reach a solution. He urged a sensible approach wherein Australian lives were not
endangered and for two pre-conditions to be fulfilled – “You need United Nations
sanction and you need Indonesian permission otherwise it is war”. 23 No doubt he felt
the pressure from the public to “do something” but from his responses it seems that
he, in a way, was between a rock and a hard place.

Public opinion by itself may not have caused the change in policy but it certainly
added to the pressure on the government to act in response to the atrocities committed
in East Timor in the first two weeks of September. Fernandes writes that “panic had
begun to take hold” in the federal cabinet when the protests increased,24 so it is clear
that the demonstrations, letters, emails and so on had a strong effect on the
government.

The Media
The media in Australia is both a vehicle reflecting foreign policy outcomes and a source
of input to that process. In its reflective – or reporting – role, the media certainly places
great demands on government. 25

Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant’s words above indicate the impact that the media can
have on foreign policy in Australia, and it is certainly evident in the case of the East
Timor in 1999. The East Timor crisis in September 1999 produced a large number of
articles in the three investigated newspapers (The Australian, The Age and Financial
Review). The massive coverage in the media certainly put pressure on the government
to “do something”.
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Table 5. 2 Coverage on East Timor in selected newspapers 1997-1999
Newspaper

Jan-Feb

Mar- Apr

May-June

Jul-Aug

Sep-Oct

Nov-Dec

1997

1997

1997

1997

1997

1997

The Financial Review

3

6

9

3

6

3

The Age

16

11

13

6

16

13

The Australian

25

40

23

32

27

19

Jan-Feb

Mar- Apr

May-June

Jul-Aug

Sep-Oct

Nov-Dec

1998

1998

1998

1998

1998

1998

The Financial Review

5

6

15

8

9

6

The Age

5

10

39

35

25

43

The Australian

14

16

65

41

40

34

Jan-Feb

Mar- Apr

May-June

Jul-Aug

Sep-Oct

Nov-Dec

1999

1999

1999

1999

1999

1999

The Financial Review

49

80

55

78

350

114

The Age

75

124

106

118

370

155

The Australian

94

170

107*

143*

531*

126*

Newspaper

Newspaper

* The number of articles for The Australian May-December 1999 are most likely lower than they
should be, compared to the other newspapers investigated and in relation to previous The Australian
articles, due to a change in the search engine used during the course of the research process. I
discovered this as I initially printed out the articles (with the exception of May-December 1999) and
when I did a subsequent search a few years into the research-process, I discovered that the amount of
articles were lower than before. I cannot account to why this happened, as I do not know how search
engines work, I can only state the fact.

As can be seen in the table above, East Timor received attention in the three
investigated newspapers, although it is not until May/June 1998 that the number of
articles increases, due to the resignation of Suharto and the possible implications for
East Timor. The numbers are also higher throughout 1999, reflecting the events taking
place during the year, such as Australia’s minor policy change in January, the Bali
summit in April, the registration of voters in East Timor during June-August, and the
outbreak of violence in September and its aftermath. The number of articles increases
steadily throughout the year with the exception of a low in May/June for all three
newspapers. The big spike naturally occurs in September/October 1999 with a
minimum of 350 articles in any one newspaper and a total of at least 1251 articles
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between the three newspapers. The Australian consistently produces most articles on
East Timor, while Financial Review has the lowest number of articles. However,
looking at the number of articles it is clear that starting with the fall of Suharto in May
1998 East Timor received constant attention which indirectly would influence the
decision-makers in the government.

A closer look at the editorial opinions of the different newspapers 1997-1999, as well
as individual journalists, displays some differences between them. Generally, The Age
is more critical of the government’s East Timor-policy, while The Australian is more
in line with the government’s actions, and the Financial Review also tends to lean
towards the government’s view. First, editorials of the three newspapers will be
examined to discern their overall stance on the government’s East Timor-policy.
Second, specific journalists who wrote on East Timor and expressed opinions will be
investigated.

The Australian’s editorials generally supported the government’s policy on East
Timor and rarely directly criticised it. When Suharto resigned in May 1998, it stated
“Australian policy has been well-informed and sensible throughout this crisis, as it
has been towards Indonesia for the past 10 years”. 26 When East Timorese
independence became a possible scenario in late 1998 it argued against it, warning of
the possible break-up of Indonesia that might follow and for an outbreak of violence
between groups in East Timor. 27 It went on to support Howard and Downer’s actions
in the Bali summit in April 1999 and in the lead-up to the ballot. It criticised Brereton
several times, calling him “badly advised” and argued against his calls of April and
August for peacekeepers to be sent to East Timor. 28 In further evidence of its support
for the government, it referred to response to the two massacres in Liquica and Dili
that occurred in April 1999 as “hysterical reaction”. 29 Even in September 1999, when
the widespread violence broke out in East Timor after the announcement of the result
of the ballot, it did not directly criticise the government, only concluded that relations
26
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with Indonesia had to be re-evaluated and acknowledged Australia’s lack of influence
with the Indonesian government. 30 There is no doubt that The Australian editorials
mirrored government action when it came to its East Timor-policy 1998-1999.

The Financial Review’s editorials are not as obvious in its support for the
government’s policy as The Australian but do still lean in favour of it. It outlines
supportive arguments for the government’s policy in January 1999, on the same
grounds as the previous government’s policy, reasons such as to avoid the financial
commitment East Timor would require from Australia, having a tiny state just north
of Australia 31 , and it also points in March 1999 towards the problems East Timor
itself would face as an independent state. 32 It argues against sending peacekeepers at
all in April 1999, as Brereton has called for 33 , and insists, both in April and August,
against sending any in without Indonesia agreement. 34 However, they call for
increased pressure on Indonesia to allow peacekeepers in after the ballot if it is clear
that security cannot be upheld. 35 Furthermore, they insist on the big picture – to
concentrate on Indonesia and the risk of Balkanization, rather than East Timor. 36 By
September 1999, it claims the Howard government failed to realise how its policies
would lead to Indonesian anger with Australia. 37 There was, thus, some criticism of
the Australian government on this issue, however overall it is in favour of the
government and does not offer any heavy criticism of it.

The Age differs from both the Financial Review and The Australian in that it is much
more critical of the Australian government’s East Timor-policy, and consistently so. It
is criticising the government from 1997, all the way up to September 1999. Already in
1997, The Age’s editorials argues for a change from the previous policy and says
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more pressure on Indonesia is required, rather than bowing to its will. 38 Furthermore,
the government should be more vocal on human rights, according to a November
1997 editorial, which indirectly concerns East Timor. 39 When Habibie in June 1998
announces the possibility for a ‘special status’ for East Timor and promises to begin
withdrawing troops from East Timor, The Age acknowledges a slight change in the
Howard government’s actions but criticises its overall policy, which in many ways
remained the same. It also states that “Australia has a lot of ground to make up”, urges
further moves towards East Timor autonomy, including the release of Gusmao, and
wants Australia to play a role in this process. 40 In a clear stance against the
government, The Age states in September 1998 that Labor policy on human rights
should be bipartisan, making it clear on which side The Age stood. It also indirectly
indicates that it is for self-determination for the East Timorese, stating in a discussion
on Indonesia and East Timor “that harmony remains elusive when people have no say
in their own future. Democracy and self-determination, far from being preoccupations
of naïve idealists, now look like goals for realists too”. It also seems less concerned
about Indonesia falling apart than the other two newspapers, comparing it to the
peaceful demise of the Soviet Union. 41 A later editorial reinforced The Age’s position
that human rights must have a prominent place in Australia’s foreign policy. 42

Australia’s slight policy change that was officially announced in January 1999 was
received favourably by The Age “but further shifts likely to be needed”, according to
the editorial. The editorial left no doubt that it believed that the change was made
from practical calculations rather than purely humanitarian reasons. 43 Contrary to The
Australian and the Financial Review, The Age did not describe a potential
independent East Timor as a major cause of concern to Australia but rather expected
Australia to provide aid and support. They argued that there was now a chance for
Australia to make up for some of its past actions. The Age also early on argued for the
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need to have a peacekeeping force ready if required.44 The Age again raised the issue
when it urged Howard to push for a UN peacekeeping force in the Bali summit,
although they were not optimistic there would be such an outcome. It is clear in its
criticism of the government and how it is not doing enough. 45 Shortly before the vote,
The Age argued – again - for a peacekeeping force to be sent to East Timor after the
ballot, warning of the risk of civil war immediately afterwards. 46 When the violence
did break out, The Age kept pushing for more pressure on Indonesia to allow for an
UN peacekeeping force to be sent to East Timor. 47 The Age concluded, not
surprisingly considering its continuous criticism of the government, that Australia’s
approach towards Indonesia had been a “disappointment and failure”. It states that
“after years of miscalculation and wishful thinking by diplomats and political leaders,
it is time for a reality check.” 48

There were definitely differences between the three investigated newspapers. The
Australian kept defending the government or at least putting forward the same line of
argument as the government. The Financial Review was not as direct in its support for
the government but was clearly leaning in favour of it, while The Age was
continuously critical of the government’s policy throughout the period 1997-1999. In
terms of influence, The Age would have put most of the pressure on the government
but the fact that The Australian continued to be supportive would have lessened that
pressure, as compared to a united media exerting pressure on the government.

The media was however influential in other indirect ways. Individual journalists
reporting from East Timor in 1998-99 about the atrocities and the situation on the
ground kept writing articles containing personal stories of East Timorese and of
terrible, frightening events, thereby painting a picture to the reading public of the
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misery of the people in East Timor. The Age’s Lindsay Murdoch 49 and The
Australian’s Don Greenlees 50 and Sian Powell 51 were particularly prominent in
writing articles that told stories from East Timor. Other journalists also wrote similar
type articles, albeit to a lesser extent, such as The Age’s Louise Williams, 52 Craig
Skehan, 53 and Farad Faroque, 54 Financial Review’s Tim Dodd, 55 and The
Australian’s Brian Woodley. 56 These stories are told either by them being there in
person or from interviews conducted with East Timorese that had suffered attacks,
lost family members, or been injured by Indonesian military or authorities, or prointegration militia. The authors are not necessarily directly critical to the Indonesian
occupation or Australian policy towards East Timor but the stories themselves are
often quite graphic and more often paint a picture of the miserable situation in East
Timor, caused by Indonesian oppression. The reader is left with a clear image of how
“bad” the situation was and the articles therefore served as an indirect influence on the
public reading them. Murdoch deserves a special mention, since he reported directly
from Dili in those first 10 days of September 1999 when the mayhem broke out. His
eye-witness reporting was particularly graphic and left no doubt about the terrible
scenes that took place in Dili at this time. 57 It would certainly have served as an
indirect influence on the public, if not also the government. Overall, it is interesting
to note that The Age and The Australian have the most productive journalists in this
49
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indirect influence, despite these two newspapers difference in opinion on the issue
overall.

This would most likely have contributed to the public’s outrage and the expression of
anger that showed itself in September 1999 through demonstrations, letters and phone
calls to politicians, and the union movement’s, such as the ACTU, boycotts of
Indonesian companies and products. 58 The interaction between the media, the public,
and interest-groups all combined to put a lot of pressure on the government to “do
something”.

Interest-Groups
Interest Groups played their part in pressuring the Howard Government to change its
policy on East Timor. Indeed, the many East Timor support groups and organisations
kept the issue alive during Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor, as described by
James Button. 59 The most important figure here is of course the 1996 Nobel Peace
Prize winners Jose Ramos-Horta, based in Australia, and Bishop Carlos Belo, in East
Timor. However, academics, ex-politicians, former diplomats, the Catholic Church in
Australia, Union movements, all had an interest in influencing the government one
way or the other and did so, through direct actions or through letters to newspapers.
The East Timor support groups 60 kept the East Timor-issue alive by sending letters
and making statements to the newspapers, thereby ensuring that attention remained on
the government’s policy and the situation in East Timor. They kept pointing to
specific events that occurred, 61 or criticised the government’s East Timor-policy. 62
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Furthermore, they organised demonstrations 63 and commemorated the anniversary of
the 1991 Dili-massacre 64 , to name a few examples. Important direct actions taken
were obviously their part in organising demonstrations in September 1999 against the
bloodbath then occurring in East Timor. 65 In doing so, they helped the public express
its frustration and anger over what had happened in East Timor and helped to add
further pressure on the government.

Jose Ramos-Horta and Bishop Carlos Belo played an important role in holding up the
pressure on the government. Belo will be discussed in the Regional Factor-section, as
he was based in East Timor for most of the time period. Ramos-Horta, as he was
based in Australia and acted as the main unofficial ambassador of the East Timorese
resistance internationally, was a constant feature during the 1997-1999 period. He
spoke to audiences around the world about the plight of the East Timorese, for
example to the US Congress human rights caucus 66 , the European Parliament 67 , met
with dignitaries such as the British foreign minister 68 , giving him the opportunity to
speak to key actors in world politics and raise the issue of the East Timorese. The
Australian government was not as open to visits by Ramos-Horta. As Fernandes
relates, when Ramos-Horta was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1996, Australia did not
send its ambassador to the ceremony, and Downer could only find time for a 30minute meeting with him, which - considering the Australian policy on East Timor at
the time - symbolically took place in Adelaide instead of in Canberra. 69 Throughout
1997 to 1999, Ramos-Horta commented on and criticised the Australian government’s
East Timor-policy. He spoke often at rallies and seminars in Australia. And he wrote
letters and opinion pieces to newspapers 70 , to the UN Secretary-General Annan 71 and
62
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so on. His voice was constantly there, ensuring that the East Timor-issue was never
really forgotten. More specifically, he criticised Australia’s military ties with the
Indonesia army and urged the Howard government to alter its East Timor-policy in
general. 72 When the first slight shift came in January 1999, he praised the
government’s altered policy, saying that “he was thoroughly pleased” 73 with it and
even applauded the “courage and statesmanship” of Howard and Downer. 74 However,
not soon after, he was back criticising the government, this time over its scepticism
over a viable independent East Timor, although he agrees the independence-process
should not be too quick. 75

Unlike other activists Ramos-Horta did not initially call for a UN peacekeeping force
in the lead-up to the ballot but he expressed concerns over the threat of the armed proIndonesia militia. 76 However, after the April-massacres he changed tone and urged
the UN to take over security in East Timor, warning of more bloodshed. He urged
Australia to take a stronger stand against Indonesia, calling for them “to expel
Indonesia’s military attaché in Canberra and suspend all financial assistance to
Indonesia”. 77 Although critical of the Australian government overall, he is quick to
praise it when they find common ground. After meeting Downer in June 1999, he
stated: “I am very pleased with this public denunciation of the role of the Indonesian
army”, referring to Downer’s comments on indications that the military supported the
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pro-integration militia. 78 As it got closer to the vote, Ramos-Horta became much
more critical of the Indonesian failure to provide security and now urged for more
pressure, including economic sanctions, until Indonesia allowed a peacekeeping force
to enter. 79 As mass violence broke out in East Timor in September 1999, RamosHorta kept pushing for a UN peacekeeping force to be sent in immediately. 80 By
being so vocal, he added to the pressure the Australian government were under.

A few other interest groups deserve mentioning here. The Catholic Church helped
keeping up the pressure, mainly through sister Susan Connelly and the Christian
Sanctuary Network. Connelly had seven letters to The Australian published during
1999, constantly calling on the government to do more. One of her more memorable
lines was: “For pity’s sake, Australia, stop being a wimp!”. 81 The Christian Sanctuary
Network declared that they had 7 000 Australians willing to hide East Timorese
refugees if the government refused to allow them to stay in Australia. 82

Former diplomats, academics and former politicians also made their voice heard
through opinion pieces and letters to newspapers. Former diplomats such as Richard
Woolcott, 83 Bruce Haigh (ex-DFAT), 84 Duncan Campbell, 85 Bruce Grant, 86 and
Rawdon Dalrymple, 87 all wrote in, or to, newspapers and offered their opinion on the
East Timor-issue, as did former politicians such as Gareth Evans, 88 Bill Hayden, 89
Tom Uren, 90 Paul Keating, 91 and John Hewson. 92
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Prominent academics and experts in the area also attempted to influence opinion and
the government. Examples here include the executive director of the Australian
Defence Association Michael O’Connor, 93 the director of the Asia-Pacific Security
Program at the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Alan Dupont, 94 Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University Scott
Burchill, 95 and the executive officer at the Monash Asia Institute Damien
Kingsbury. 96

The influence of the Union movements also needs to be recognised. This came to pass
in September 1999, when mass violence broke out in East Timor. The ACTU had
considered boycotts and obstruction against Indonesian companies due to the violence
in East Timor in late April/early May 1999, 97 however, it was the mass action taken
by union movements in September 1999 that added to the pressure on Indonesia at the
time, and thereby indirectly on the Australian government. Numerous boycotts were
initiated against Indonesia targets, such as the Garuda-airline, “money transfers to
Indonesia”, “postal and telecommunications at all Indonesian businesses in
Australia”, 98 Indonesian ships left unloaded, no import of Indonesia crude oil, certain
exports to Indonesia were stopped and many other similar actions. 99 The Unions also
helped organise the protests taking place around Australia against the violence in East
Timor.
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An interested party in the events of East Timor was BHP, which had begun working
the oil-fields in the Timor Gap area in July 1998 and therefore had a stake in what
would happen with East Timor. 100 An independent East Timor may have renegotiated
the Timor Gap Treaty and as BHP stood to benefit hugely from future oil production
in the area under the 1989 Timor Gap Treaty, it would have a large interest in
developments in the East Timor’s independence. Evidence of this can be seen from
the visit by a BHP representative to Gusmao while he was still imprisoned in August
1998. 101 However, it is difficult to estimate the possible influence and pressure BHP
placed on the government but it would certainly have been very aware of the
company’s economic and resource interests.

Political Parties
The major significant influence on the government in this category is without a doubt
Labor’s change to its own longstanding policy on East Timor. By changing policy, it
broke the 23 year-old bipartisan stand on East Timor and instead began putting
pressure on the government to do the same. This change was mainly engineered by
Shadow Foreign Minister Laurie Brereton. It became official in October 1997 that
Labor had decided to change its longstanding policy on East Timor. The policy
position stated: “It is Labor’s considered view that no lasting solution to the conflict
in East Timor is likely in the absence of a process of negotiation through which the
people of East Timor can exercise their right of self-determination”. 102 The new
policy was formally adopted in January 1998. 103 The change increased the pressure on
the government regarding East Timor. James Cotton points to Labor’s policy change
as quite influential, as it led to a Senate inquiry on East Timor. 104 Clinton Fernandes
argues that “The ALP’s change of policy – and the resulting pressure on the
100
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government – was a critical factor in the independence of East Timor”. 105 Whether it
was a direct factor for East Timor’s eventual independence may be overstating it but
he is certainly correct in “that the government had no comfort zone” after the
bipartisan stance ceased to exist. 106

Laurie Brereton appears to be the man behind the shift. Bruce Haigh points to the
critical role Brereton played in Labor’s policy change and the risk he was taking in
attacking his own party’s past policies on East Timor. 107 He was the man leading the
charge on the government’s East Timor-policy, after becoming more and more
uncomfortable with his party’s position on East Timor vis-à-vis human rights, and
deciding to work to alter the ALP’s stance on East Timor. 108 He was less vocal in
1998, although he demanded the government call for the release of Gusmao. 109 The
Labor party saw the chance to add pressure on East Timor when Suharto stepped
down and repeated its new position for an act of self-determination for East Timor. 110
However, it is in 1999 that Labor, mainly through Brereton, steps up the pressure on
the government. The government’s slight policy change in January 1999 “was
cautiously welcomed” and Brereton referred to it as a possible “tentative step towards
the position articulated by Labor over the past 15 months”. 111 But Labor and Brereton
continued to clash with the government and kept up the pressure. Soon after these
comments Labor began pushing for a UN peacekeeping force to be sent to East
Timor, contrary to the view of the government, and continued to make this
demand. 112 Brereton went on to criticise the outcome of the Bali summit that left
Indonesia in charge of security in the lead-up to the ballot, stating: “Tragically, many
more East Timorese may pay the price for Mr Howard’s failure”.113
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As the ballot came closer, Brereton continued his calls for a peacekeeping force and
for the government to keep using its influence with Indonesia to secure its permission
for such a force. 114 As violence increased in East Timor in September 1999, Brereton
criticised the government for not doing enough and demanded “stronger action”,
which should include, according to Labor, “immediate economic sanctions, the
suspension of the defence relationship, withdrawal of de jure recognition of
Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor and a demand that Australia be involved in
the Security Council discussion”. 115 Labor thus consistently called for the government
to do more thereby putting them under pressure. It was the initial policy change in
1997, led by Brereton to move Labor towards a more idealistic position on East Timor
away from the previous pragmatic policy,116 that allowed for them to do so and that
added to the mounting pressure facing the government during 1998 and 1999,
particularly in September 1999.

The other, smaller political parties did not have any significant influence over the
government’s policy making. The Greens urged stronger actions by the government
and among other things told them in May 1998 after the fall of Suharto that they
should end the military cooperation with Indonesia altogether, something which not
even Labor supported at the time. 117

International Factors

Global Factors
This section does not provide a direct influence on Australian decision-making on
East Timor; rather, there are indirect influences in the actions taken on and against
Indonesia by global actors such as the UN, the US, the EU, the IMF, the World Bank,
Portugal and Nelson Mandela. These actions - or lack of action as the case may be would have had an influence one way or the other on Australia’s decision-makers.
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The UN had been involved in the East Timor-issue since the Indonesian invasion in
1975. The General Assembly made annual resolutions from 1975 until 1982 118 and
the Security Council likewise condemned the invasion in 1975 and 1976. 119 Attempts
were made to reach a solution between Indonesia and Portugal on East Timor,
beginning with negotiation in 1983, but this did not lead to much. However, the new
Secretary-General Kofi Annan (1997-2007) took a special interest in the East Timorissue and through his personal representative Jamsheed Marker the negotiations took
off again after Suharto’s resignation in 1998. 120 During 1998 and the first half of 1999
negotiations continued and despite a few bumps in the road it eventually led to the 5
May Agreement wherein a ballot would be held under UN supervision, although
Indonesia would be in charge of security. 121 The UN Mission in East Timor
(UNAMET) would supervise the registration of voters and the ballot. 122

During 1997 to 1999, the UN criticised the Indonesian government for its human
rights violations in East Timor and for not upholding security in the lead-up to the
ballot and, of course, after the announcement of the ballot-result. The United Nations
Human Rights Commission 1997 criticised Indonesia for a range of human rights
violations in East Timor. 123 Violence remained a concern in 1999 when negotiations
on the 5 May Agreement were under way. The April-massacres highlighted this
concern and Marker and Annan both urged an end to the violence and urged Indonesia
to ensure the safety and security of the East Timorese people.124 Kofi Annan
especially was vocal in condemning the militia violence in East Timor in the lead-up
118
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to the ballot between May and August. Time and time again he called on the militia to
stop the violence and on the Indonesian government to hold to its part of the
agreement on security. 125 The Security Council issued statements in which they
expressed “deep concern” on the violence in May 1999, and again in August when
stating “strong concern at the continuing campaign of intimidation and violence in
East Timor”. 126 Annan played a very important, visible and personal role in the East
Timor-process and it was even more evident in September 1999. He stepped up the
pressure on Indonesia as the violence escalated, issuing deadlines to Indonesia to stem
the violence 127 , while repeatedly phoning Habibie to urge him to accept a
peacekeeping force. 128 His hands were tied, though, as his spokesperson Fred
Eckhardt explained; the UN is not a world government and China would surely have
vetoed any Security Council-resolutions on an intervention without Indonesian
consent. 129 Still, Annan put constant pressure on the Indonesia government and
thereby also indirectly on the Australian government.

The US House of Representatives criticised Indonesia for its human rights record in
East Timor in 1997 130 and that was indicative of US actions against Indonesia during
the 1997-1999 period. There were often calls for tougher action by the Indonesians to
stop the violence in East Timor but just as often no concrete action. Stanley Roth, the
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, was the main person
involved in relation to East Timor until September 1999 when Clinton and Albright
become more actively involved. Roth and Albright both expressed the US’s worry
over the increased violence in East Timor in February and March 1999 and both saw

125

Mark Riley, ‘Don’t Squander This Chance: Annan’, The Age, 7 May 1999 and Mark Riley, ‘UN
Push For Military Advisers’, The Age, 26 May 1999 and Tim Dodd, ‘Timor Factions In Last-gasp
Peace Talks’, Financial Review, 1 July 1999 and Don Greenlees & Dennis Shanahan, ‘Bloodshed on
eve of poll’, The Australian, 28 August 1999 and Paul Daley, ‘Thousands In Timor Rescue Plan’, The
Age, 28 August 1999
126
Mark Riley, ‘Security Council Warns On East Timor Violence’, The Age, 28 May 1999 and Lindsay
Murdoch, ‘Jakarta Officials Set To Reject Poll’, The Age, 26 August 1999 and Robert Garran, ‘Timor
fallback – stagger the vote’, The Australian, 26 August 1999
127
Don Greenlees & Robert Garran, ‘Marching into tragedy’, The Australian, 8 September 1999 and
Mark Riley, ‘UN Likely To Approve Emergency Mission’, The Age, 9 September 1999 and Mark
Riley, ‘Security Council Fails To Act, Again’, The Age, 11 September 1999
128
Mark Riley, ‘UN Gives Jakarta Toughest Warning’, The Age, 8 September 1999 and Mark Riley, ‘A
Plea To Stay On From The UN’s Top Man’, The Age, 10 September 1999
129
Mark Riley, ‘Folly Of United Nations That Are Not United’, The Age, 11 September 1999
130
Colleen Ryan, ‘US-Indonesia Rift Widens Over East Timor Call’, Financial Review, 12 June 1997
and Colleen Ryan, ‘US-Indonesia Tiff’, Financial Review, 16 June 1997

163

the need for an “international presence” in East Timor. 131 No concrete actions were
taken, though, and neither were they after the April-massacres, apart from again
supporting an “international presence” in East Timor, and urging Indonesia to take
control over security in East Timor and stop the militia violence. 132 However, as
Joanne Gray stated, the US was already heavily involved in Kosovo, as well as in Iraq
with UNSCOM and in enforcing its own initiated no-fly zones, at the time, which
partly explains why they criticised Indonesia but did not take concrete action, as well
as the lack of action up until the APEC-summit in September. 133 When violence
continued in the lead-up to the ballot, the US State Department and Stanley Roth
issued strong warnings over and over again to the Indonesia government to halt its
support for the pro-integration militia and to stop the violence. 134 President Clinton
also got involved by writing a letter to Habibie in August to try to emphasise how
seriously the US looked at the situation. 135 However, the US did not impose any
economic sanctions on Indonesia and neither did it plan to take part in any possible
peacekeeping force, which eroded the strength of its repeated warnings. 136 It is not
until President Clinton was about to leave for the APEC-summit on 9 September that
word was put into action by cutting US military links with Indonesia and possibly
stopping financial aid as well. It seems to have been effective as Indonesia capitulated
only days later and allowed a force to enter East Timor. The US did not press
Indonesia with concrete actions but rather with strong statements, which would have
reinforced Australia’s stance rather than influenced them to change.
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The IMF and the World Bank only play a part at the end of the process in September
1999 but it is a crucial part, as it led to Indonesia giving in on the peacekeeping
demands. As major lenders to Indonesia they had the leverage to press them when
violence escalated in the beginning of September and the international community
tried to figure out how to get Indonesia to accept peacekeeping troops. By refusing or
delaying further payments to Indonesia, the IMF and the World Bank asserted tough
pressure, which would certainly have played a part in Indonesia finally giving in. The
IMF warned Indonesia on 8 September that future payments of up to $US6 billion
were at risk unless they curbed the violence in East Timor and a few days later called
off a delegation to Jakarta that was to discuss the next set of payments. 137 However,
its threats came after the Howard government had already changed its policy, so IMF
and World Bank pressure on Australian decision-making would have been minimal.

Briefly worth mentioning in this section is Portugal and Nelson Mandela. Because of
its role as the former colonial ruler in East Timor, Portugal was therefore a party to
UN negotiations over the future of the territory. Portugal would have had only a
minor influence, if any, on the Australian government but made its voice heard
anyway. Portugal took Australia to the International Court of Justice, challenging the
legality of the Timor Gap Treaty, but the court concluded in June 1995 that the treaty
was indeed legal. However, the case managed to put some light on the situation
regarding East Timor. 138 Portugal called for a peacekeeping force in April after the
massacres and again when violence broke out in early September. 139 It added to the
international storm of protest against Indonesia. This was further assisted when
Nelson Mandela turned world attention on East Timor in July 1997 when he visited
Gusmao in jail and urged his release. Mandela’s stature as a statesman and global
reputation helped in putting international focus on the East Timor-issue. 140 According
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to Ramos-Horta Mandela “ … had never met anyone as impressive as Xanana”. 141
Gusmao also met with other prominent statesmen. 142

Regional Factors
The strongest actor in this category is not ASEAN, APEC or New Zealand but
Xanana Gusmao and Bishop Belo. 143 These two leaders repeatedly urged the
Australian government to take action against Indonesia regarding East Timor,
Gusmao from his prison cell or house arrest and Belo from East Timor. Particularly
Gusmao frequently appeared in Australian newspapers as a symbol for the East
Timorese resistance and struggle towards independence.

Despite being in jail, Gusmao’s voice was often heard and his criticism of Australia’s
policy on East Timor, together with Ramos-Horta, certainly added to the continuous
pressure on the Howard government. He also met with the UN representative for East
Timor Jamsheed Marker 144 , US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 145 and even
Alexander Downer 146 himself, indicating Australia’s perceived importance in the
process. His comments therefore weighed heavily and caught the attention of the
Australian government. In similar style to Ramos-Horta, Gusmao often criticised the
Australian government but also praised them when they moved closer to his own
position. Gusmao argued for a longer period of autonomy within Indonesia for East
Timor in December 1998, and in that particular aspect he shared the view of the
Australian government’s policy shift that became public a month later. 147 However,
his comments to the policy shift reflected some bitterness towards past Australian
policy, saying that it was “long-overdue” and “we will not be throwing a party to
celebrate”. 148 Gusmao was disappointed with Australia’s integrationist position for
East Timor within Indonesia. 149 Furthermore, he first called for a UN peacekeeping
141
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force to be sent into East Timor in March 1999 and repeated that call in April and
May as violence flared up in East Timor, counter to the Australian view. 150 He
continued to add pressure to the Australian government for them to “urgently pressure
the Indonesian President, the Government and, in particular, the Minister for
Defence” stating this in a letter to Ambassador McCarthy 151 , and by making
statements like “My people are disappointed. We expected some strong, public
condemnation (from Australia).” 152

Gusmao kept making statements in the lead-up to the vote, again urging the need for a
UN peacekeeping force to stem the violence. 153 He was finally freed from his house
arrest in September 1999 after the vote 154 and spoke at a rally in Melbourne when the
protests were at its height, where he pleaded “I thank our friends, the people of
Australia, my brothers and sisters, Australian workers and Australian students. Please
help us, please help me to save my people”, pointedly leaving out the Australian
government in his thanks. 155 This only days after his father allegedly had been killed
in the violence in East Timor. 156 He continued throughout to be a direct and indirect
voice of criticism of the Australian government’s East Timor policy.

Catholic Bishop Carlos Belo was another strong East Timorese voice, like RamosHorta and Gusmao. Belo shared the Nobel Peace Prize with Ramos-Horta in 1996 and
was based in East Timor from where he fought for East Timor’s cause. He met with
US President Clinton 157 as well as President Habibie 158 to outline his arguments. He
also made several comments and statements that kept the East Timor-issue on the
agenda and thereby served as yet another – direct or indirect – critic of Australia’s
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policy. Belo brought severe criticism on Indonesia and its behaviour in East Timor. 159
When the Indonesian offer of either autonomy or independence for East Timor was
presented, Belo stated the need for a longer period of transition before independence
but it was clear that independence was always the end goal. 160 He appealed for
Australian assistance in the process 161 , and as violence escalated in the lead-up to the
ballot he urgently called for peacekeepers to be sent in to East Timor. 162 He finally
had to flee East Timor on 7 September as the violence flared.163

ASEAN did not serve as an influence for change in regards to Australia’s East Timor
policy, essentially because of its non-interventionist stand, worrying “that East Timor
could set a precedent for Western interference in the internal affairs of other member
states using the norm of humanitarian intervention as justification”. 164 The ASEAN
countries were therefore cautious to support an interventionist line of action in the
case of East Timor. 165 Thus, the other ASEAN countries had little interest in calling
for the Australian government to be tougher on Indonesia, rather the opposite is true.
It is possible, though, that a statement by the Philippines for Indonesia to stop the
violence and the offer of assistance to a possible peacekeeping force by Malaysia and
Thailand on 7 September 1999 helped influence Indonesia to accept it a few days
later. 166

APEC did not in itself play a role in Australia’s position on East Timor; however, the
fortunate timing of the APEC-summit in mid-September 1999 meant that it was used
to place pressure on Indonesia, as it gathered the regional leaders at the same place,
allowing them to make a concerted effort. 167 President Habibie choose not to attend,
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however APEC lobbying and discussion appeared to work, as Habibie declared on 12
September that peacekeepers would be allowed, just as APEC held its meetings. 168

NZ probably did not have any major influence over Australia’s East Timor-policy;
however, it was a symbolic move when a large majority of New Zealand
parliamentarians in May 1999 officially protested against the militia-led violence in
East Timor by handing over a petition to the Indonesian ambassador to disarm the
militia and to provide for a peacekeeping force. 169 Apart from that, New Zealand
played a minor, if any, part in influencing the Australian government.

Bilateral Relations
The two most important bilateral relationships for Australia in relation to the East
Timor-issue were Australia-Indonesia and Australia-US. These two will be looked at
in this section and how either of them may have influenced Australia’s decisionmaking process. Neither directly influenced Australia to change its policy, instead
they served to reinforce Australia’s position.

The Australian relationship with Indonesia over East Timor had been characterised by
successive Australian governments giving support to Indonesia’s claim of sovereignty
over East Timor. “Quiet diplomacy” was the preferred method as Howard did not
believe that “a confrontational approach” would lead anywhere and furthermore, he
believed the East Timorese simply had “to accept its place as an integral part of
Indonesia”. 170 The overall relationship took precedence over the issue of East Timor.
This is very much the situation in the investigated period as well, all the way up to the
policy shift in September, when the relationship finally breaks down. Downer saw the
potential for a final settlement of the East Timor-issue when Suharto stepped down
and Habibie announced the possibility of ‘Special status’ for East Timor. 171 The
Australian government worked towards that goal but a sense that there was not
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sufficient progress led to the Howard letter sent to Habibie in December 1998. 172 The
Indonesian reaction to the letter and the slight Australian policy shift was overall
negative. Habibe said that “he would not be dictated to on East Timor” and the
official comment stated that “we are certainly concerned and deeply regret that the
Australian Government has changed its policy on East Timor”. 173 The relationship
had taken its first blow since Habibie took over as President. The increased violence
in East Timor in February-April 1999 tested the relationship further. The two Aprilmassacres caused Howard to ask for a meeting with Habibie in an attempt to use
whatever influence Australia might have to get Indonesia to stop the cycle of violence
in East Timor. Although careful not to sound aggressive, Howard still stated “that
there was an unmistakeable impression in Australia that ABRI was turning a blind
eye”. 174 However, any notion that Australia would be able to persuade Indonesia to
accept international peacekeepers amounted to nothing, as Habibie refused to allow
any in. 175

The relationship deteriorated further in the lead-up to the ballot as the violence
continued. The Indonesian government questioned Australia’s objectivity and stated
“Australia cannot act as a godfather”. 176 The “quiet diplomacy” approach continued
with DFAT saying Australia had complained a total of 120 times to Indonesia about
the situation in East Timor. 177 Howard repeatedly phoned Habibie on the security
situation both before and after the ballot. 178 However, his calls had no effect on the
situation on the ground and after the result of the ballot was announced large scale
violence broke out. The relationship reached meltdown at this point and the “quiet
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diplomacy” approach was thrown aside. Different actions were contemplated, such as
cutting military links and stopping financial aid. Australia appealed to Indonesia to
stop the violence, warning it may be internationally isolated if nothing was done. 179
The “quiet diplomacy” had led to nothing and animosity instead became a feature of
the relationship. Australia’s relations with Indonesia served as an obstacle to change
rather than as an influence to change. The overall approach to maintain good relations
with Indonesia meant that the Australian government was careful not to look too
aggressive on the East Timor-issue, which of course meant not making any drastic
changes and this reinforced the status quo.

The Australia-US relationship over East Timor did not serve as an influence for
change. Rather, the US reluctance to contribute to a peacekeeping force was a source
of irritation for the Australian government when they had decided to finally change
policy. Stanley Roth and Ashley Calvert met in February 1999, after the slight
Australian policy shift, to discuss the new situation and how to prevent violence on
the ground in East Timor to get out of hand. At that stage, Roth floated the idea of a
peacekeeping force but the notion was rejected by Calvert, as Australia at that time
was against a peacekeeping force in East Timor, instead focussing on a diplomatic
approach. 180 That would soon change but the irony was the American reluctance to
commit to a peacekeeping force in September 1999 when Australia began pushing for
one. The US had indicated that it wanted a large Australian part in a potential
peacekeeping force after the ballot but in meetings between Roth and Calvert in July,
Australia was still hesitant to declare any such commitment for fear of upsetting its
Indonesia-relations. 181 Any policy difference between Australia and the US was
denied 182 but tension increased in September when Australia wanted an American
commitment to a peacekeeping force. The Americans for their part left it to Australia
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to call for such a force and to take charge. 183 The Australia-US alliance was
somewhat shaken when Howard and Downer in an unusual direct manner asked for
US assistance on East Timor in September 1999. Howard referred to previous
Australian commitments to American-led operations when he spoke to Clinton, and it
was understood that Australia now expected something back. 184 Howard’s comment
on 10 September indicates Australia’s disappointment on the American position: “I
understand the Americans have broken their military ties (with Indonesia),”…”I
understand those military ties are worth $700,000 a year. I’d rather they publicly offer
some troops and keep their military ties, quite frankly”. He continued: “I don’t think
the Americans have yet put as much pressure on as we would like”. 185 Howard’s
disappointment with the US can certainly be detected in these remarks and shows the
limited interest of the US in East Timor.

Non-State Actors
There were two types of actors in this category that may have had an influence on the
Australian government, if only indirect. One is human rights organisations, such as
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Carter Center. The other is East
Timor activists such as the East Timor Action Network and the International
Federation for East Timor.

Amnesty International continuously reported on human rights violations in East
Timor. 186 It also criticised the Australian government in 1997 on its human rights
record on East Timor refugees “and its reluctance to condemn human rights violations
in Indonesia and East Timor”. 187 Downer responded that the criticism was
“disgraceful, gratuitous and based on ignorance of Australia’s policies in relation to
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East Timor”. 188 His angry response shows that Amnesty touched a raw nerve with the
government and that there was some basis to the claims. Amnesty International
helped keep up the pressure on the government with its numerous reports on the onthe ground situation in East Timor. For example, Amnesty International released a
report in June 1999 which showed the “distinct pattern of human rights violations in
East Timor, which began before the 5 May Agreement were signed and has continued
since the, creating an atmosphere of insecurity and intimidation”. Amnesty
International showed the direct link between the Indonesian military and the prointegrationist militia. 189 Amnesty International kept up its criticism of the violence in
East Timor in the lead-up to the ballot, warning of the danger facing voters and during
the violence that broke out afterwards.190 Throughout the crisis, Amnesty
International served to keep the spotlight on the atrocities committed in East Timor,
which would have indirectly added to the pressure on the government.

Human Rights Watch and the Carter Center similarly reported on the human rights
violations in East Timor and thereby kept highlighting the East Timor-issue to the
Australian public and government. Human Rights Watch produced reports, such as
the “Indonesia/East Timor: Deteriorating human rights in East Timor”-report of
1997 191 and commented on specific events. By doing that, it ensured that violations
were taken up by newspapers and brought to public attention, adding to the
pressure. 192 The Carter Center issued reports in July and August 1999 on pre- and
post-ballot violence in East Timor, stating “no significant improvements in the
security situation in East Timor or fulfilment by the Government of Indonesia (GOI)
of its security obligations under the 5 May New York agreements”, and also showing
the link between Indonesian military and the pro-integrationist militia. They also
188
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reported on being forced to leave East Timor under threat from the militia. 193
Together with Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, they all painted a
gruesome picture of the state of affairs there. Overall, these organisations had an
indirect influence but on a minor scale in terms of influencing the Australian
government.

Key Decision-Makers
Howard and Downer were the two main decision-makers in relation to the East
Timor-issue. Downer took care of the day-to-day affairs, at least during 1997 and
1998. He still did so in 1999 but Howard took on a larger role beginning with the
letter he sent to Habibie in December 1998. Once it gets to April and the Bali summit,
and definitely by September 1999, Howard had taken control of the decision-making
process.

Greg Hunt argues that Downer first thought of a possible way to solve the East
Timor-issue in February 1998. According to Hunt, he instructed DFAT to look at
policy alternatives. 194 The situation then changed with the fall of Suharto and Downer
began exploring new ways to perhaps solve the East Timor-issue. Downer himself
stated: “We thought it would be good to resolve the East Timor issue once and for
all”. 195 Downer believed that the East Timorese had to take part in the process or any
agreement would never gain support on the ground in East Timor. 196 Downer again
asked DFAT in the second half of 1998 to look at ways to help the process along
towards East Timorese autonomy. The thinking that the East Timorese had to be
involved led to the idea of some sort of autonomy for East Timor within Indonesia as
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a way for resolving the issue. 197 Downer was clearly the driving actor of the two at
this stage of the process. 198

As Alison McPhail argues, it appears that Howard become more involved as the slight
policy shift became public in early 1999. 199 Downer still was the main face outward
on the issue, however Howard increased his visibility. The concerns over the
increasing violence in East Timor in February and March, culminating with the two
massacres in April, led Howard to himself take the initiative for a meeting with
Habibie in Bali at the end of April. 200 By now, it seems that Howard had taken a
leading role in the decision-making process. By late August and early September
Howard was clearly acting the statesman and led the decision-making. He is
constantly on the phone with Habibie, Clinton and Annan, trying to, at first, ensure
security for the ballot and its aftermath, and then when that fails to occur, he works
towards getting Indonesia to accept a peacekeeping force. He is also very visible in
terms of press conferences and interviews to get his government’s view out to the
public. McPhail argues that Howard responds to domestic pressures and it is evident
that as a pragmatic politician, he aims to respond to the public outcry to “do
something” 201 . The Bali summit is partly a response to domestic pressure and the
more aggressive stance in September is certainly also at least partly due to domestic
pressure. 202

Howard and Downer’s pragmatic and realist approach to foreign policy explains the
long standing view of theirs that overall relations with Indonesia superseded the issue
of East Timor. Downer’s initial approaches seem to focus on solving the issue rather
than concern for human rights. As the process continues throughout 1999, the
197
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approach still appears to be to minimise damage to their relationship with Indonesia
and it is not until it becomes clear in early September that things had gone too far that
they give up on it. Downer is initially the main driving force but after the Howardletter, Howard is taking over more and more.

Window of Opportunity
The Window of Opportunity in changing Australian policy towards Indonesia
regarding East Timor opened with the resignation of President Suharto of Indonesia in
May 1998. It was unlikely that East Timor’s situation would have changed
substantially while Suharto was still in power but with Habibie taking office as
President, there was a sense that a solution could be reached.

The ALP had already changed its policy 1997/1998 but the government did not seize
the moment to do the same. Neither did they do so once the window was open;
instead reaffirming its position that East Timor should remain a part of Indonesia.
Even with the Howard-letter, which was referred to as a 30 degree-change, the
essential aspects of the old policy remained. At the same time, there was a feeling
that the window to do anything at all on East Timor was closing fast. Habibie was
generally seen as an interim president and it was therefore perceived important to
push the process forward to avoid a changed attitude from a future president, while at
the same time avoiding to actually making the change in policy.

The Howard government remained steadfast to hold on to the old policy in 1999,
sticking to a policy that would minimise the damage to the overall Australia-Indonesia
relationship, trying not to let the East Timor-issue affect it too much. There were no
initiatives to act on the Window of Opportunity and change its policy until they were
essentially presented with a fait accompli in September 1999. As it turned out, the
Window of Opportunity was there from the fall of Suharto to September 1999 but was
not acted upon. As it was not perceived as an opportunity, the window was not acted
upon and instead the government played catch-up politics throughout the process and
was more or less forced by domestic pressures and international events to reluctantly
change policy in September from factors outside of its control.
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Typology of change
There are two changes to consider in Australia’s foreign policy regarding East Timor.
First, the smaller change that was introduced in December 1998 when Howard sent
the letter to Habibie, proposing a lengthy period of autonomy for East Timor within
Indonesia (10-15 years), followed by an act of self-determination. The change only
amount to Refinement on the typology scale, despite the rhetoric at the time, as the
basic goals were the same. The Howard-government still wanted East Timor to
remain part of Indonesia and the overall objective of maintaining a good relationship
with Indonesia was still a priority over the issue of East Timor. There was also a mix
of old and new instruments used in this policy change. Quiet diplomacy and emphasis
on the relationship with Indonesia remained, while a new instrument – the letter - was
used as a new, more direct approach to influence Indonesia’s East Timor policy.

The second change was the major foreign policy change in September 1999, which
ultimately led to Australia leading the INTERFET-mission into East Timor. It is here
classified as a Redirection, as several previous goals were abandoned and some
remained. The Howard-government was forced to give up its (and previous
governments) policy of having a good relationship with Indonesia at any cost over
any issues regarding East Timor, instead adopting a more aggressive tone towards
Indonesia. Still, the overall goal of a good relationship with Indonesia was obviously
still there, so the general sense of the goal was remained. It decided to lead a
peacekeeping force into East Timor, something they had earlier been, if not
completely against, at least apprehensive to do. Australia now had to accept an
independent East Timor and the old goal of an end to the violence in East Timor
remained; however, the instrument in reaching that goal changed from quiet
diplomacy to a more direct approach.

Consequences of change
The Howard government’s change in policy had large consequences. The relationship
with Indonesia that they had aimed for so long to protect was in tatters and would take
a long time to repair. The political impact was the greatest consequence of the policy
change. Relations with Indonesia plummeted and there were already anti-Australian
feelings in Indonesia in September, albeit only expressed on a lesser level through
demonstrations outside the Australian embassy. In the presidential election in
177

Indonesia in October, anti-Australian sentiments played a part as well. However,
despite those feelings, actual political and economic effects were slight. 203

It did not help however, that Howard was seen as “too triumphant in Indonesia’s
humiliation, depicting his government as repudiating decades of failed appeasement
of Indonesia”. 204 The “deputy-sheriff”-debate that came out of an interview with The
Bulletin, gave the picture of a new arrogant Australia that would be much more active
in the region. The angry reaction from Indonesia and several Asian states did not help
matter either. Howard refuted the “deputy sheriff”-implications but the damage was
done. 205 However, perhaps it was the logical consequence of the US’s reluctance to
commit peacekeeping troops to the East Timor-intervention and Australia’s
realisation that it may have to stand on its own two feet much more from now on.

Howard himself stated, in regards to Indonesia, that “it was going to take a while to
rebuild the relationship”. 206 Indonesia had as a result of the intervention dissolved the
Australia-Indonesia security agreement and Indonesia did not replace its ambassador
immediately when his term was up but there was no disruption in actual diplomatic
relations. 207 So Australia-Indonesian relations, although shaken, did not deteriorate to
the extent of full hostility and only began to ‘normalise’ with Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono becoming president of Indonesia in October 2004.

Conclusion
Australian foreign policy change towards Indonesia in regards to East Timor came
about in September 1999 after strong domestic pressure from public opinion, the
media and interest groups that interacted to put pressure on the government. The ALP
added pressure with its policy shift and the combined pressure from these domestic
factors made it essentially impossible for the government not to change its policy.
These factors interacted with events in Indonesia and East Timor to eventually add
enough pressure on the government to change policy. Other international factors had
an indirect role in that the pressure put on the Indonesian government would not have
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gone unnoticed by Australia. In light of that external pressure, it was difficult for the
Howard government to act against most of the international community, whether they
would have wanted to or not. However, it was not until September 1999 that the
change occurred, due to the key decision-makers perception up to that time that the
overall Australia-Indonesia relationship took precedence over the East Timor-issue. In
September 1999 however, it was perceived by Howard and Downer that the cost of
holding on to the old policy was simply too great and it led to the policy change. In
the end it led to a strong deterioration of relations between Australia and Indonesia,
something they aimed at avoiding all along, with Australia’s leadership of
INTERFET.

The next chapter introduces the second case study in this thesis on Australia’s foreign
policy change towards Solomon Islands in 2003. It will first provide a background to
the breakdown of Solomon Islands law and order and of its economy. It then
investigates Australian foreign policy towards Solomon Islands from its independence
until the change in policy in 2003.
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Chapter 6: Australian Foreign Policy Change towards
Solomon Islands
Introduction
Australian foreign policy towards Solomon Islands from its independence in 1978 up
until the RAMSI-intervention in 2003 was characterised by a “hands-off”-approach.
A fear of being seen as a “neo-colonial” caused Australian governments to provide
aid, technical assistance and diplomats to help negotiate between competing groups,
but requests for more direct assistance in the form of police and military were
consistently declined. Meanwhile, the situation in Solomon Islands was steadily
deteriorating economically, socially, and politically with increasing levels of violence
and a breakdown of the rule of law.

This chapter will discuss the background to the 1998-2000 conflict and subsequent
problems of the Solomon Islands state. It will investigate Solomon Islands economy
and the social effects caused by the conflict, as well as the failure of Australian
foreign policy towards Solomon Islands up to the policy change in May 2003. It
demonstrates that the Australian government held on to its “hands-off”-approach
despite the deterioration of the Solomon Islands economy and its law and order
situation. The change finally occurred when Foreign Minister Alexander Downer
began to understand that the current policy was not working. It coincided with a letter
being sent by Solomon Islands Prime Minister Allen Kemakeza asking for assistance,
with rumours of Indonesia being approached for help by Solomons officials, the end
of major combat operations in Iraq, and increased pressure from think-tanks to change
policy towards a more “hands-on”-approach.

After years of avoiding the prospect of becoming more involved in the direct affairs
of Solomon Islands, and the risk of being seen as a neo-colonial power or having a
long term-commitment with no clear exit strategy, Australia moved very rapidly
during the April-July of 2003 toward full-scale intervention. This carried the
responsibility of long-term involvement for security, economy and the provision of
governmental services through RAMSI. In contrast to the case of East Timor, with
Solomon Islands there was very limited media interest in events prior to intervention
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and no significant swell of public opinion to drive government thinking. Instead the
foreign policy change emerged from a new paradigm of security at an international
level that flowed through to impress upon key decision makers their regional
responsibilities. Within this context the role of ASPI was significant as it provided a
clear framework for action and suggested how the situation could be resolved to
enhance Australian security.

Background: a Nationless State
Solomon Islands is located in the South Pacific east of Papua New Guinea and
consists of six main islands – Guadalcanal, Malaita, Santa Isabel, San Cristobal, New
Georgia, and Choiseul - and hundreds of smaller islands and atolls. The total land
area is 28 369 sq km with an additional 1.34 million km2 of water. The population
stood at 460 000 as of 2004 and consists mainly of Melanesians (94.5 %). There are
also Polynesians (3%), Micronesians, European, Chinese and “others” (2.5 %). 1 The
main exports are timber, fish, copra, palm oil, and cocoa. 2 Solomon Islands is diverse
in terms of language, ethnicity, and custom. The large majority are Christians (90 %),
while the remaining 10 % follow other local religions. 3

Britain established a protectorate over what is today the southern part of Solomon
Islands in 1893. The British then took over the northern islands (New Georgia,
Shortland Islands, Santa Isabel, Choiseul, Vella Lavella) from Germany six years
later. 4 Solomon Islands was from then on a British colony up until it was given selfgovernment in 1976 and finally full independence in 1978. 5
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National identity is a new phenomenon in the Solomon Islands. People instead
traditionally identify with their particular island or their village, clan, or even
language. Government after government had proven unable or unwilling to provide
adequate assistance to the provinces. Secessionist demands to different extents
followed from this lack of trust in the government from several areas in the Solomon
Islands. 6 Perceived differences in the distribution of wealth between urban and rural
people and between different regions in Solomon Islands fuelled the tensions and
were some of the main reasons behind the outbreak of violence in 1998. 7 Since there
is no strong common Solomon identity and tensions between different groups began
to build, the issue of a weak trust in the government came to a head. Demonstrations
occurred in Honiara in 1988 and riots in 1989, relating to these problems, and served
as a prelude to the tension that would come to a boil 10 years later. 8

The literature surrounding Solomon Islands and its recent problems is now quite
extensive and in general very well written and researched. Of particular note has been
the work of Jon Fraenkel, Clive Moore, Sinclair Dinnen and Tarcisius Kabutaulaka,
all of whom have been used extensively in this chapter. Their knowledge of the
people and politics of Solomon Islands have been invaluable for this thesis as they
explain complex situations clearly and move beyond simplistic arguments of ethnicity
as being primarily responsible for the outbreak of the troubles.
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There are between 60-87 different languages spoken on the Solomon Islands,
depending on the source, with Melanesian pidgin being the lingua franca of
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communication among the population. 9 The numbers vary, however, it is clear that
the large number of languages spoken within a population of only about 500 000
people, has important implications, and increases the difficulties in building a nation.
The capital was moved from Tulagi on the island of Florida to Honiara in
Guadalcanal during 1953. Japanese and American troops had left behind vital
infrastructure, such as buildings, roads and an airport, making Honiara the logical
choice as the Solomon capital. 10

People from other islands began migrating to Honiara in search of work, most of
whom came from Malaita.11 The migration had begun already during the Second
World War when many Malaitans moved to Honiara to work for the allies against the
Japanese. 12 Honiara’s population increased quickly and reached 5 000 in the 1960s.13
The development in Guadalcanal naturally attracted people from Malaita, who had
nothing of the sort. Many of the people that left Malaita moved to Guadalcanal which
upset the traditional order as traditional land went into the hands of the new settlers
from Malaita. 14 In fact, between 1978 and 1986 more people moved out of Malaita
than in, while the opposite took place in Guadalcanal, which illustrates the migration
tendencies. 15 There were some restrictions on migration before independence but they
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were removed when Solomon Islands gained independence in 1978. 16 The rapidly
increasing population caused tensions between locals and settlers, as Honiara became
the centre for development in Solomon Islands. The urbanisation and migration upset
traditional cultures and customs, which was particularly apparent between people
from Guadalcanal and Malaita. 17 The migration to Honiara and Guadalcanal caused
resentment among the existing indigenous population, which later was one of the root
causes for the outbreak of violence in 1998. The Guadalcanal youth that took to arms
felt that the Malaitan settlers had moved in on their traditional land, without
appropriate compensation being issued. 18 It is part of, and a normal occurrence, in
Solomon-tradition to offer compensation for any wrongdoing in order to preserve
relationships and to reduce tension. 19

There are three ways that new migrants could get land on Guadalcanal: They could
buy “alienated land from the government”; they could buy tribal land or customary
land from traditional land owners”, or they could be given land as payment for
work. 20 According to Melanesian tradition, the spirits of one’s ancestors are part of
the land, which is why the current land holders have a responsibility to look after it,
which makes selling the land like selling the spirits as well. The other consequence of
selling the land is of course that future generations that would have had inherited the
land lose any chance of taking over from their ancestors. 21 Morgan Wairiu has
pointed out the clash between the modern Western society’s view on land with the
traditional Solomon view;

The outside world sees land as a resource base, a commodity, something that is bought
and sold. Land is something that can be used to make a profit. Solomon Islanders, on the
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other hand, understand it as part of their life and not as a commodity, not something that
can be bought and sold. 22

These different views on land were a further underlying reason to the tension and
subsequent fighting. Guadalcanal adheres to a tradition wherein women are
considered in charge of the land. The matrilineal societal order was upset when land
was sold to people from other islands and provinces, often by males, often bypassing
their clans, which inevitably led to arguments between different land owners. Anger
and bitterness on this issue among the young and the women was one of the main
causes for the outbreak of violence in 1998.23 Increasingly, resentment spread as more
and more Malaitans came to Guadalcanal and the land issue became more apparent.
Blame was cast on the settlers rather than on the people that had sold the land in the
first place. 24 Yet another reason for the fighting is pointed out by Chevalier. He states
that 63 % of the population in the Solomon Islands were under the age of 25. 25
Liloqula and Pollard estimated in 2000 that 48 % of the population is under 14 years
of age and 75 % of the population is under the age of 30 years. 26 Few get enough
schooling; many are unemployed, which makes ‘security’ an attractive profession.
Easy money could be made through criminal acts like robbery, while at the same time
giving young men a sense of status and power, much preferable to being unemployed
and poor. 27 Rapid population growth put a strain on education and health services and
to ensure enough land for everyone to live from. 28 Consequently there were many
young, unemployed, resentful people who felt that the government did not provide
jobs for them, while people from other islands came in and took those jobs, while also
taking their traditional land. These feelings came to a head in late 1998 when a group
of Guale people (those indigenous to the island of Guadalcanal) took up arms and
began attacking Malaitan settlers, since in their mind the government had not dealt
22
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with the problem. The tensions had been brewing for many years and it finally
exploded into violence in December 1998. 29

The Solomon Islands economy up to 1998
The British initially focused on plantations as the main feature in the Solomon
economy. 30 The Second World War disrupted these plans, although it took until the
1960s before attention was fully given to other areas. 31 After independence, the main
activities for the formal Solomon Islands economy have been forestry and fishing
with logging particularly prominent leading to the exploitation of forests on many
islands. Government officials found that there was money to be made by forging
alliances with logging companies. Timber exports rose sharply in the early 1990s to
average 45 % of overall exports between 1990 and 1998. 32 The Asian financial crisis
had a negative impact on the logging industry and thereby on the Solomon economy
in general in 1997-98. 33 However, due to mismanagement by the government,
including corruption, most of the revenue generated from the logging industry went to
foreign logging companies instead of the Solomon Government, causing further
resentment among the people on many of the islands. The anger was further fuelled in
Guadalcanal when settlers from other islands were perceived to take part in the
exploitation. 34 Meanwhile the economy was deteriorating rapidly. At the end of 1997
state debt stood at S$ 1.2 billion, more than twice the government’s annual budget.
Kabutaulaka lists several reasons for this situation, such as bad management of the
economy, “uncontrolled spending and non-collection of revenue”, “substantial fraud
and theft by government servants”, and “large amount of money given to
parliamentary members” all contributing to the declining Solomons economy. 35
Dinnen and Kabutaulaka both argue that the 1997 election showed the public’s
29
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mistrust of the government, as about half of the Members of Parliament were voted
out, the biggest change in parliament yet. 36

Corruption has been a common feature in the Solomons economy. Peter Larmour
presents two examples of high-level corruption in the Solomon government. In the
1980s a World Bank-funded project to provide textbooks and other essential material
to schools highlighted the problem when an Australian consultant was found by an
inquiry to have given payments to the permanent secretary in the Ministry of
Education in the Solomon Islands, possibly to look the other way, as it emerged that
there were indications of too close of a relationship between the provider and the
receiver, with the Australian consultant having close ties both to the project and to the
company selling textbooks to schools involved in the project. Both denied any
wrongdoing. An even worse case took place in 1995 when a Malaysian logging
company paid off government members, among them the current Minister for
Commerce Employment and Trade, and the Minister for Finance and Home Affairs,
presumably to receive favourable contracts. 37 Knowledge of corruption fed a public
mistrust of the government, which already was perceived to be creating increased
disparity in wealth. Solomon national identity was weak due to the diversity of the
Solomon population as peoples’ associations were primarily local, either village or
clan, and in combination with a rapidly growing population, tensions due to migration
to Guadalcanal, the clash of cultures and traditions, and many unemployed youths, by
1998 the Solomon Islands was on the brink of civil war.

1998-2002 – Tension, violence and lawlessness
Violence broke out in December 1998 in Guadalcanal when a group calling itself the
Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM), previously known as both the Guadalcanal
Revolutionary Army (GRA) and the Isatabu Freedom Fighters (IFF), 38 took to arms
and began to harassing and even killing settlers from other islands, mainly Malaitans.
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Reports told of about 80 people being killed or missing, and numerous incidents of
rape and torture have been documented as well. Between 20 000 and 35 000 people
were forced from their homes by July 1999 as a result of the violence. 39

The root causes to the outbreak of violence was the resentment felt by (mostly young)
Guadalcanalese men, stemming from a feeling that settlers from other islands were
taking jobs away from them, had taken land from them, and had not shown proper
respect to their local culture. 40 A badly managed economy also contributed to the
situation and the resentment which led to the uprising. The perception that
government members were getting rich from exploiting minerals and that the people
from Guadalcanal had received little from the developments made in Honiara were
also part of the reasons for the outbreak of violence. 41

In May 1998 Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu paid compensation moneys to
the families of two Malaitan girls who had been raped. This money however came
from Guadalcanalese grants, causing resentment among the people of Guadalcanal.
They accused him of favouritism, as the Prime Minister himself was Malaitan. They
demanded compensation for 25 Guadalcanalese people murdered over the last 20
years and at this point harassment of Malaitan settlers began in earnest. 42 The anger
and resentment built up throughout the years, the differences in customs,
unemployment, and the sense of being cheated by the government was unleashed, as
Guadalcanalese began to acquire weapons by raiding ammunition storages, started to
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harass and make further demands for compensation from Malaitan settlers.43 Amnesty
International reported widespread violence, abductions, torture, rape, murders, forced
displacements, looting and burning down of homes, particularly during the conflict
1998-2000, but also after the mid-2000 coup by members of both sides of the conflict.
These abuses were conducted not only by gangs, but also by police, which shows the
breakdown of the law and order in society. 44

Government responses to the conflict failed due to its inability to exert power.
Government officials were more interested in profits for them selves or for the group
they belonged to. In mid-1999 45 a group of Honiara Malaitans formed the Malaita
Eagle Force (MEF) to counter the IFM. The MEF launched a campaign against the
IFM and its supporters, thereby intensifying the conflict further. 46 Its main aim was to
seek compensation for the forced evictions of thousands of Malaitans. 47 To make the
matters worse The Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) consisted mainly of
Malaitans and many of them supported the MEF. 48

Popular feeling that the government of Prime Minister Ulufa’alu had not acted fast
enough on the issue of compensation led first to the formation of the MEF in early
2000, then to a coup. On 5 June 2000 the MEF together with parts of the police force
seized the police armoury and essentially forced the Ulufa’alu-government to step
down. Manasseh Sogavare became the new Prime Minister, in a parliamentary session
clearly under duress. 49 The new government began to issue compensations to the
amount of S$10 million dollars. 50 However, hostilities between the MEF and the IFM
43
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continued and even increased. More than 200 people died during the conflict. 51 The
positions became clearer with the MEF holding Honiara, with the rest of Guadalcanal
being controlled by the IFM. Negotiations continued but were unsuccessful until a
peace agreement was brokered and facilitated by the Australian and New Zealand
governments and reached in Townsville, Australia on 15 October 2000. 52 Under the
Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) the two main actors in the conflict, agreed to end
hostilities and to return weapons. 53

The TPA did not however deliver what it promised. Flaws in the agreement were
pointed out by several scholars and it became quickly apparent that it would not last
long. The return of weapons clause was far from perfect: 1 131 weapons were
returned between November 2000 – July 2001 overseen by the International Peace
Monitoring Team (IPMT), but many also went missing only to turn up with the
militants again, mainly because the loyalties of some of the police officers in charge
lay with the militants. 54 Kabutaulaka points out further weaknesses with the
agreement. Its first mistake was the assumption that the IFM and MEF had clear
hierarchies and membership, allowing them to carry out the agreement. The two
groupings were in reality much more loosely held together, to wit the leaders did not
have the actual control over ‘members’. Furthermore, amnesty was given to earlier
violations and criminal acts made by the combatants, so no one was held accountable
for what had transpired during the conflict. Moreover, the only parties attached to the
agreement were the government and the MEF and IMF. Other groups and parts of the
country were not represented, leaving the future open for further tension and conflict.
Allegiance to an ethnic group or clan preceded any loyalty to the government, leaving
a weak government, unable to enforce the TPA. 55

The conflict displaced an estimated 35 000 people, or 58.6 % of the Guadalcanal
population, by mid-1999, according to Jon Fraenkel. Many Malaitans fled back to
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their home island or to the capital Honiara which even though located on Guadalcanal
became a stronghold for Malaitans during this time. 56 Despite the fact that the
situation had improved in the Solomon Islands after the TPA, it was far from perfect.
The IMF and the MEF had reduced tension but many areas were still unstable. No
side trusted the other enough to give up all its weapons. Some militants had broken
free from the main groups and continued fighting so the conflict moved from being
between the IMF and the MEF to become harder to define. Gangs and subgroups
continued to use the breakdown of law and order to further their own interests, the
most notorious of which was Harold Keke on the Weathercoast. 57

The mismanagement of the economy continued as evidenced by two cases: In July
2001, the then deputy Prime Minister and minister for National Unity, Reconciliation
and Peace, Allen Kemakeza, gave himself a check for S$ 800 000 for “compensation”
and another S$ 750 000 to his permanent secretary. Both were fired when it was
exposed but it goes to show how the “compensation”-culture was misused,
contributing to the deteriorating economy and a lack of public confidence in the
state’s political institutions. 58

In an effort to curt the general lawlessness a program of “Special Constables” was
created shortly after the coup to get militias from the two movements to receive
training in combat and to retrain them in practical jobs, such as electricians, in order
“to bring these young people who are now used to holding guns back to normal life”.
Special Constables soon outnumbered the regular police. 59 But this was not a solution
as some Special Constables were suspected of extorting villagers, which increased
tensions further. A Special Constable was murdered in early February in Honiara and
two more on 22 February near the sea border to Bougainville60 , further highlighting
the deteriorating law and order situation. Another attempt to rid the criminal elements
and militants of weapons began 1 May 2002, when another 31-day gun amnesty was
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issued by the government and overseen by the IPMT team, who collected the
surrendered weapons, in order to try to halt the violence. 61 Over 800 weapons were
handed in, however, it was suggested that about 500 “military-style weapons” were
still unaccounted for. The gun-amnesty was undermined by none other than the Prime
Minister Kemakeza himself, admitting later that he suggested to militants on both
sides to hold on to their weapons while he was negotiating Keke’s surrender. The
negotiations came to nothing and weapons remained with the militants. 62

In September 2002 five people were killed and another 11 injured in violence on
Guadalcanal on three separate occasions. Among the atrocities committed was the
decapitation of a Solomon church deacon on the Weather Coast of Guadalcanal,
South of Honiara. Only his head was recovered. 63 There were further killings in
November when two people were shot on the Weathercoast, one of them a
policeman. 64

Jon Fraenkel illustrates the lawlessness of the Solomon society at the time with the
resignation of Finance Minister Laurie Chan in December 2002. Chan was forced to
write a cheque for S$ 3.6 million made out to armed police officers for what was
claimed to be “unpaid salaries”. Furthermore, Special constables fired shots at the
Prime Minister’s house in retaliation for not being given compensation they felt they
were entitled to, such as the above mentioned “unpaid salaries”.65 With a government
being extorted by its own police and public servants, there was even less hope to
revive the ailing Solomon Islands economy.

A well-known Solomon peace activist, Sir Fredrick Soaki, was assassinated on 10
February 2003. Soaki had worked to persuade “special constables” to disarm, and was
having dinner with them when a masked man showed up and shot him in cold blood.
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Soaki’s murder further illustrates the breakdown of law and order. 66 A police officer
was arrested for Soaki’s murder but managed to flee from prison, possibly assisted by
top-level officials. 67

The violence in Solomon Islands caught the attention of the Australian media when it
was reported that an Australian missionary was beheaded over a land dispute on 18
May 2003. 68 This occurred only days after several banks in the Solomons had to close
and staff had to leave after a failed pyramid scheme had resulted in threats towards
the banks. 69 On 12 May Westpac, ANZ and other banks closed for the protection of
their staff but opened again a day later. 70 By May 2003 Solomon Islands was viewed
by others as a state in turmoil.

In this “failed state” the most infamous figure during 2002-03 was rebel leader Harold
Keke, who had his base on the Weathercoast on Guadalcanal. Keke had been involved
on the Guale side of the fighting 1998-2001 but had cut his ties with that group and
had organised an independent force, terrorising the villages of the Weather Coast.71 In
August 2002 he claimed responsibility for killing his former ally the Minister for
Sport, Youth and Women’s Affairs Father Augustine Geve, 72 of to whom Keke’s
group had lent its support in the elections only 8 months earlier. 73 When the police
tried to capture Keke in October 2002, seven men were killed in the fighting. 74

RSIP’s hunt for Keke was unsuccessful; instead he continued his campaign of
intimidation. It was reported in November 2002 that up to 3000 people were forced to
stop working on Mondays and Fridays, since Keke had forbidden them to do so –
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“Instead they were told they were only allowed to pray”. 75 In the continued search for
Keke and his supporters another nine people lost their lives by them in April 2003.
Reports further suggested that the Keke gang could be responsible for another 12
deaths as well. 76 He went on to take missionaries hostage on the Weathercoast, 77
which were later released, four Anglican brothers in early July, and three more
Anglican brothers were given their freedom on 23 July, only days before the RAMSIintervention after spending over two months in captivity. 78 Just before the release of
the missionaries, Keke’s gang ambushed police on the weekend 14-15 June, killing
six officers. 79

By June 2003 it was clear that Solomon Islands was in dire straits. Murders,
harassments, extortion, corruption and fear were rife. The law and order situation was
disastrous and there was not much improvement in sight. When Cyclone Zoe had hit
Solomon Islands in January 2003, it had highlighted the poor conditions and the lack
of basic services the government could provide. For example, police refused to man
rescue boats with relief aid until they received money. 80 The degradation of society
cannot be illustrated any better, with people refusing to help their fellow men unless
money was exchanged. Corruption and a lack of trust in the government’s ability to
provide had finally led to an “every man to him self” situation.

Allen Kemakeza, himself sacked for corruption in 2002, was now the Prime Minister
but did not go to his office to work anymore and was employing what Mary-Louise
O’Callaghan described as “some of Honiara’s better-known thugs to handle his
‘personal security’”. 81 When the highest ranking official in the land did not dare to
work outside of his home the security situation was dire indeed. The government did
not have control over its territory with Harold Keke terrorising the Weather Coast and
the streets of Honiara were not deemed safe, even by the Prime Minister. The words
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of the Governor of Solomon Islands Central Bank emphasised the situation: “We are
in a situation where breaking laws and not complying with government regulations is
now the norm”. 82 Such was the situation in the Solomon Islands in May/June 2003.

Solomon Islands economy 1998-2003
The size of the economy had already steadily declined due to the Asian Financial
Crisis and the negative effects that had on the Solomon economy, particularly in the
logging sector. 83 Now the economy suffered severely from the conflict. Between 1998
and 2002 GDP fell by 24 % and formal government debt increased by over 40 %.
Poor economic management and overspending by the government and its ministers
was part of the problem but militants and even parts of the police used extortion to
collect “compensation” from the Treasury, which caused the economy to deteriorate
further. 84 The Gold Ridge mine on Guadalcanal and the Solomon Taiyo fish cannery
at Noro in the Western Province both had to shut down which increased the rapid
decline of the Solomon economy. 85 Connell has even argued that the closure of the
Gold Ridge mine was what finally caused the economy to crumple. 86

Even worse off, according to Satish Chand, was the financial sector. Many companies
had closed down operations in the Solomons and other foreign investors had left.
Investment confidence declined sharply putting an increased strain on the already
deteriorating economy. 87 During the conflict 1998-2000, Chand noted the palm oil
industry went from producing 30 000 ton a year to nothing when the Solomon Islands
Plantation Limited (SIPL) closed. Also, fish production decreased by more than half
its production. 88 In some states economic contraction of this magnitude would be
catastrophic however, it should be noted that roughly 75 % of the Solomon islanders
were not involved in the formal side of the economy and practical subsistence fishing
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and agriculture. In the villages people remained mostly unaffected but urban centres
were hard hit. 89

The government of Taiwan issued grants and loans to the Solomon government after
the TPA of October 2000 in exchange for speeches of support by Solomon Islands for
Taiwanese membership of the United Nations (UN). 90 Among them was a $US25
million loan in June 2001. 91 However, most of the money went to pay compensationclaims of various kinds, such as for lost property, and did little to get the economy
back on its feet. 92

So, despite the peace agreement being in place, the situation remained tense and
outbreaks of violence continued. The economy was in a downward spiral and the
Solomon Islands faced bankruptcy. The country was well on the way to become what
policy makers termed a “failed state”, as described in ASPI’s report later released in
2003. 93 The government no longer had control over spending and had no solution to
stop the downward spiral. The Kemakeza-government attempted to regain control of
the economy when in February 2002 it presented a recovery-plan, which included
cutting down public service staff levels and reining in government spending. At the
same time, though, Prime Minister Allen Kemakeza admitted that “the desperate
economic situation was now a fact of life” for Solomon Islands. 94 The continued
unrest did nothing to help these recovery-plans. Another attempt to save the economy
was initiated in March 2002 when Finance Minister Michael Maina announced a 25
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% devaluation of the Solomon dollar, however, the devaluation only lasted for four
days due to the outcry by parliamentarians, which led to Maina getting fired and the
devaluation being revoked. 95 The outcome was that the economy continued to
decline. Health and education suffered hard with public servants remaining unpaid for
months. 96

In October 2002 further signs of the failing economy were seen; 1 300 public servants
were about to be laid off and the government had severe difficulties paying
employees; Unpaid teachers went on strike and other calls for wider strikes came,
threatening to shut down international flights to the Solomon Islands, due again to
unpaid wages, this time to airport workers. 97

Figure 1.1 below illustrates the

Solomon economy’s steep decline between 1996 and 2003. The effect of the ethnic
tension between 1998-2000 is clear and the continued decline, albeit not as sharp,
after that shows the poor performance of the Solomon economy during the years
1996-2003. 98
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Figure 6.1: Solomon Islands GDP/capita 1996-2003

As can be seen in Figure 6.1 the sharpest falls occurred in 2000 and 2001. Table 6.1
below further describes the economy’s decline.
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Table 6.1: Solomon Islands major economic indicators 1993-2003
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Source: DFAT 2004. 99

The table reveals in more detail the sharp economic decline particularly with the Real
GDP falling by 14.2 % in 2000 and 9.2 % in 2001. Merchandise exports also fell
sharply in 2000 by 51.4 % and 29.5 % in 2001, but recovered in 2002 up 56.9 % and a
further 42.8 % in 2003. The external debt rose from S$ 833 million in 1999 to S$
1307 in 2002. The current account balance improved from negative S$ 223.8 million
in 2000 to negative S$ 172.3 million in 2001. With increased government
consumption this caused the rise of national external debt, which can be seen even
more clearly in Figure 6.2 below.
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Figure 6.2: Solomon Islands external debt 1995-2003

Source DFAT 2004. 100

What these numbers together indicate is an economy declining rapidly during the
years of ethnic tension and continued unrest 1998-2002. The conflict caused the
government to lose control over its finances and it could not resist demands for
compensation; corruption and civil society broke down around them. Law and order
was out of control, the government had great difficulties providing and paying for
basic services, and the country was moving towards bankruptcy. 101

Whether Solomon Islands had become a failed state or not is debatable, depending on
how functional it once was according to specific criteria. Borrowing from Robert
Rotberg, DFAT’s report Solomon Island: Rebuilding an Island Economy, Solomon
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Islands was quickly becoming one by early 2003, when measured against the
following characteristics:

Source DFAT 2004. 102

It can first be noted that some of these criteria, such as weak and flawed institutions
and deteriorating economic performance, can be detected in many states today. Still, it
can be argued that Solomon Islands already showed, or were fast approaching, several
of these signs of becoming a failed state, such as the deteriorating law and ordersituation, GDP detracting years in a row, the education and health system in severe
difficulty, corruption, and a government that had lost its control over its territory,
including the ability to control the violence and to collect taxes functionally. Alfred
Sasako, a Solomon Islands MP, wrote how the situation in July 2003 was desperate
and how the government had no control over law and order in Honiara, where a “gun
102
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culture” had emerged. Health-facilities were generally closed and schools were only
sporadically open. The money meant for these services and for wages had instead
gone to the “Special constables”, who according to Sasako, each received roughly
AUD$5 000 every two weeks as “allowance”. Several other schemes extracted money
from the government, including renting out stolen cars by police to the police, and
providing security. 103 The Economist had already in February 2003 discussed these
problems and concluded that Solomon Islands was certainly on the path towards
becoming a failed state. 104 The government could no longer provide basic services
and was constantly subject to extortion from elements in the society, particularly the
police. With the situation volatile Solomon Islands larger neighbours began to express
concern, and Australia moved to overturn its previous policies and went on to fund
and lead an intervention.

Australian Foreign Policy towards Solomon Islands up to 1998
The Australian government’s attitude towards Solomon Islands from independence to
the first outbreak of violence in 1998 was characterised by a “hands-off”-approach.
Concerns of being seen as “neo-colonialist” led the Australian government to follow a
policy of aid rather than intervention, letting the island states of the Pacific decide on
their political and economic futures themselves. 105 This policy was directed not just
towards Solomon Islands but the South Pacific as a whole. Australia provided aid for
food and education, as well as technical assistance and police training. In money
terms, Australia provided A$1.35 million dollars to Solomon Islands between 197176, then A$6.9 million dollars to 1979. Later it amounted to A$7.5 million of aid
money per year between 1984 and 1989. 106

Despite its “hands-off” approach to the South Pacific, Australia still did intervene in
the South Pacific pre-1998. However, the intervention in Bougainville 1997-2003 was
more of support for a peace-monitoring mission than the more direct intervention in
East Timor in 1999 and Solomon Islands in 2003. When the government was
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overthrown in Fiji in 1987 Australia sent naval ships, but they never landed, again a
much smaller response than the subsequent interventions in East Timor and Solomon
Islands. 107 The approach was still to refuse sending military and police to troubled
islands, except as monitors and brokers of peace, letting the islands solve their own
problems instead. 108 Australia’s respect for the Pacific islands (including Solomon
Islands) newly won sovereignty from the 1970s meant it tried hard to not to be seen as
an interfering big brother. 109

The 1997 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper did not mention Solomon Islands
specifically. Instead it discussed the South Pacific as a whole, with the exception of
Papua New Guinea which received special attention. The White Paper stressed
working bilaterally and multilaterally with the island states through the South Pacific
Forum (SPF). It also pointed out how Australia’s actions (or inaction) in the region
will affect how the rest of the world viewed Australia. Finally, support for what is
termed “improved economic management” and “good governance” by the states in
the South Pacific is a specific concern for Australia, which, if mismanaged, could lead
to “negative consequences for Australian interests, including possible calls to
intervene, and heightened calls for increased migration”. The general impression is
that it grouped all Pacific island states (except PNG) together in general statements.
There was an awareness of the economic difficulties in some of the South Pacific
countries, with fears of what was to come (calls for intervention). 110

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (DFAT) Annual Report 1997-98 also
highlighted regional economic reform. It noted how Australia had assisted with
economic reform programs after receiving a request from the Solomon Islands
government, as well as with law and order-issues, but it is not entirely clear exactly
what that assistance consisted of. The opening of the Gold Ridge mine by the
Australian company Ross Mining was highlighted as an outcome of the Australia-
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Solomon Islands negotiations. 111 Up until 1998, focus is on providing aid and
technical assistance but otherwise letting Solomon Islands decide for themselves what
course of action to take. There was an awareness of not being seen as interfering too
much in Solomon Islands’ affairs and to respect its sovereignty. The “hands off”approach was very much in place.

Australian Foreign Policy towards Solomon Islands 1998-2002
Australian foreign policy towards Solomon Islands after the outbreak of violence in
late 1998 focussed on assisting the Solomon Islands government with the breakdown
in law and order. After the coup of June 2000 the Australian and New Zealand
governments contributed to the International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) that was
set up to monitor the implementation of the TPA. The initial team was unarmed and
consisted of 35 Australian observers and another 14 observers from New Zealand,
with personnel participating from the Pacific Islands states of Cook Islands, Vanuatu
and Tonga, along with the Commonwealth’s Botswana in the second rotation. 112
Meanwhile, the situation steadily deteriorated in Solomon Islands up until the
RAMSI-intervention in July 2003.

The DFAT annual reports for 1998-99 and 1999-2000 stress how the Australian
government helped the Solomon government to manage ‘ethnic tensions’ after
violence broke out in late 1998. It does not, however, go into any detail on what that
‘help’ consisted of. 113 The Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs Kathy Sullivan
visited Solomon Islands in mid-1999. 114 Other senior departmental staff also made
frequent visits to the islands to encourage the peace effort as part of Australia’s
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response to the crisis. Focus was on an internal solution, in line with earlier Australian
policy on the South Pacific. 115

Part of Australian policy was providing aid money to support the Solomon Islands
government during these difficult times. In fact, in the lead up to the crisis in 1998
Australia had given A$11 million dollars in aid in 1997-98, then 13.3A$ million
dollars 1998-1999, and A$18.7 million dollars 1999-2000. 116 The increasing amount
of aid to Solomon Islands was part of the support given by the Australian government
to the crisis. Australia was also the main financier of the Multinational Police Peace
Monitoring Group (MPPMG) in October 1999 but did not send any personnel
themselves. 117 Peace talks in May and June 2000 were sponsored by the Australian
government together with New Zealand but the Australian government again,
however, emphasised that the problems in Solomon Islands was for them to solve and
not by any foreign power. 118 The Head of the Pacific Division of DFAT Greg Urwin
visited Solomon Islands in April 2000 and met with the Prime Minister and other
officials, as well as leaders of the different ethnic groups, in an effort to put a stop to
the fighting. 119

The Australian government’s response to the 5 June 2000 coup in the Solomon’s was
to help broker a peace agreement between the warring sides by facilitating and
promote the negotiations. 120 Australian Foreign minister Alexander Downer
personally visited the Solomon Islands three times in 2000. 121 These efforts resulted
in the Townsville Peace Agreement, negotiated between the Solomon Islands
government, the IMF and the MEF on Australian soil. 122 Australia also contributed to
the International Peace Monitoring Team set up through the TPA by sending 35 of the
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49 observers. 123 According to Dinnen, the aim of Australia was to get a signed peace
agreement between the IFM and the MEF, hoping that this would settle the hostilities
once and for all. 124

Prime Minister Howard had failed attend the South Pacific Forum meetings in 1998
and 1999, but he did go to the October 2000-meeting. As Gurry has pointed out,
depending on the response, Australia’s problem was that it would either be seen as a
bully or as neglecting the region. 125 However, the Australian government declined
requests from the Solomon Islands government in early 2000 to send 50 armed police
to help with the deteriorating law and order-situation. 126 Howard again stated two
days after the coup in June 2000 that he had decided not to send police to Honiara. He
was adamant that Australia would not be “the policemen of this part of the world”.
The Solomon Islands crisis needed “to be resolved domestically” and he was not
willing to put “Australian police to an unacceptable risk”. The absence of an exit
strategy also played an important part in the decision not to send police to Solomon
Islands, according to Howard. 127 Instead of sending in police and/or military troops
the HMAS Manoora evacuated those Australians still in Solomon Islands. 128

The point was further driven home by Dr. Ashton Calvert, the Secretary of the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in a speech on 3 August 2000. He stated
“we cannot determine the course of the region, nor should we seek to”. He went on:
“It is not our role, however, nor is it in our interest to try to step in and run South
Pacific countries in times of trouble. We will continue, as occasion demands, to
advise and encourage – and, as in the recent case of Fiji, to warn – and to provide
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substantial, constructive support to them”. He concludes: “the island countries’
futures must be for them, not us, to determine”. 129

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer removed any doubt in a speech on 2 November
2000 to what the Australian policy was in the matter: “Australia is not a neo-colonial
power. We are not going to take over countries in the Pacific and run their affairs for
them. We believe that to do so would be unacceptable”. And to clarify: “Australia is
not prepared to take an overbearing interventionist approach. It has been proven not to
work in the past and, worse still, to leave a terrible legacy behind”. In this Downer
compared any intervention to the actions of past colonial powers, but would later
come to consider it necessary. 130

Finally, as the crisis and violence took the grip of Solomon Islands, Australia more
than doubled its aid, providing A$35.1 million in 2000-2001, A$40.6 million 20012002, A$36.2 million 2002-03, and A$37.4 million 2003-04. 131 However, Helen
Hughes argued that just giving aid could have the opposite effect than intended. In her
report released just a month before the announcement of the RAMSI-intervention, she
showed how economic aid had actually made the situation worse, rather than
helping. 132 The fact that the Solomon Islands economy continued to deteriorate in
2002 indicate that Hughes may have been correct. GDP hit its lowest point in late
2002. Even though the economy began to slowly pick up again in 2003 the situation
was still serious and the government’s financial position desperate. 133

The Solomon Islands government again asked in December 2001 for Australian
police officers to help monitor the election. Again the request was denied; instead the
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Australian government gave $3 million dollars to assist with the election. 134
The conflict also had an effect on Australian trade. For example, merchandise exports
from Australia to Solomon Islands fell from $99 million dollars in 1999, before the
conflict began, to $55 million dollars in 2002. 135

The Australian government’s position towards the escalating violence during 19982002 was to increase aid and support to the Solomon Islands government, which was
too weak to establish law and order. Australia had also twice denied requests from the
Solomon Islands government to send armed police to assist them but instead acted as
the peace-broker, supporting the peace negotiations between the government and the
warring parties. The policy was stable: Solomon Islanders had to solve their problem
themselves without direct intervention by Australia, which was adamant it would not
be seen to be a neo-colonial power in the South Pacific.

2002-2003 - The road towards a change in policy
In 2002-03 there were further signs of deterioration in the Solomon Islands’ society
and economy. The Australian rhetoric remained constant right up to the change in
policy, however, there were signs in the lead-up that a shift was possible. Foreign
minister Downer visited Solomon Islands in January 2002 together with New
Zealand’s Foreign Minister Phil Goff to get a first-hand look at the situation and to
meet the newly elected Prime Minister Allen Kemakeza. Downer repeated the
Australian policy that the situation in Solomon Islands could only be sorted out by
Solomon Islands government itself. The bad situation was illustrated by the fact that
some of the meetings between Kemakeza, Downer and Goff were held in darkness,
since the electricity did not work properly. Despite that, Downer rejected further aidsupport, instead offering more help training Solomon Islands police. 136 Downer
appointed diplomat Perry Head as a “special adviser to the Solomon government”, to
help getting the law and order-situation under control. 137 Although Downer said that
he was told “that there are some real signs of improvements taking place”, the
134
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experiences on the ground combined with reports that 1200 ‘Special constables’,
essentially armed militias, received wages without actually doing any police work
probably indicated to him that things were not going all that well. Downer did,
however, call for their disarmament and for them to join the regular police force. 138

As a result of the ‘Special constables’ not being disarmed, Australia withdrew the
police monitoring the TPA-agreement in mid-February 2002. It was on one hand done
in protest at the lack of progress by the Solomon Islands government, although not
stated as such, but it can also be seen as a sign of admission that the process was not
working. Downer’s comment that the team had done “about all it can do” reflects the
latter. 139 The monitoring team was finally pulled out in June 2002. Despite the
appearance of failure, Downer attempted to put a positive spin on the withdrawal,
pointing out that “it has ended ethnic conflict and overseen the destruction of over
2000 weapons”. It was clear, though, that the situation was not under control since
reports came in at the same time about a possible massacre conducted by Keke’s gang
and also the fact that DFAT issued a travel warning for Solomon Islands, stating that
“considerable work remains to be done to reconcile former combatants, who still hold
large numbers of weapons”. 140

The policy of providing a large amount of aid to Solomon Islands (A$36 million
dollars) instead continued but no other special efforts were initiated. 141 Prime
Minister Howard went to Fiji for the Pacific Island Forum meeting in August with a
message that future aid could be reviewed through measures of “good governance”
and improved law and order. Howard was also proposing to the PIF-meeting to elect
Greg Urwin, a former Australian diplomat, as the new Secretary-General for the PIF,
a position traditionally held by a Pacific islander. 142 Barker noted Prime Minister
Howard’s decision to attend the 2002 PIF-meeting, having only attended 4 out of 7 as
Prime Minister, combined with the tougher approach on aid and the push for Urwin as
PIF Secretary-General, signalled a harsher line towards the Pacific Islands states, and
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particularly the Solomon Islands. 143 In two articles Barker argued that the so-called
“Arc of Instability” needed much more attention by the Australian government. The
risk of having failed, or failing, states in the immediate neighbourhood required
urgent action and Barker saw few signs of new ideas on how to approach the issue. 144
Howard came out of the 2002 PIF-meeting in Fiji displaying confidence in the
decision to have the PIF continue to monitor Solomon Islands and with the hope that
it would be a more stable Solomon Islands at the time of the next PIF-meeting a year
from then. However, the “step forward” as Howard called it, had not resulted in
anything concrete being done. The discussion instead focussed on the terrorism-threat,
in line with global agenda since the September-11 attacks. The Forum issued a
declaration on regional security, stressing the need for the members to combat
terrorism and transnational crime. 145

As the year continued there were no obvious improvements in Solomon Islands.
Concerns over the continuing deterioration of the economic and security situation in
Solomon Islands caused Foreign Minister Downer to send a High Level Mission to
Solomon Islands between 1-4 October 2002, consisting of Australian and New
Zealand officials. 146 Briefings by Australian senior officials indicated that the
situation would continue to be dire for a long time and would take decades to resolve
properly. Several requests had been made by the Solomon Islands government but
were refused by Australia holding on to the policy that only Solomon Islands could
resolve the problems themselves. According to a senior official “if we intervened with
a military force we would be running the joint for the next 20 to 50 years”. 147 At this
stage it was becoming clear that the policies did not work but at the same time the
Australian government refused to consider the military intervention-option. Doing
what they were doing was clearly not enough but Australia was convinced that
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stronger measures would bring accusations of acting like a “colonial” power. The
mission to Solomon Islands and which included a stop in Vanuatu, can be seen as an
indication that the Australian government was at a loss of what to do, hoping answers
would come out of the visit.

Australia began assisting the Solomon Islands government in October 2002 to
integrate the so-called Police Field Force into the regular police force. The Police
Field Force had a close connection to the MEF and the 2000-coup, and was a paramilitary part of the RSIP, separate from the Special Constables. Its integration into the
regular police force was set as a condition for further Australian aid. 148

Just over one week later the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002 killed 202 people,
including 88 Australian citizens. The Australian government adopted the view that the
terrorism-threat to Australia was real and that its neighbours warranted close watch.
Since Australia and Australians were clearly now confirmed targets the region
became even more important, particularly in the context of the “war-on-terror”. 149
The region, and with it Solomon Islands, would from now on figure more and more
often in the terrorism-discussions.

Growing concerns over the Solomon Islands-situation were apparent by December
2002. Several reports indicate a shift in thinking around this time. Geoffrey Barker
raised the question whether the withdrawal of SAS-troops from Afghanistan had
anything to do with these growing concerns of the immediate neighbourhood and the
need for the troops closer to home? Several areas were of concern – Indonesia, East
Timor, The Solomons, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu for example. 150 Rowan
Callick suggested that riots in Dili, East Timor had got the attention of the Australian
government and the multitude of issues in the area had brought a new focus on the
“Arc of instability” again. 151 Callick reports on how a change in thinking was
developing in the Australian government. An acceptance that the “hands-off”approach has not worked was emerging and that a new tactic was needed. A more
148
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“hands-on”-approach with a long-term focus rather than short-term was being
considered seriously now. 152
The ASPI-report 153 “Beyond Bali” released in November 2002 also argued that the
“hands-off”-approach did not work and that Australia needed to engage more directly
with its Pacific neighbours, particularly Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Solomon
Islands. The report states that this will be “nothing less than a change of policy
paradigm”. 154 The ASPI report argues a number of reasons to why this policy change
should take place: humanitarian concerns, the risk that criminal networks will take
advantage of Pacific weak states, being used as a base for a conventional or terrorist
attack on Australia. In order to avoid these security risks to Australia, a more direct,
“hands-on”-approach was needed. 155 The release of the report in November with its
policy suggestions and newspaper reports of a new thinking in the Australian
government is probably linked. Up until November the Australian government
seemed to struggle for solutions to the deterioration of the Solomon Islands economy
and society and to accept the failure of the “hands-off”-policy. The ASPI-report
brought fresh thinking on the overall Pacific issue, however, possibly not detailed
enough for policy-makers to change approach towards Solomon Islands just yet. The
first step to a change in policy is often to accept that the old policy is a failed policy.

Alexander Downer’s concern was further displayed with his trip to Solomon Islands
of 17-18 December 2002. He expressed “deep concern” about the situation and
conveyed to PM Kemakeza that Australia would continue to assist his government.
He did however criticise the lack of commitment shown by the Solomon Islands
government to solve the critical situation 156 and dismissed concerns expressed in the
ASPI-report that terrorists might set up base in Solomon Islands as “exaggerated”
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while admitting that the weak financial system could be used by terrorist groups for
money laundering. 157 He also re-emphasised the Australian policy that it could help
with aid and broad economic management but that “there are things we can’t do,
things that the Solomon Islanders have to do themselves”. 158 Thus, there was no
indication as of yet of a change in policy. Later on in June 2003 after the policy had
changed, Downer admitted that it was the visit in December 2002 to Solomon Islands
was the point where he “became uncertain that just by continuing the policy we were
pursuing we were going to achieve the breakthrough that I wanted.” 159

At the time, though, Downer continued to insist publicly on the “hands-off”-approach
and to speak against an Australian intervention. The strongest affirmation of that
policy came in an article written by Alexander Downer in The Australian on 8
January 2003. In it he stated:

Sending in Australian troops to occupy Solomon Islands would be folly in the extreme. It
would be widely resented in the Pacific region. It would be very difficult to justify to
Australian taxpayers. And for how many years would such an occupation have to
continue? And what would be the exit strategy? The real show-stopper, however, is that
it would not work – no matter how it was dressed up, whether as an Australian or a
Commonwealth or a Pacific Islands Forum initiative. The fundamental problem is that
foreigners do not have answers for the deep-seated problems afflicting Solomon
Islands. 160

Downer acknowledged the many problems in Solomon Islands but pointed towards
the aid given and other help provided by Australia. He finished the article by saying
that:
We are doing as much as we reasonably can, recognising that there are limits to what
outsiders can do. But the challenges are large and there are no quick fixes; change is
going to take time. It will be a process of evolution, not a revolution. It will be a long,
hard road, but it is the only way forward. 161

Australian policy could not have been stated any more clearly. The “hands-off” policy
in place would continue, and for a long time. It is interesting to note the later
admission that Downer already in December, about 2 weeks before the article was
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published, had doubts about the policy but still reaffirmed the “hands-off” view so
strongly in the article.

The 2003 DFAT White Paper which was released in February 2003 acknowledges
that “Australia has a particular responsibility to help the countries of the South Pacific
deal with their deep-seated problems” but also states that “we are prepared to help
those countries which are prepared to help themselves” 162 , a clear indicator that the
“hands-off”-policy was still very much in place. The White Paper also declares that
small, weak states in the South Pacific are vulnerable to criminal networks and
terrorist supporters, and that it “directly affects Australia’s security interests”. 163
However, despite this threat, the White Paper stresses that “Australia cannot presume
to fix the problems of the South Pacific countries. Australia is not a neo-colonial
power”. The paper goes on emphasising the need for the island states to help
themselves, with assistance from Australia in the form of aid and technical advice.164
Again it is clear that the “hands-off”-approach stands and the official line remained
the same. Foreign Minister Downer once again affirmed this long-standing policy at
the launch of the White Paper on 12 February 2003, saying in regards to a
intervention in Solomon Islands would be “bitterly resented in the Solomon Islands
itself” and stated indirectly that the Solomon Islanders had to solve the problems
themselves. 165 So despite signs elsewhere of a possible change, the government policy
stayed the same. Shortly after the White Paper was released the Defence Department
in March 2003 issued a “Defence Update” on Australia’s national security. This
document echoes the Foreign Affairs and Trade Policy White Paper in saying that

… the Australian Government should not be expected to solve the problems of the
Solomon Islands, and anyway cannot do so. It is only the people and their leaders who
can end the violence and give Solomon Islands the stability necessary to address its
166
economic and political problems.
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The Update at the same time leaves open the possibility that the Australian Defence
Forces (ADF) may be involved in future crises down the track, by “providing
assistance” to island states, thus at least recognising the possibility of some sort of
Australian intervention into one or more of the Pacific states. However, given the tone
of the Defence Update-paper it is more of a last resort option. 167

Meanwhile, more and more calls for a change in policy towards the South Pacific
countries were heard, particularly in relation to Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands
and Vanuatu. Graeme Dobell gave a public lecture in Canberra on 12 February 2003;
the same day the Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper was released. Dobell attacked
the failed Australian policy in the South Pacific, saying much of it “has been reduced
to aid policy”. 168 He argued for a change in policy, a new policy where Australia
would allow workers from the Pacific islands to Australia, propose further economic
cooperation, introducing the Australian dollar as a regional currency, in order to help
the failing states back on their feet. 169

Mike Manning and Susan Windybank of the Centre of Independent Studies warned in
March 2003 that Papua New Guinea was heading towards collapse like Solomon
Islands if nothing was done soon. They simply stated that Australia’s aid policy
towards PNG did not work and that a change in policy was needed if the Australian
government didn’t want to see PNG collapsing. This change would require Australia
to go from passive to a more active role. 170 Their paper concerns PNG but it
highlighted the failure of the “hands-off”-approach towards Melanesia as a whole.

Another report from the right-wing think-tank Centre for Independent Studies in May
2003 criticised Australian aid-policy in the South Pacific. Helen Hughes put forward a
neo-liberal argument that aid was detrimental to the Pacific state’s economy rather
than helping them. She suggests a change in the Australian aid-policy where
“conditionality under the principle of mutual obligation” would be implemented. To
stop aid completely would be the best option, according to Hughes, but would be seen
167
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as a too radical approach. 171 In a later paper she states the similar point that as long as
unconditional aid is provided the Pacific states will not change their economic
management. 172 Chris Gallus, the Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, argued
in response to Hughes’s first article that the Australian government was already doing
what Hughes want them to do. All aid-programs were working according to how
Hughes wanted them to work.

She added that the situation was “not quite as

desperate as Helen would make us seem”. 173

Meanwhile, The Australian Strategic Policy Institute had been working on a followup paper to its “Beyond-Bali” report, this time focused on Solomon Islands. The
report, named “Our Failing Neighbour”, proposed a significant policy change towards
Solomon Islands. The report stated that the approach currently taken did not work, nor
could the aid be suspended. Letting Solomon Islands continue its decline was not an
option either. More importantly, it recognised that Solomon Islands could not solve
the crisis by itself. 174

The report proposed a new more direct approach, breaking with the long-standing
policy towards the Pacific as a whole. It would entail deploying roughly 150
policemen in Solomon Islands for up to a year. A smaller military force would be
standing by to be deployed to Solomon Islands, if needed, to back up the police.
“Judicial and correctional personnel” would also be brought in this first phase of the
intervention to ensure a functioning legal and prison system. The operation would be
put under a multinational agency and the whole operation would be multinational in
composition. The main aim at first would be to get the law and order situation under
control. 175 The second phase would be aimed at ensuring for the future that Solomon
Islands would have an effective government. This phase would target the underlying
issues to the problem by building up the political and economic institutions, thereby

171

H. Hughes, ‘Aid Has Failed the Pacific’, p. 26
H. Hughes, ‘Helping the Islands to help Themselves’, Quadrant, July-August 2003, p. 49
173
Chris Gallus, ’Interview with ABC 666 Canberra’, 8 May 2003
174
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, ‘Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon
Islands’, June 2003, p. 3
175
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, ‘Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon
Islands’, pp. 4, 41-43
172

218

improving health, education and other areas that had been suffering from poor
governance. ASPI estimated the two-phase operation to last to up to 10 years. 176

The Director of ASPI Hugh White had been distributing drafts of the report among
the bureaucracy long before it was released publicly on 10 June 2003. He also began
to have “consultative sessions with all the relevant ministries, departments, and
agencies, including the intelligence establishments as well as foreign missions and
organisations to workshop some new ideas on the Solomon’s” by the end of 2002. 177
That would have been shortly after the “Beyond-Bali”-report which had pointed out
the problems, so he then actively set out to try to convince the bureaucracy to change
direction in the case of Solomon Islands. As Mary-Louise O’Callaghan put it, “White
understands the beast that is government; the complex combinations that go to make
up policy decisions but, most important, how the juggernaut of political thinking is
capable of suddenly sending the bureaucrats scuttling in a direction they’ve been
studiously avoiding for years”. 178 A deliberate attempt by White and ASPI to
influence the government to change its policy had been set in motion.

Elsina Wainwright, who prepared the ASPI-report “Our Failing Neighbour”, wrote in
Financial Review already in October 2002 arguing for a change in policy towards the
Pacific, a more direct approach to address states heading towards “failed-state”-status,
pointing out Solomon Islands as the state furthest along that process. Wainwright had
put the risk of failed states in the context of terrorism in relation to the Bali-bombings
only 11 days earlier and warned that “they can also become havens for terrorist
organisations”. This threat would warrant a more “hands-on”-approach to stop
Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu becoming failed states. 179
Wainwright later gave further detailed examples of the risk that failed states can pose
to other countries, for example, Somalia and Afghanistan. 180
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Meanwhile, Solomon Prime Minister Kemakeza sent a letter to PM Howard on 22
April, again asking for assistance and to meet with Howard to discuss the desperate
situation in Solomon Islands. Howard called Downer who said: “Look, the situation is
just dire, I think we should take this very seriously and have a look at what we can
do”. 181 The first step in the process had been taken. Downer and Howard were now
seriously contemplating a more drastic change in policy towards Solomon Islands.

Howard’s reply was the first positive response received from such a request to a
Solomon Islands government. The message included an invitation to Australia for
further talk about what to do with the situation in Solomon Islands. 182 Foreign
Minister Downer met with PM Kemakeza in Japan on 18 May, delivering said
message. Downer and PM Kemakeza discussed the situation and new options
available for Australia helping the Solomon Islands government with its law and
order-crisis. 183 At the same time Downer began exploring the different options
through DFAT on how to help solve the problems in Solomon Islands. 184 A Solomon
Islands Task Force was set up, led by DFAT’s Graham Fletcher, to coordinate
planning between DFAT, Australian Defence Department and the Australian Federal
Police. 185

Further light on the deteriorating situation in Solomon Islands hit Australia and the
government when news came of the Australian missionary that had been beheaded in
Solomon Islands on 18 May, the same day Downer met with Kemakeza in Tokyo.186
The murder received wide attention in Australian media and would have alerted many
of the unaware public of the situation in Solomon Islands. Downer commented on it
as “absolutely horrific” and again expressed his concern of the law and order
situation. 187
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Cabinet’s National Security Committee met on 28 May, deciding that all options were
open, including armed intervention. The Solomon Islands PM Kemakeza flew to
Canberra on 5 June. 188 He met with Prime Minister Howard, Foreign Minister
Downer, and Defence Minister Robert Hill, who informed him that Australia might be
willing to send police and possibly military forces to Solomon Islands to address the
dire situation there, provided the Solomon Islands government agreed to certain
economic conditions and reforms to get the country back on its feet. 189

On 10 June 2003 Alexander Downer launched the ASPI-report “Our Failing
Neighbour” saying it was a “very timely report” considering the development lately.
He refers to the report as a “key contribution” and it and its recommendations “will be
a reference point in our policy development process”. 190 The fact that Downer himself
launches the report indicates its importance in the government’s rethink on Solomon
Islands and what action to pursue. Downer would most likely have been aware of the
report’s contents several weeks before the launch. He later expressed his admiration
for the paper, saying: “I think the ASPI paper is a very good paper by the way, very
impressed by it”. 191

A high level scoping mission team of Australian and New Zealand officials, the
Australian Joint Departmental Focus Group consisting of personnel from DFAT,
AFP, and the ADF, went to Solomon Islands in 10 June to assess the situation and to
what could be done by a possible intervention. 192 Downer was waiting for their report
before making further decisions. 193 Their impressions and advice was taken to the
National Security Committee of Cabinet by Alexander Downer on 25 June. 194 The
Scoping Missions report was also referred to by Downer and New Zealand’s Foreign
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Minister Phil Goff at the Pacific Islands Forum’s Foreign Ministers meeting in
Sydney on 30 June. 195

On 25 June 2003 the Australian government, through discussions in the National
Security Committee of Cabinet, took the in-principle decision to send a regional
assistance mission to Solomon Islands. Certain conditions had to be met first, though:
1. A formal request from the Solomon Islands Government was required;
2. Legislation needed to be enacted by the Solomon Islands parliament that
allowed external personnel to be in Solomon Islands and to perform their duty
under the mission;
3. The initiative had to be endorsed by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). 196

The reasons given by Howard and Downer for the Solomon Islands-intervention,
dubbed “Co-operative intervention” by Downer 197 , were that Australia could not have
a failed state so close to its shores. It could possibly become a safe haven for criminal
networks and even terrorists operating from Solomon Islands and threatening
Australian security. It was therefore also in Australian national interest to prevent that
from happening. 198 Downer admitted that there were no evidence of terrorist activity
in the South Pacific, only money laundering on a small scale, but he emphasised the
possibility of it happening if Solomon Islands became a failed state and too weak to
stop criminal and/or terrorist elements using the islands as a base for operations
against Australia. 199 References were also made to the responsibility Australia has for
its part of the world, “our patch”, that the rest of the world expected Australia to
ensure stability in this region. 200
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The first condition was met on 4 July when the Governor-General of Solomon Islands
Sir John Lapli formally requested assistance, so advised by the cabinet of Prime
Minister Kemakeza. The Solomon Islands parliament passed a motion supporting the
assistance-mission on 11 July and then passed legislation on 17 July granting
immunity and certain powers to all the police and military that would take part in the
intervention. 201

Meanwhile, the Pacific Islands Forum endorsed the intervention. The PIF had at its
meeting in August 2002 issued a statement expressing its concern over the poor
situation in Solomon Islands but the only action taken back then was to monitor the
situation and wait to hear from an ‘eminent person’s group”. Geoffrey Barker
describes it as “their inability to consider anything beyond continuation of the eminent
person’s group reflected the forums impotence”. 202 However, with the intervention
looming the Foreign Ministers of the PIF’s member states met in Sydney on 30
June. 203 Australian officials had already talked to the different member states before
the meeting, so they were aware of what the agenda would be. 204 The meeting was
held under the provisions of the Biketawa declaration, which allows for emergency
meetings between the member states in case of a member state being under threat, be
it domestic or external. 205 With all 16 member states represented a unanimous
decision was taken to support the proposal for an intervention into the Solomon
Islands. 206 The Australian government now had what they required for an
intervention; A formal request from the Solomon Islands, unanimous support by the
other island states in the South Pacific through the Pacific Islands Forum, legal
protection for the intervention-forces while operating in the Solomon Islands. The
intervention was multinational in nature with contributions from several countries in
the region, particularly New Zealand.

201

Australian House of Representatives, ‘Ministerial statement to parliament on the Regional
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands’ 12 August 2003, p. 18199
202
Geoffrey Barker, ‘Forum sidesteps Solomons issue’, Financial Review, 17 August 2002
203
A. Downer, ‘Joint Press Conference following Pacific Islands Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting,
Sydney’, 30 June 2003
204
A. Downer, ‘Doorstop- Parliament House’, 25 June 2003
205
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “Biketawa” Declaration’, 2000,
http://forumsec.org/_resources/article/files/Biketawa%20Declaration.pdf [Date accessed 1 July 2007]
and A. Downer, ‘Talks On Solomon Islands’, Media Release, 25 June 2003
206
A. Downer, ‘Joint Press Conference following Pacific Islands Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting,
Sydney’, 30 June 2003

223

The final decision to deploy the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
(RAMSI) was taken by the National Security Committee of Cabinet on 22 July. The
Australian part of the mission would consist approximately 1 500 Australian Defence
Force personnel, 155 Australian Federal Police and 90 personnel from Australia’s
Protective Services. Combined with the contributions from other countries to RAMSI,
the total force would be around 2 225 personnel. 207 All in all, eight countries
contributed with personnel to the initial RAMSI-operation: including 240 military
personnel and 33 police personnel from New Zealand, 121/15 from Fiji, 35/10 from
Tonga, 83/- from Papua New Guinea, -/15 from Samoa, -/5 from Kiribati, and -/2
from Cook Islands). 208

Conclusion
This chapter has described how Solomon Islands steadily deteriorated during the
years up to the RAMSI-intervention in July 2003. The economy was declining, the
society breaking down under the weight of corruption, lawlessness, murder, violence
and harassment. The underlying reasons for Solomon Islands’ fall towards “failed
state” status were many, including distrust of the government due to corruption and
mismanagement of the economy. Rapid population growth resulting in high
unemployment among youths contributed to the resentment felt by both sides of the
conflict. The clash of cultures and traditions, mainly between the Guadalcanalese and
the Malaitans, played its part in the dangerous mix that finally resulted in the conflict
beginning in December 1998. The Townsville Peace Agreement stopped the worst
fighting but Solomon Islands society continued to deteriorate until it was on the brink
of failed state status in 2003.

Meanwhile, the Australian government stuck to its “hands-off”-approach of assisting
Solomon Islands with increasing aid, technical assistance and diplomats negotiating
between the warring factions. By 2002 the Australian government seemed at a loss to
know what to do. Pressure on the government became stronger after the 12 October
Bali bombing when the possibility arose that terrorist networks might use the failing
207
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state of Solomon Islands as a base for operations against Australia. All these factors
contributed to the discussion and helped reinforce a view that the current policy was
not working. Realisation that the “hands-off”-approach had failed finally began to
sink in at the end of 2002 but it took until April 2003 before a change in policy was
seriously contemplated. While it was clear that problems had existed in Solomon
Islands for some time the government had until that point no clear framework for
addressing such concerns. ASPI provided the framework through early drafts of its
report being circulated amongst Departmental officials, DFAT adopted the readymade solution with minor modifications, and the intervention later proceeded. The
letter from Kemakeza to Howard on 22 April 2003 set off a policy process that
culminated in the RAMSI-intervention in July 2003. The “hands-off”-approach was
scrapped, to be replaced by a “hands-on”-approach. The next chapter will utilise the
theoretical model to explain the Australian foreign policy change towards Solomon
Islands in 2003.
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Chapter 7: Solomon Islands Analysis
Introduction
This chapter will apply the theoretical framework of the thesis on foreign policy
change to the Australian foreign policy change towards Solomon Islands in 2003. It
investigates the variables identified in the model and estimates their importance and
influence in the Australian government’s decision to change its long standing policy
towards Solomon Islands.

The sources of change – domestic and international – are investigated first. Then the
key decision-makers are discussed, as well as the Window of Opportunity. Finally,
the Extent of Change and the Consequences of Change is examined. The chapter
concludes with a discussion identifying the most important factors and actors in the
decision-making process resulting in a policy change. It is argued that a combination
of international factors contributed to the change, at the same time as an ASPI-report
was arguing for a change. Several international factors, such as the US-alliance, the
Bali bombings and the perceived “War-on-Terror” context, with its threat perception
of “failed states”, all had an influence on the government’s thinking. Australia’s role
in the region, being bigger and more powerful than its neighbours in the South
Pacific, also played an important part. The intervention can be seen as a way for
Australia to consolidate its position as the regional hegemon.

Sources of Change
The sources of change are divided into domestic and international categories. The
domestic category’s sources of change are The Bureaucracy, Public Opinion, The
Media, Interest-groups, and Political Parties. The international sources of change
contain Global factors, Regional factors, Bilateral relations, and Non-state actors.
Each source of change will be discussed separately below.
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Domestic Factors

The Bureaucracy
Although it became clear in 2002 (if not before) among DFAT-officials that the
current “hands-off”-approach did not work, the bureaucracy did not have the will or
ability to influence the government to drastically change policy. There is thus little
evidence to suggest that there were calls for a change from within the bureaucracy.
The White Papers produced by the Defence Department and the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade adhered to the Government’s view at the time. Geoffrey
Barker reports that when DFAT prepared the White Paper released in February 2003,
John Howard and Alexander Downer made sure their views were represented in the
document, and not necessarily those of the Department. He writes that “Mr Downer
wrestled control of the White Paper overview from the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade in order to ensure that it reflected the political and economic values of the
federal government”. 1 Rather than the Department influencing the government it was
the other way around – the government, Howard and Downer, imposed its will on the
Department.

Howard and Downer’s control over the bureaucracy stems back to when John Howard
became Prime Minister in 1996. Six departmental heads were replaced soon after
Howard took government, which ensured that the bureaucracy became, in Patrick
Weller’s words, “very controlled”. The bureaucracy now “does what the government
require of it”, in the words of Peter Shergold, head of the Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet, which discourages “creative thinking” by the bureaucracy. 2
This aspect naturally had an affect on the bureaucracy’s possible influence in the case
of Solomon Islands in 2002-03.

The bureaucracy provided important information to the foreign minister through its
visits to Solomon Islands in October 2002 and June 2003. The first mission was led
by DFAT deputy secretary David Ritchie and included officials from New Zealand as
1

Geoffrey Barker, ‘Downer takes reins on foreign policy’, Financial Review, 24 December 2002
Louise Dodson, ‘At the centre of attention’, Sydney Morning Herald, 23 February 2006, Patrick
Weller quoted in same article. See also James Walter, ‘John Howard and the ‘strong leader’ thesis’,
Paper presented at John Howard’s Decade Conference, National Museum of Australia, 3-4 March
2006, pp. 6-7
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well. The reason for the mission was the growing concern over Solomon Islands
decline. The Australian government had earlier withdrawn its IPMT-team in June
2002 and was now looking to find new ways to stop the deteriorating economy and
law and order-situation. Their findings didn’t contribute to a change in policy at the
time and in fact Ritchie claimed to be “pleasantly surprised” by improvements in the
economy and security compared to a year earlier. 3 However, considering that Downer
later in 2003 admitted to be more and more concerned about the deteriorating
situation in the Solomon’s towards the end of 2002, the comments made by Ritchie
appears at best naively optimistic, if not made for public consumption. Upon the visit
to the Solomon Islands in October 2002, foreign affairs officials appeared alarmed but
without a workable solution to the critical situation. On one hand they described
Solomon Islands as in “utter lawlessness” but if Australia were to intervene “we will
be running the show for the next 50 to 100 years”, as one official put it. Since Prime
Minister Howard had ruled out an intervention 4 , the DFAT officials seemed at a loss
at to what to do.

There is no indication of the bureaucracy being behind the policy change. They did
however play an important role in the process, but not by its own doing. ASPI
Director and former deputy secretary at the Defence department Hugh White began
courting “all relevant ministries, departments, and agencies including the intelligence
establishment as well as foreign missions and organisations to workshop some new
Solomons’ ideas”. He then distributed the ASPI draft-report throughout the
bureaucracy, which meant that when Downer came asking for ideas, they had one
ready for him. 5 However, as stated above, it was not the bureaucracy that came up
with the idea. They were not a source for change themselves.

Public Opinion
A clear majority in Australia supported the Australian-led intervention into the
Solomon Islands. As can be seen in the table below, according to an opinion poll
conducted 1-3 August 2003 with 1200 people surveyed from around Australia, after

3

Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, ‘Rebels advertise refusal to disarm’, The Australian, 4 October 2002
Megan Saunders, ‘In the midst of Pacific grim’, The Australian, 3 October 2002
5
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4
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the intervention was already under way, 75 % of the interviewed were in favour of the
intervention and only 12 % were against it. 6

Table 7.1: Newspoll, 1-3 August 2003 on Solomon Islands Intervention
THINKING NOW ABOUT AUSTRALIA’S INVOLVEMENT IN HELPING TO RESTORE LAW
AND ORDER IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS. ARE YOU PERSONALLY IN FAVOUR OR
AGAINST AUSTRALIAN TROOPS AND POLICE BEING INVOLVED IN HELPING TO
RESTORE LAW AND ORDER IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS?

The support was strongest with the Coalition supporters (88%) but a clear majority of
the ALP-supporters were in favour of the intervention as well, so a broad majority of
the people polled was in favour.

There were not any major fluctuations in voter intentions in the two party preferred
opinion polls made by Newspoll, A.C. Nielsen, or Roy Morgan Research conducted
between May – August 2003 that would suggest the public being against the
intervention. The Coalition remained steadily between 43-47 % in the Newspoll polls,
between 40-46.5 % in the Roy Morgan polls, and roughly 45-48 % in A.C. Nielsen’s
polls for May-August 2003. 7 The Coalition experienced a dip in voter’s preference at
the end of May noted by all three opinion institutes (43 % Newspoll, 40 % Roy
Morgan, 45 % A.C. Nielsen) which is just before the government’s announcement of
the possible intervention in to Solomon Islands a few weeks later and was mainly

6

Newspoll, ‘Solomon Islands’, opinion poll conducted 1-3 August 2003, published on 5 August 2003,
http://www.newspoll.com.au/image_uploads/cgi-lib.12617.1.0801_Solomon _Islands.pdf [accessed 24
July 2007]
7
Newspoll, ‘Federal voting intention May-September 2003’, http://www.newspoll.com.au/cgibin/polling/display_poll_data.pl [accessed 24 July 2007]

229

attributed to the resignation of Governor-General Peter Hollingsworth. 8 Immediately
after this the Coalition experienced a rise in support which remained steady until midAugust when they experienced another dip noted in Roy Morgan and Newspoll’s
opinion polls. This dip (Coalition down 6 % in Roy Morgan’s opinion poll 24 August
2003) was explained by Roy Morgan with the jailing of Pauline Hanson and the
misconduct of Wilson Tuckey; using his position as a Minister for Regional Services,
Territories and Local Government to attempt to abolish his son’s traffic charges.9

Neither of these changes in voter preference seems to link to the Solomon Islandsintervention, either in time or as a direct factor. Rather, throughout the period MayAugust 2003 which covers the period of before the announcement of a possible
Solomon Islands-intervention, the announcement, and the actual intervention, there
are stable numbers in the opinion polls for the Coalition and nothing that suggests that
the Solomon Islands-intervention had a major impact on public opinion. The
Newspoll data of 5 August 2003 supports this as well.

An opinion poll in December 2002 indicated that the public were increasingly
concerned about security-issues after the September-11 attacks and the Bali bombing
in October 2002. 10 The Australian government’s linking of the crisis in Solomon
Islands to the failed state-debate in the war-on-terror context as a possible threat to
Australia can help explain public support for the intervention, as they had already
shown a growing concern on security and would react positively to the government
acting in that context.

The investigation of three newspapers – The Age, The Australian, and Financial
Review – reveals the almost total lack of interest from the public of the situation in the
Solomon Islands. From 1 January 2002 to the announcement of a possible
intervention in June 2003, there are no letters from the public and only a few opinion

8

Roy Morgan Research, ‘ALP Takes Lead in Wake of Governor-General's Resignation, However
Electors Want Howard to Stay as PM’, 6 June 2003,
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9
Roy Morgan Research, ‘ALP Takes Lead After Hanson Sentenced to Jail and Wilson Tuckey's
"Foolishness”,30
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10
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pieces. However, these were written not so much by the “public” as academics and
people with a more direct connection with politics. The expert commentators will be
further analysed in the Media section.

Apart from these expert commentator’s articles, there is no evidence of the public
writing letters to newspapers about Solomon Islands. Likewise there is no evidence of
the public aiming to influence government policy; rather there was no reaction and no
real interest. Whether it was because of public apathy or that the public did not have
any knowledge of the situation cannot be proven, however, the media’s coverage (or,
with two notable exceptions, the lack of coverage) of the Solomon Islands-situation
investigated below may help explain it.

The Media
Media coverage of the situation in Solomon Islands in 2002 and 2003 was scarce with
a few exceptions. Focussing on three newspapers – The Age, the Australian, and the
Financial Review - and their reporting of Solomon Islands reveals a lack of attention
by the media of the unfolding crisis there.

The exceptions to this were The Australian’s Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, Paul Kelly
and Greg Sheridan, The Financial Review’s Geoffrey Barker and Rowan Callick, and
The Age’s Tony Parkinson. They wrote specifically of Solomon Islands for their
respective newspapers on more than one occasion, particularly so O’Callaghan, being
the only Australian journalist at the time permanently stationed in Solomon Islands.

During 2002 there were fewer than 150 articles in the three newspapers that related to
the Australian policy towards Solomon Islands. Below follows a table listing the
number of articles in each newspaper investigated. The search was done by using
Solomon + Islands as keywords and the table below shows the result. Not all of the
articles listed below were directly related to Australian foreign policy towards the
Solomon Islands or to events taking place in Australia or the Solomon’s that could
have an impact on the Australian decision-making. However, the tables are still good
indicators of the infrequent reporting on Solomon Islands in these three newspapers.
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Table 7.2: Coverage on Solomon Islands in selected newspapers 2002-2003
Newspaper

Jan-Feb

Mar- Apr

May-June

Jul-Aug

Sep-Oct

Nov-Dec

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

2002

3

3

7

13

7

7

The Age

3

3

7

5

4

4

The Australian

10

17

18

15

18

12

The Financial
Review

Newspaper

Jan-Feb

Mar- Apr

May-June

Jul-Aug

Sep-Oct

Nov-Dec

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

3

8

19

56

28

The Age

11

2

15

63

18

The Australian

24

11

64

114

37

The Financial
Review

The tables show clearly that the Australian consistently reported more on the
Solomon Islands than the Financial Review and The Age. The Financial Review
follows second and The Age performs poorly with the exception of July/August 2003.
The large number of articles in The Australian can partly be explained by the
numerous articles from Mary-Louise O’Callaghan. 11

There are peaks in the number of articles in July/August 2002 for the Financial
Review which coincides with the Pacific Islands Forum annual meeting. The
Australian and The Age increased the number of articles in January/February 2003,
reporting on cyclone Zoe that hit the islands in Solomon Islands in early January and
also exposing the state’s inability to deal with the situation. It also coincided with
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer’s article in The Australian on 8 January
reaffirming Australia’s “hands-off”-approach to Solomon Islands 12 , which produced
comments from journalists and other commentators, thereby increasing the number of
articles for that time-period. The announcement of a possible intervention in to

11

Clive Moore, Happy Isles in Crisis: The historical causes for a failing in Solomon Islands,19982004, Asia Pacific Press, Canberra, 2004, p.131, and Jon Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom: From
Uprising to Intervention in the Solomon Islands, Pandanus books, Canberra, 2004, p.14
12
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Solomon Islands in June 2003 and the following actual intervention produced a spike
in the number of articles for May/June and July/August 2003.

Overall, the reporting on Solomon Islands has to be considered low, at least for the
Financial Review and The Age. Considering the deteriorating law and order-situation,
the proximity to Australia, the failing economy, and the socio-economic plight in
Solomon Islands in 2002 and 2003, it is interesting to note the low number of articles,
particularly from the Financial Review and The Age. It shows the lack of interest from
the general media in Solomon Islands. As O’Callaghan noted, when Foreign Minister
Downer held a speech at the National Press Club in Canberra on Australia’s role in
the region in May 2002 not one journalist asked a question on Solomon Islands. 13
This at a time when Australia withdrew the IPMT and the law and order situation was
still not under control.

The Australian fares better overall in its reporting on Solomon Islands and the main
reason was the presence of Mary-Louise O’Callaghan in Honiara. She is by far the
most prominent writer of articles written for The Australian. By living there, she
could produce detailed reports on the situation from an insider’s perspective, while
the other newspapers relied on externally placed journalists and commentators.

The level of reporting activity has been investigated above. In order to further
estimate any possible influence by the media sources used here, a more detailed
examination of the articles written by the journalists in question will be conducted.

The Australian’s O’Callaghan wrote articles describing the situation in the Solomon
Islands throughout the investigated period 2002-03. Most articles only reported on
events in Solomon Islands, such as visits by Australian officials, violence, political
and economic developments (or rather lack there of), and described Solomon Islands
from an insider’s perspective. Her reports highlighted the volatile and desperate
situation in Solomon Islands and kept the readers informed of what was happening
there. If not for her, little information would have reached Australian readers.

13

Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, ‘Solomons still beset by guns, graft and violence’, The Australian, 14
October 2002
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In the majority of her articles she merely reports the situation but she does expresses
her opinion on what Australia ought to do as well. On 14 October 2002 she notes the
lack of attention from Australian media and the failure of the aid-policy. She
expressed concerns whether the Australian government actually understands what is
happening in Solomon Islands. Its support for Prime Minister Kemakeza underlines
that, according to O’Callaghan, since he appeared unable to deal with the situation, or
was possibly part of the problem himself. 14 Without outlining an alternate policyproposal, it is clear that she believed the current policy not to work. However,
although only a few of the articles contains direct comments by O’Callaghan, the
constant articles describing the lawless situation were in themselves an indirect
message Australian policy. Through the articles a picture emerges of a society without
a functioning state able to control law and order, or the economy, or even rescue
efforts in the wake of a natural disaster (cyclone Zoe). That picture indirectly displays
the ineffectiveness of Australian aid and effort.

Also in The Australian, Greg Sheridan wrote an editorial in August 2002 warning
about the crisis facing Melanesia. He particularly pointed to PNG but discussed
Solomon Islands and labelled it “effectively a failed state”. He argued that Australia
“need to re-engage with Melanesia” and that aid alone is not sufficient to stop the
downward spiral. He did not, however, argue for an intervention. 15 The article may
have been prompted by the upcoming PIF-meeting a week later. He then wrote an
article on 31 May 2003 regarding the terrorist threat against Australia and briefly
point towards PNG and Solomon Islands as potential bases for terrorist groups in case
they became failed states. 16 Still, Solomon Islands were mentioned only in passing.

O’Callaghan and Sheridan’s articles were the only two in The Australian in 2002 and
up until June 2003 that specifically argued for a change in Australia’s policy towards
Solomon Islands. It does not indicate much pressure on the government. There is only
one article written in favour of a policy change before the announcement of a possible
intervention in June 2003; the unnamed author highlights the dangers and risks of a
more active Australian assistance but argues that while Australia risks being seen as a
14

M-L O’Callaghan, ‘Solomons still beset by guns, graft and violence’, The Australian, 14 October
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16
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234

colonial power the alternative would have huge effects on Australia. The proposed
action is to send personnel there, possibly even police, to help ensuring that the aid
money is spent sufficiently, and to do so through the Commonwealth or the PIF. 17 An
opinion piece stated in 20 May 2003 that a reengagement with Melanesia was
necessary with tighter control on how Australian aid was spent. 18 Three articles in 18
months explicitly arguing for a policy change in the Australian cannot be seen as it
putting the government under pressure to any great extent. More useful was perhaps
O’Callaghan’s constant reports from Solomon Islands describing the situation.

When Downer announced in June 2003 that an intervention might be taking place, the
response from The Australian was positive. Sheridan wrote on 7 June when the
policy-process had begun in earnest in support of an Australian-led intervention,
arguing that Australia’s values, reputation, and national interest were all on the line. If
Australia wasn’t doing anything about it now, it’ll pay for it later – economically as
well as politically. 19 O’Callaghan also supported the new policy initiative, although
she couldn’t help but add “it took them only three years to work it out, but the federal
government has finally recognised that the failing state of Solomon Islands isn’t going
to magically fix itself”. 20

Further editorials and articles in The Australian in June/July endorsed the decision
with caveats such as just so long as the government understood that it was a long-term
commitment 21 and with comments such as, “better late than never”. 22 The Financial
Review was slightly more active in promoting a policy change in 2002. Geoffrey
Barker wrote five articles arguing directly or indirectly the need for a change in
policy. Three of those articles appeared in the weeks before the PIF-meeting in
August 2002. Barker argued against sending Australian troops to Iraq when the need

17
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was greater in its own neighbourhood. 23 He underlines his belief that “the real threat
to our security lies not in places such as Iraq but in disaster-prone nations to the near
north”. 24 He further argued that Howard “should consider appointing a full-time
Minister for Pacific Island Affairs”, to shift focus back on the region and in realisation
that the security threat came from there, not Iraq. 25 Barker continues to push the issue
in two subsequent articles in September and November 2002. 26 Rowan Callick also
wrote an article in October 2002 arguing that it was time for Australia “to consider
cauterising the wounds in failed states” referring to the troubled nations in Melanesia
without explicitly stating how. 27

Interestingly enough, after Barker had consistently argued his position between JulyNovember 2002, there then were no more such articles arguing a new approach
towards the region that specifically mentioned the policy towards Solomon Islands
between November 2002 and May 2003. Callick wrote that the White Paper released
in February 2003 needed a “rethink” in the overall policy towards the “Arc of
instability” but he did not propose an intervention. 28 In the few articles the focus was
more on PNG than Solomon Islands, almost accepting Solomon Islands’ failed statestatus. 29

After it became clear that an intervention was likely to happen, Geoffrey Barker and
Rowan Callick both endorsed the decision. Barker called it an “historic but necessary
shift” and supported Downer’s statement that “Australia could not risk leaving failed
states festering off its coast in an age of international terrorism, and drug, people and
money trafficking”. He also carefully stated that “perhaps Australia should have acted
more vigorously sooner to address the Solomon Islands crisis; perhaps it should have
been less sensitive to charges of neo-colonialism in its traditional hands-off policy”. 30
Callick too acknowledged the “remarkably swift policy turnaround”. He points out the
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timing of the decision, coming after the invasion of Iraq and the visit to the United
States by Howard and the increasing concern over failed states being used by
terrorists groups. 31 An editorial in the Financial Review stated: “The new Downer
doctrine of ‘cooperative intervention’ in Australia’s troubled neighbourhood is to be
applauded” and goes even further, proposing “a federation for the smaller Pacific
states; dollarisation and liberalisation of migration”. 32 The Australian-led intervention
had the full support of the Financial Review.

Between 2002 and June 2003 The Age did not provide one article arguing directly for
a change in policy towards Solomon Islands. Criticism of Australian policy towards
the Pacific in general occurs, such as in an interview with Dr. James Chin who
criticises the Australian government as partly responsible for the militarisation of
Solomon Islands by leaving it to its fate in 2000. 33 Mark Forbes points indirectly to
the failing Pacific policy by writing about the deteriorating situations in PNG and
Solomon Islands but there are no demands of changing policy towards Solomon
Islands specifically. 34 While The Australian and the Financial Review contained a
handful of articles proposing a change in Australian policy towards Solomon Islands,
The Age did not even have that.

The Age was however supportive of the change in policy when it was announced. An
editorial states “Australia’s full acceptance of its South Pacific leadership role is
overdue but welcome”. It criticises the government for not acting sooner. 35 Tony
Parkinson agrees with the government, stating that Australia “has direct strategic
interests at stake”, describing Australia’s “unique and unavoidable role in the power
equation of the South-West Pacific” and the threat that may come from a failed
Solomon Islands state. 36 Michael Gordon in turn sees it as Australia “being a good
neighbour”. 37 Full support, thus, from The Age.
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Expert commentators used the three newspapers to further their agenda and to argue
for a change in policy. While the newspapers investigated abstained from stronger
opinions, with the few exceptions mentioned above, these expert commentators
expressed clearer and stronger views. The most notable commentator writing in The
Australian had to be foreign minister Alexander Downer who on 8 January 2003
strongly defended the current government policy towards Solomon Islands. 38 Former
Liberal leader John Hewson also voiced his opinion in the Financial Review in
September 2002 when the debate over a possible invasion of Iraq raged, arguing that
Australia’s first responsibility was towards its region and not in Iraq. Solomon Islands
is mentioned but by no means outlined as priority one. 39 In July 2003, after the
decision had been made, Hewson seemed to agree with it but referred to it as “catchup politics”. 40

An important contributor behind the later decision to intervene in Solomon Islands,
ASPI’s Elsina Wainwright, used the Financial Review to further her opinion. In
October 2002, in light of the Bali bombing, she argued that the smaller Pacific islands
could be used as safe havens by terrorists and therefore posed a risk to Australian
security. Her main example is the failing state of Solomon Islands. She proposes a
“rethink of our approach and look at becoming more fully engaged and committing
resources in a different fashion”. 41 Wainwright was later the main author behind the
ASPI-report on Solomon Islands. She confirmed her views after the release of that
report in an opinion-piece in The Australian. 42

To accompany their CIS-report Susan Windybank and Mike Manning wrote an article
in March 2003 warning that the PNG may become a failed state unless the Australian
government helped. Although not concerned with Solomon Islands, the article
highlighted the possibly serious consequences for Australian security if nothing was
done and may have contributed to the government’s later change of policy. 43 It also
gave more ammunition to the notion of an “Arc of Instability”. These were the only
38
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contributions by expert commentators up until it became apparent that the Australian
government were considering an intervention. After the launch of the ASPI-report
several commentators supported the plans, albeit with different concerns.

Academic Jon Fraenkel voiced concerns that Australia may become a colonial power
in Solomon Islands again, criticising the lack of details in the proposed ASPI-plan for
an intervention. 44 Dr. Colin Hunt likewise expresses concerns of how the plan will
deal with the deep-rooted causes and economic growth. 45 The former Executive
Director of the Australia Defence Association, Michael O’Connor calls it “a
challenge, but also an opportunity” 46 , Labor’s Foreign Affairs spokesman, Kevin
Rudd said it should have happened earlier 47 as does Satish Chand, Director at the
Pacific Policy Project at the Australian National University. 48 Helen Hughes, Senior
Fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies stated that the aid-policy had to be rethought; otherwise the intervention would not be a long-lasting success. 49 Director of
studies for the ANU’s graduate program in strategy and defence, Robert Ayson 50 and
former New Zealand Prime Minister Mike Moore gave their support and emphasised
that it had to be multinational in nature. 51 Overall, though, the intervention had the
support, more or less, by these expert commentators.

In conclusion, the media cannot be seen as a major influence on the Australian
government’s change in policy towards Solomon Islands. Rather, the lack of attention
is striking. The exception was the constant stream of articles by Mary-Louise
O’Callaghan, stationed in Honiara. These articles painted a picture of Solomon
Islands as a failed, or failing state, and may have contributed to the growing concerns
that Downer expressed during the period. However, despite a few articles arguing for
a change in policy in the three newspapers combined, only a few argued for an
intervention. It was only after the launch of the ASPI-report on 10 June 2003 that a
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greater number of articles were written and then mainly in support of the policy
change the government had already adopted. Many authors claimed it should have
been done earlier but generally they had failed to argue that before the fact.
Throughout the investigated time period of 2002 up to June 2003, The Australian, the
Financial Review, and The Age, were not a major influence on government policy
towards Solomon Islands.

Interest-Groups
The main interest-group that had an influence on Australian foreign policy towards
Solomon Islands was the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). It was set up by
the government in 2001 but claims to be “an independent, non-partisan policy
institute” although it received funding from the Department of Defence budget. 52 In a
series of publications in 2002 and 2003 ASPI highlighted the potential threats that
could come from failed states in the region.

The threat of terrorist groups using failed states close to Australia as a base for attacks
on Australia was highlighted in the ASPI-report “Beyond Bali”, released shortly after
the first Bali bombing in October 2002. In light of the recent terrorist attack in Bali,
the report warned especially of Solomon Islands, but also of the risk that PNG,
Vanuatu, and possibly East Timor, becoming failed states. If that were to happen,
terrorist networks might use them as bases for possible attacks on Australia. 53 Elsina
Wainwright, who was the strategy and international program director at ASPI, also
wrote an article in the Financial Review repeating the main argument of the “Beyond
Bali”-report. 54

The report received publicity in the media, being reported by The Australian, The
Age, and the Financial Review, further highlighting ASPI’s warning of the
consequences of letting Solomon Islands deteriorate further. The newspapers also
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wrote of ASPI’s proposal of a more active role in its immediate neighbourhood. 55
Hugh White stated that “it’s an idea whose time has come”, advocating that the
hands-off approach towards Melanesia had not worked and a shift in thinking and
policy was now necessary. The awareness of the possible threat failed states can pose
contributed to the idea now being more acceptable than a couple of years ago. 56

ASPI continued to work towards an Australian policy change in 2002 and 2003
preparing another report – “Our Failing Neighbour” - that targeted Solomon Islands
specifically. Elsina Wainwright led the work on the new report which recommended a
new approach towards Solomon Islands. ASPI director Hugh White had previously
worked as deputy secretary of the Defence department and had a good understanding
of how the bureaucratic process worked and now used his experience to push for a
policy change. He ensured that drafts of the report were distributed to relevant
departments in the Australian bureaucracy and by late 2002 began organising
“consultative sessions with all relevant ministries, departments, and agencies
including the intelligence establishment as well as foreign missions and organisations
to workshop some new Solomon ideas”. 57 Later on when Downer asked his
department for new ideas on Solomon Islands, the idea for an intervention had already
been planted by White and made it easy for the bureaucrats to present it as an option.

Additionally, when the National Security Committee of Cabinet met in May 2003 to
discuss Solomon Islands, copies of the report that was about to be launched were
distributed to the ministers present. 58 The ASPI-report was very much a part of the
policy-making process and in the mindset of the bureaucrats from late 2002 to the
government ministers when they met to discuss possible options to deal with Solomon
Islands situation in May 2003.
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The ASPI report “Our Failing Neighbour” was launched on 10 June 2003 by Foreign
Minister Alexander Downer, which in itself indicates how much he had taken in the
policy options proposed in the report in his rethink on Solomon Islands policy.
Downer said in his speech that no decisions had been made as of yet but referred to
the report as a “reference point” in the policy process. He particularly pointed to the
idea of a multinational intervention, which he labelled “Cooperative intervention”. He
agreed that Solomon Islands government “appears powerless to stop the downward
spiral”, thereby essentially giving up the old policy of Solomon Islands helping
themselves. 59 Furthermore, Downer referred to the ASPI-report as “very timely” and
valuable to the discussions on “how to deal with the situation in the Solomon
Islands”. 60 It is clear that the report had an important impact on the policy change.
When it became clear that the current hands-off approach did not work, the ASPIreport appeared to represent a well thought through and viable alternative. A much
more active role by Australia was proposed, involving a multinational intervention
into Solomon Islands. The operation would have to be approved by Solomon
government and would be carried out in two phases: Phase one would aim at law and
order; Phase two at institution building. 61

The Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) was somewhat influential and produced
two reports that also played in to the policy change debate. Windybank and
Manning’s PNG assessment argued that the “hands-off”-policy had failed Melanesia
as a whole and stated that “there is no ‘exit strategy’ as far as the neighbourhood is
concerned”. 62 Helen Hughes continued the CIS critique, arguing in May 2003 that aid
was actually hurting the Pacific Island states rather than helping. Australia needed to
add stricter conditions on aid to the Pacific to make it work. 63 These reports provided
further opinions that something different had to be done to stop the downward spiral
of some Pacific states.
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The ASPI-report especially but also the CIS were often referred to in the press and by
academics as an important part in the policy change. Several articles in the Financial
Review, 64 The Age, 65 and The Australian 66 all pointed to the important role ASPI, and
to a lesser extent, the CIS had played in the government’s policy change towards
Solomon Islands. Leading academics in the area also acknowledged their role in
changing the government’s thinking. 67

Other interest-groups that may have aimed at influencing the Australian government
are Australian businesses. The Australian Pacific Islands Business Council strongly
welcomed the intervention when it was announced 68 however; there is no evidence of
Australian companies and corporations being a major influence in the Australian
government’s decision to alter its policy. The opportunities for Australian businesses
to conduct business in Solomon Islands were strongly diminished 1998-2003 due to
the civil unrest there. Around a 100 Australian companies traded with Solomon
Islands before the coup in 2000, with about 30 of them actually being in Solomon
Islands. Due to the unrest that number declined to just a few being able to maintain
their business in Solomon Islands. 69

Trade between Australia and Solomon Islands has been fairly modest. According to
the ASPI-report, bilateral merchandise trade reached $106 million in 1997-98, before
declining to $56 million in 2000-2001. The report states that future trade “although
not huge, are potentially valuable”. 70 Furthermore, Australian exports to Solomon
Islands in 2001 amounted to AUD$61 million and imports only AUD$2.5 million 71 ,
so the balance of trade was strongly in Australia’s favour. Certainly, it would benefit
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Australian business if the intervention was successful but trade being at a modest
level, there are no indications that this was a major reason for the policy change.

The ASPI- and CSI-think tanks were two interest-groups that had most influence over
the Australian foreign policy change towards Solomon Islands. Hugh White’s
knowledge of how the bureaucracy functioned enabled him to put forward his and
ASPI’s agenda to the bureaucracy through information sessions and by distributing
drafts to them and even to the government ministers. This provided the bureaucracy
with a clear alternative when Downer asked for policy options. It also presented the
government ministers with a viable plan for a policy change when they met to discuss
Solomon Islands in May 2003. Taking this into account it is clear that ASPI had a
strong influence in the decision to change policy.

Political Parties
There was a general consensus among the parliamentary parties over the intervention
into Solomon Islands. Labor, the Greens, and the Australian Democrats all supported
the action taken by the government, although with some disagreements over details in
the operation.

The government had received criticism over its Pacific policy from the other parties
before the intervention. Comments made by Labor and the Australian Democrats said
that it should have been done earlier and in a slightly different way. The Australian
Labor Party criticized the Government already in June 2000 for declining several
requests made in April and May 2000 by Solomon Islands Prime Minister Ulufa’alu
for Australian police to be sent there. 72 Already in May Labor MP Duncan Kerr urged
the government to participate in a multinational security force. 73 Once the coup had
taken place on 5 June and Prime Minister Ulufa’alu had been forced to resign, Labor
again criticized the government’s lack of action and argued that Australia should send
peacekeepers to Solomon Islands to stabilize the situation. 74
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The Australian Democrats similarly argued that the government should have sent
police to Solomon Islands when requested in 2000. Its spokesperson for Foreign
Affairs Senator Vicki Bourne claimed that if the government had acted on the request,
the coup could have been averted. Bourne expressed “great concern” over Howard’s
“lack of foresight” on Solomon Islands. 75 The criticism continued in 2002 with the
Foreign Affairs spokesperson for Labor Kevin Rudd stating in August that the
government had to act tougher towards the Solomon Islands government. Rudd
argued that there were still a lot of guns in the Solomon Islands society and in order to
assure disarmament of the lawless elements a “more activist, interventionist
diplomacy in the Solomon Islands through the South Pacific Forum” was needed.
Rudd cited threatening to stop aid as one example of how the government could act in
a tougher manner. 76 Rudd’s comments came at the same time as the Solomon Islands
economy continued to deteriorate, despite the Australian government’s increased aidprogram from 1998, and the withdrawal of the IPMT in June 2002. The current policy
clearly did not work and Labor seized the opportunity to put pressure on the Howardgovernment. Rudd once again voiced Labor’s disapproval of the current policy in
October 2002, claiming, the government’s aid-program “had been comprehensively
ineffective in restoring political stability and even modest levels of economic
development”. 77

When the Foreign Affairs and Trade Policy White Paper was released in February
2003 Kevin Rudd noted the lack of “a coherent, forward strategy on the implosion of
law and order across the south-west Pacific”. 78 The White Paper confirmed the longstanding policy that the Pacific Island states had to help themselves while Australia
could assist with aid and technical advice, which the Labor party had criticized for
years. 79
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The beheading of an Australian missionary in Solomon Islands in May 2003 provided
Rudd with an opportunity to again point out what would happen if Solomon Islands
were allowed to continue to deteriorate. He again called for “a much tougher approach
by the Australian government” not just towards Solomon Islands but towards several
countries in the South Pacific. 80

The policy change was under way but whether Rudd and the Labor Party were aware
of that is uncertain. However, the Labor party had kept up the pressure on the
government though continued criticism since the year 2000 and again during 20022003, particularly when it became apparent in 2002 that the current policy did not
work and it kept the issue alive. When the Howard-government announced the change
in policy and possible intervention into Solomon Islands, the Labor party supported it.
Rudd couldn’t help commenting that it should have come much earlier but was still in
favour of it. 81 However, when plans of the intervention surfaced Rudd stated that they
wanted less military and more focus on the policing part of the operation. 82 Rudd
argued that police should be the main component of the intervention-force and any
military force should be kept to a minimum. 83

Neither the Greens nor the Australian Democrats spoke against the Howardgovernment’s decision. 84 There was no debate in parliament at the time of the
decision since parliament was on winter recess 85 but when the issue was raised in the
Senate on 12 August 2003, almost three weeks after the intervention; Greens Senator
Bob Brown endorsed the motion on Solomon Islands. He warned, though, to be
careful not to appear imperialistic and to ensure that the operation contributed to give
power back to the people of Solomon Islands and not “in some way or other,
empower outside entities and make the mistake of giving the appearance that
Australia has long-term power ambitions as far as this little country is concerned”. 86
Greens Senator Kerry Nettle later made the remark that a lot of taxpayer’s money
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could have been saved if the Australian government had acted already in 2000 and not
waited until 2003. 87 The Australian Democrats supported the intervention as well.
Senator Natasha Stott Despoja as the spokesperson for the Australian Democrats
issued support on behalf of the party but also wanted more information on how the
assistance would actually help rebuilding the Solomon Islands economy and other
issues outside the specific law and order-problem. 88 Despoja also stated the
Democrat’s support in the Senate on 12 August 2003. 89

The political parties in federal parliament supported the intervention into Solomon
Islands. However, a small party outside parliament, the Socialist Alliance, opposed
the intervention. The operation was described by the Socialist Alliance as “an
imperialist act” and the undertaking was “brought on by corporate globalisation
agenda”. 90 However, given its position as a radical party without a seat in federal
parliament, and despite arranging a small demonstration in Melbourne against the
Solomon-intervention, which only attracted about 10 people 91 , its impact and
influence on the government and public opinion was limited at best.

International Factors

Global Factors
There are a number of global factors that may have influenced the Howardgovernment in its decision to alter its policy towards Solomon Islands. The 11
September 2001 attacks in the US had an impact worldwide and the ensuing
discussion over terrorism, failed states, and how to prevent further attacks affected the
Australian government’s foreign policy as well. Global actors had an interest in
Solomon Islands and may have had an effect on Australian decision-making, as did
international norms of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention.
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The September-11 terrorist attacks in the United States brought with it a shift in
security focus towards non-state actors such as terrorist networks. Focus had earlier
been directed towards threats from other states or within states. This shift was driven
by the United States which was displayed in the National Security Strategy
assessment in September 2002. It stated that:

Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger
America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to
our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to
penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us.
Today, the world’s great powers find ourselves on the same side – united by common
dangers of terrorist violence and chaos. 92

Australia’s close relationship with the United States meant that its outlook on the
world was influenced by this shift in thinking by its ally. Prime Minister John Howard
enacted the ANZUS Treaty for the first time just days after the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, vowing Australia’s support for the United States. 93

The Australian rhetoric emulated that of the US as well. Shortly after the US began
pushing its pre-emptive strategy (if necessary), as outlined by President George W.
Bush in an address at West Point, 94 and in the National Security Strategy 2002, 95
Prime Minister Howard and Foreign Minister Downer echoed those sentiments.
Howard stated that:

I mean let me make it very clear if I were presented with evidence that Australia was
about to be attacked and I was told by our military people that by launching a preemptive hit we could prevent that attack occurring I would authorise that pre-emptive hit
and expect the opposition to support me in the process. So in a situation like this Robert
[Hill] was expressing a self-evidently valid proposition and particularly against the
background of the events of the 11th of September. 96

Downer also defended this position, saying:
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If you’re sitting in Canberra and you know that somebody is about to launch an attack
against say, Sydney, or an Australian city of one kind or another, you have information
that this attack is about to take place, you would obviously work with other countries in
order to try to stop the attack taking place. But in the end, if there is to be an attack on an
Australian city, of one kind or another, in those circumstances we have to do everything
we can to try to avert it. 97

Although it is clear that such a scenario represents an extreme case, it caused uproar
from a number of Asian countries, including Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. 98
Despite the criticism Downer defended the position, saying that it would only happen
in the extreme case when all other avenues had failed. 99 It is clear, though, that the
Australian government had taken the American view of a new security paradigm after
the September 11 attacks – that threats had to be stopped pre-emptively before they
had a chance to occur. A new focus emerged on terrorist networks potentially using
failed states for money laundering, for planning attacks, or as a base from which to
launch attacks. 100

Prime Minister Howard and Foreign Minister Downer both acknowledged this new
threat. Howard pointed to the potential of terrorists using the Pacific Islands states for
their purposes. 101 Downer saw it as “an exaggeration” when he December 2002 he
commented on the possibility of Solomon Islands being used as a terrorist base but he
raised concerns that terrorists financing could go through the Pacific Islands states. He
said there had not been a concern regarding Solomon Islands; mainly because he
believed an Islamic terrorist organisation would not be welcome by the indigenous
population, but that they had worried about a few other states. 102 He repeated these
concerns in March 2003 but maintained that the threat came from money laundering
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that could finance terrorist networks and again he did not specify a certain country of
concern. 103

When the decision had been made to change the policy towards Solomon Islands,
Howard and Downer now emphasised the threat of having a failed state in the region
and it being exploited by terrorists. Howard referred in a speech on 1 July 2003 to the
“age of terrorism” since 11 September 2001. He further stated: “too often we have
seen rogue and failed states become the base from which terrorist and transnational
criminals organise their operations, train their recruits and manage their finances”. He
continued: “we know that a failed state in our region, on our doorstep, will jeopardise
our own security. The best thing we can do is to take remedial action and take it
now”. 104

Howard admitted that there was no evidence of terrorist activities in Solomon Islands.
Instead, he stressed the possibility and potential of a failed Solomon Islands being
used by terrorist organisations. On 20 July 2003 he said: “I’m sure the Australian
people will understand if the Solomon’s become a failed state it is a haven potentially
for terrorists, drug-runners and money launderers”.105 Downer also emphasised the
perception that “since September the 11th last year, and for us especially, since
October the 12th this year, the world is a very different place”. 106 Like Howard, he
admitted that there was no evidence “certainly not in relation to terrorism. Money
laundering, well only at a petty level. Our point is, and ASPI’s point too – I think the
ASPI paper is a very good paper by the way, very impressed with it – but I think the
potential is the problem.” 107 With both Howard and Downer stressing the potential of
terrorists using Solomon Islands for their operations, the intervention has to be seen as
a pre-emptive action, ensuring that the possibility will not arise. Although they
mentioned it in 2002 and early 2003, it wasn’t until the decision to alter policy had
been made that full emphasis was put on the threat of failed states in the region.
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Whether Solomon Islands was a “failing” or “failed” state was unclear. Howard and
Downer seemed to stress the possibility of Solomon Islands becoming a failed state,
rather than declaring it a failed state. 108 Academics and journalists used the terms
failing or failed state to describe Solomon Islands in 2002 and 2003 but there was no
consensus. The Economist wrote in February 2003 that “The Solomon Islands faces
the prospect of becoming the Pacific’s first failed state”. 109 Geoffrey Barker
(Financial Review) referred to Solomon Islands in November 2002 as “now a failed
state, in the hands of extortion gangs” 110 , Graeme Dobell stated “a good case can be
mounted that Solomon Islands was indeed becoming a failed state” 111 , while Elsina
Wainwright in October 2002 describes Solomon Islands as “virtually a failed
state” 112 , and Jon Fraenkel notes in regards to Solomon Islands “whether or not this
was a ‘failed state’ was debatable” 113 . No consensus, but most seemed to at least think
Solomon Islands was not working well.

The international norm (or principle) of sovereignty also played a role in the
discussions in the Australian government’s decision to change its policy towards
Solomon Islands. The policy up to the intervention emphasised the sovereignty of the
Pacific Island states and that Australia was “not a neo-colonial power”. 114 Downer reemphasised this policy repeatedly. 115 Sovereignty was stated as one of the reasons as
to why Australia would not intervene in Solomon Islands prior to the intervention in
2003. One of the key conditions for an intervention was that it would be based on an
108
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invitation from the Solomon Islands government. This condition was declared time
and time again by both Howard and Downer. 116 A reason for this condition would be
the recognition of Solomon Islands as a sovereign state and that intervention would be
by invitation only. If Australia led an intervention based on an official request from
Solomon Islands government it would not violate the principle of sovereignty and
would therefore be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the international community.

The intervention into Solomon Islands was described by some journalists as a
Humanitarian Intervention. The ASPI-report attempts to show the similarities between
the situation in the Solomon Islands and earlier examples of humanitarian intervention
in Kosovo, Somalia and East Timor. It concedes that the Solomon Islands case
doesn’t completely fit these examples but argues that it shares “key similarities. In
particular, they all represent attempts to reconcile the need to help states and peoples
in trouble with the need to avoid the dangers of neo-colonialism.” 117 Rowan Callick
refers to the principle, as well as to the report, repeating the arguments from the
ASPI-report. 118 However, the overwhelming impression of how the Australian
government justified the intervention is not in terms of humanitarian intervention but
in terms of security, in light of the September-11 attacks and the Bali-bombing. The
humanitarian dimension of the crisis in Solomon Islands is often mentioned but the
operation itself is most of the time justified by the need to stop Solomon Islands from
collapsing, from becoming a failed state, with the potential security implications that
this would have for Australia.

Several international institutions had reasons to be in favour of an intervention
however, there are no indications that any of them exerted decisive pressure on the
Australian government. The United Nations was not directly involved due to the fact
that China would most likely veto any Security Council-resolution, since Solomon
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Islands recognised Taiwan. The Australian government therefore did not seek support
of a UN resolution, however, it did receive support after the event. The UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan praised the Australian-led intervention in a statement on 5
August 2003. 119 The President of the Security Council also endorsed the intervention
on behalf of the Security Council-members on 26 August 2003. 120 The unlikelihood
of securing a UN-resolution also indicate that the UN would not have been able to
exert great influence on the Australian government in changing its policy, despite the
UN being supportive once the intervention had taken place. The China/Taiwan issue
prevented an UN-resolution but did not stop them from expressing support after the
intervention was already a fact, as there are provisions under Chapter VIII of the UN
Charter for regional associations to maintain peace and security. 121

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank would have an interest
in Solomon Islands stabilising again, however, as Graeme Dobell stated: “The World
Bank and the IMF virtually refuse to deal with it”. 122 A failing Solomon Islands state
would have served as a deterrent to lend money, as the chances of it paying the loan
back would have been low. The IMF sent a team to Solomon Islands in August 2002
and according to the then Solomon Islands Finance Minister Laurie Chan, part of the
deal would have been for Solomon Islands to give up its currency and instead adopt
the Australian dollar. 123 What, if anything, came out of this visit by the IMF is
unclear. However, Solomon Islands did not give up its currency and there are no signs
of the IMF lending money in the following period, which backs the earlier claim by
Dobell that the IMF choose not to deal with Solomon Islands. If Solomon Islands did
stabilise again, as part of an external intervention, it would give the IMF a role again,
which indicates that it would be supportive of such an action. However, there is no
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evidence of the IMF or the World Bank exerting pressure on the Australian
government to take such action.

The European Union was the largest aid donor to Solomon Islands when it in
November 2000 introduced US$200 million in aid, obviously with an interest in
solving the crisis there. 124 Being the largest donor it naturally had an interest in a
stable Solomon Islands however, there are no indications that the EU put pressure on
the Howard-government to conduct an intervention for that purpose.

The global factor that seems to have had the greatest effect on the Australian
government in its policy change is the new global debate of the potential threat that
failed states could pose to countries like the United States and Australia. The
Australian-led intervention was certainly framed around this discourse, much more so
than on the humanitarian aspect of Solomon Islands’ decline. Certainly, the
humanitarian dimensions were highlighted both before and after the decision had been
made, however the justification for the intervention was mainly focussed on what a
threat a failed Solomon Islands could be to Australian security. A number of other
global actors were in favour of an intervention but do not seem to have influenced the
Australian government to any large degree. The UN, the IMF, the World Bank and
the EU all approved of and supported the intervention but there are no indications that
any of them played a decisive role in the Australian decision-making process.

Regional Factors
Regional factors had an impact on the Australian government’s decision to alter its
policy and then lead an intervention into Solomon Islands. A number of events and
actors influenced the Howard-government’s decision-making process. The events and
actors deemed most influential are investigated below.

The Bali-bombing on 12 October 2002 certainly had an impact on the government’s
approach towards Solomon Islands. It followed a shift in traditional security thinking
towards focusing on terrorism, which had commenced after the September 11 attacks,
and which dramatically highlighted the threat of regional terrorism for the Howard124
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government. 125 Even though the bombing was “just around the corner” in Indonesia,
the high number of Australian casualties had a large impact on government thinking
as well as public opinion. Terrorism now became a very real threat in the Australian
government’s thought-process. 126 Comments and statements made by Howard and
Downer confirm this new focus. Downer noted “we have a significant problem with
terrorism in the region and obviously Bali is the most dramatic illustration of that”. 127
After the Bali bombing it became even more apparent to the Australian government
that terrorist threats could come from the region as well, reinforcing the impact of the
Bali-bombing on the security focus. This would have an effect on how the
government justified the Solomon Islands-intervention. In a clear reference to the
failing Solomon Islands, Howard said: “We know that a failed state in our region, on
our doorstep, will jeopardise our own security”. 128 The “failing state”-rhetoric of the
“War against Terrorism” thus became a regional factor contributing to Solomon
Islands intervention.

Balance of power in the region and the fear of external influence growing in the South
Pacific are also possible contributors to policy change. John Howard repeatedly stated
in the lead up to the intervention that Solomon Islands was in “Our patch”. 129 By
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doing this, Howard emphasised the role he regarded Australia as playing in the region
and, it can be argued, indirectly telling other external states that this was within
Australia’s sphere-of-influence.

Henderson and Reilly have argued that China “is incorporating the Pacific islands into
its broader quest to become a major Asia-Pacific power”. They further claim that
“China’s long-term goal is to ultimately replace the United States as the pre-eminent
power in the Pacific Ocean”. 130 Although Solomon Islands recognised Taiwan and
not China it could be argued that a failing Solomon Islands in 2003 could have
switched allegiance to China, provided that they were offered a large enough aidpackage, thereby increasing its influence further in the Pacific. Particularly since
according to Henderson and Reilly, the US interest in the South Pacific will lessen
even further. 131 It would therefore be in Australia’s interest to intervene in Solomon
Islands to avert any Chinese attempt to increase its influence.

A possibly more “real threat” to Australian influence in the Pacific was Indonesia.
There were reports that the Solomon Islands government approached Indonesia at
roughly the same time as they sent a letter to John Howard in April 2003. 132 The
alleged negotiations concerned possible Indonesian troops and were conducted
between Indonesian and Solomon authorities in May 2003, which according to Alfred
Sasako, shadow foreign minister in Solomon Islands, was discovered by Australia.133
No official request was ever made, though, but Milter Tozaka, Solomon Islands High
Commissioner in Canberra, admitted to informal discussions between Indonesia and
Solomon Islands. 134

The suggestion that Australia would have based its decision to intervene in Solomon
Islands to avoid Indonesia doing so was flatly rejected by Nick Warner, the Head of
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the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands – “possible involvement by
Indonesia had absolutely no impact on the decision of the Australian government, let
alone the decision of other regional countries to get involved here”. 135 The Solomon
Islands government also denied that any offer had been made. 136 If talks had been
conducted between Indonesia and Solomon Islands it could have affected the
Australian government’s decision, in order to maintain its sphere of influence and
position as regional hegemon however, these claims cannot be substantiated.

Regional organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) were all in
favour of an intervention, however, none can be said to have influenced the Australian
government beforehand. New Zealand foreign minister Phil Goff asked ASEAN
Regional Forum for help in June 2003 in a possible intervention but they did not
provide any direct help with troops and the like. 137 Alexander Downer also informed
the ARF of a possible intervention in June 2003 but there is no indication of the ARF
being an influence on Australian decision-making. 138 The Pacific Islands Forum did
not push for an intervention before the decision was taken. Once it was a possibility,
the PIF’s member states unanimously endorsed an intervention through the foreign
ministers in a meeting in Sydney on 30 June 2003. Several member states even
offered to provide troops and police. 139 The RAMSI-intervention was subsequently
conducted under a Pacific Islands Forum mandate. The PIF-mandate ensured some
level of legitimacy to the intervention. According to Finnemore, for a humanitarian
intervention to be considered legitimate it needs to be multilateral, preferably with a
few “disinterested states” involved as well. 140 The RAMSI-intervention can be argued
to be at least partly a humanitarian intervention and PIF support helped to legitimise
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it. The contribution of troops and police from several of the PIF-members, no matter
how small, added to the legitimacy of the operation. 141

The Asian Development Bank had funded projects in Solomon Islands but the
deteriorating economic situation in 2002 threatened these projects. The ADB warned
that its projects it paid for in Solomon Islands could be cancelled unless the situation
was stabilised. 142 Again, there is no evidence that the ADB was a major influence on
the Australian foreign policy change towards Solomon Islands, despite a vested
interest in stabilising its economy.

Bilateral Relations
Two different bilateral relations are relevant in this case study. Naturally the
Australia-Solomon Islands relationship is crucial but the Australia-United States
relationship also had an impact on Australia’s decision to intervene.

There is no doubt that Australia has the upper hand in the Australia – Solomon Islands
relationship. As a “middle power” Australia is far stronger in terms of its economy,
stability, military capability and international standing. This uneven powerrelationship is evident when examining the lead-up to the intervention. It was
Australia that decided if and when to intervene. The Solomon Islands government did
not have much influence over Australian decision-making in this regard. The Howardgovernment had said no to requests from three different Solomon Islandsgovernments for increased assistance from the year 2000 up until the intervention in
June 2003. 143 There are no indications that the Solomon Islands government was able
to persuade the Australian government to overturn its policy. Rather, the overall
situation would be a stronger factor in this regard, such as the new security-focus on
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failed states and terrorism, and the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the
Solomon Islands.

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer visited Solomon Islands on five different
occasions between 2000 and 2003. 144 He could observe firsthand the deteriorating
situation in Solomon Islands. He later admitted that his visit in December 2002
confirmed his fears that the current policy did not work and that Solomon Islands was
not improving. 145 The fact that Downer could visit Solomon Islands on a regular basis
and meet with Solomon Islands officials may have influenced his personal view by
seeing for himself the situation in Solomon Islands, and it may have contributed to an
extent to him changing his mind on the “hands-off”-approach. It seems unlikely,
though, that pressure from the Solomon Islands government influenced the Australian
government to any great extent to change its policy. The letter from Prime Minister
Kemakeza in April 2003 asking for assistance served to highlight the situation again
and provided the opening for a policy change. However, there is no reason to believe
that this request were any different in terms of influence than earlier requests by
Solomon Islands-governments. Rather, circumstances, context and other external
factors caused the policy change, not pressure or influence from the Solomon Islandsgovernment.

The Australia-United States bilateral relationship seems to have had more of an
impact than the Australia-Solomon Islands relationship in influencing the Howardgovernment to intervene in Solomon Islands. The relationship’s impact on the
decision to intervene has been highlighted by several scholars and journalists. 146
There is no proof that the United States asked Australia to lead an intervention but
several indicators point to Australia acting on Solomon Islands at least influenced by
the direction taken by the United States after the September 11 terrorist attacks. 147
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The Australia-US alliance has been of great importance to Australian governments
since World War II. When the Howard-government came in to power in 1996 it put
further emphasis on the alliance. This could be seen particularly after the September
11 attacks in Washington and New York. Australia invoked the ANZUS-treaty for the
first time in history and sent troops to support the US-led military campaigns in
Afghanistan. It was also involved militarily in Iraq, although not under the ANZUStreaty. 148

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the United States failed states became noted
and perceived as a threat not just to the population in the particular state itself but to
other states too, regionally as well as globally. 149 Daniel Lambach has shown how the
United Kingdom, Germany and the EU all adopted the discourse of failed states being
a potential security risk to their own territories post-September-11. 150 The United
States likewise identified “weak” and “failed” states as a potential threat to its security
in 2002. 151 Australia followed suit in the beginning of 2003 152 adopting the same
language as the United States on failed states, further proof of the close cooperation
between the two countries after September-11. After President George W. Bush
outlined the argument for pre-emptive strikes in a speech in June 2002153 and more
officially later in the National Security Strategy in September 2002 154 , Prime Minister
Howard was quick to support his ally and the notion of a pre-emptive strike. 155
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It is impossible to determine how much the US influenced Howard and Downer in
their thinking but it can be argued that there is a connection. Kabutaulaka agrees,
stating that “it would be fair to say those policies were influenced by the Bush
administration’s agenda”, making the connection between the US agenda in the “Waron-Terror” and Australia as a close ally. 156 Moore states that part of the reason for the
intervention was to “please the United States”. 157 Fraenkel notes that “the US had
long encouraged greater Australian strategic engagement in the Southwest Pacific”.158
A final connection can be made with the fact that Howard went to Texas to meet with
the US president on 3 May 2003, not long before a possible change in policy towards
Solomon Islands began in earnest. 159 It has been argued that Howard came back to
Australia with a new view of what to do in the South Pacific and Solomon Islands. 160
It could simply be that the Australian government felt a need to show its support to
the United States but it fits in well with Australia’s past behaviour. However, there is
no evidence that the US directly pressured Australia in taking any of the measures
mentioned below, although there is an expectation from the US that Australia would
handle law and order in the Western Pacific. 161 The Howard government showed its
support to the United States and the alliance in both a military and political sense.

The influence of the United States in this case is closely related to the “deputy sheriff”
debate that centred on whether Australia saw itself as the “deputy” to the US in the
region, especially in “peacekeeping operations”. It originated in 1999 just days after
the East Timor-intervention when Howard was interviewed by Fred Brenchley. Even
though Howard never used the words “deputy sheriff” it stuck to him due to the
wording used by the interviewer. 162 This notion did not go down well with many
Asian countries. Protests came streaming in immediately from, among others,
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Malaysia and Thailand. 163 In the days following the interview Howard denied that
Australia was a “deputy sheriff” to the US however, as Robert Ayson points out, the
Howard government’s policies echoed those of the US and not just in the above
mentioned examples but in other areas as well, for example, by not ratifying the
Kyoto protocol and the preference for bilateral agreements over wider multilateral
treaties. 164

The “deputy sheriff” debate was logically reinvigorated with the Solomon Islandsintervention in 2003 due to the peacekeeping-aspects of RAMSI. Howard repeatedly
referred to the region as “our patch” and he argued for Australia’s “special
responsibilities” to its neighbours. 165 Howard did not necessarily refer directly to the
US as having these expectations of Australia but he often stated that the rest of the
world expected Australia to take responsibility in its region. 166 He did deny any
“deputy sheriff”-labels and referred to the US as a friend, not a sheriff. It did not help
matters, though, when President Bush referred to Australia as a “sheriff” in the
region. 167 The “deputy sheriff”-label refused to go away.

It does appear that the US’s statements on security had an influence in the thinking of
the Australian government’s decision-making process. The “War-on-Terror” agenda
and rhetoric coming out of the US after the September-11 terrorist attacks was
adopted by the Howard government and with that a recognition of the danger of
having a failed state nearby. This gives the US an indirect influence on Australia’s
decision to lead the RAMSI-intervention.
163
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Non-state actors
Non-states actors are involved in Solomon Islands mainly through aid and
humanitarian organisations. There is also the possibility of criminal and terrorist
networks setting up base in a failing Solomon Islands. Despite reports from, for
example, Amnesty International (AI) and the Internal Displacement Monitoring
Centre (IDMC), legal NGO’s do not appear to have had an immediate impact on the
Australian government’s decision to intervene in Solomon Islands. AI and IDMC
were chosen in this investigation for their possible influence on the Australian
government in regards to Solomon Islands as they were the most vocal on the human
rights situation.

AI sent representatives to Solomon Islands during the 1998-99 conflict to investigate
human rights-violations. 168 In a series of reports 2000-2002 AI highlighted abuses,
rapes, murder and other human rights-violations in Solomon Islands. AI called for
increased assistance from the international community, especially from the PIF, the
ACP-EU group, the Commonwealth, the United Nations and donor countries (such as
Australia), to end the violations. 169 Considering the period of time covered it would
not appear as if AI would have had a major impact on the Australian government’s
decision-making, particularly as nothing indicates that it did anything different around
the time of the policy change in Canberra.

Other non-governmental organisations have reported on the conflict and human rights
violations in Solomon Islands, including as Oxfam 170 and the IDMC. 171 However,
168
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there are no direct signs that they directly pressured the Australian government to
change its policy towards Solomon Islands in 2003. They may, however, have had a
minor indirect influence simply by reporting on events in Solomon Islands during the
years of crisis 1998-2003. Such reports helped in keeping the issue alive and may
have alerted Australian government officials to the extent of problems. Still, that is a
minor influence and does not amount to any direct influence connected to the
Australian policy change in 2003.

Transnational organised crime and terrorist networks however can be argued to have
had an indirect influence on the government’s decision to alter its policy. The
potential risk of such networks setting up base in a failing or failed Solomon Island
state, thereby posing a threat to Australia, was the main line of argument by the
Australian government in explaining its policy change. Both Howard and Downer
used that line of argument repeatedly in the lead up to the intervention. 172 However,
as they admitted themselves, there was no evidence of terrorist networks in Solomon
Islands and not much evidence of criminal networks either, at least not criminal
networks that posed a threat to Australia. 173 Greg Fry argues that the rhetoric
highlighting of terrorist and criminal networks as potential threats in a failed state
were aimed squarely as a justification for intervention, at domestic politics and
towards the US as part of the overall “War-on-Terror” context. 174

There were no specific terrorist or criminal networks named by either Howard or
Downer. Therefore there was no specific threat either; rather it was the idea or
potential of a terrorist or criminal network that was highlighted. It can therefore be
stated that the influence of a particular group on the Australian government to change
policy was minimal. However, this could then be seen as a “pre-emptive” strike
against anyone wanting to use Solomon Islands as a base for operations aimed at
Australia. The idea or potential was important but as to real influence from Non-state
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actors, little direct pressure was put on the Australian government to intervene in the
case of Solomon Islands.

Key Decision-Makers
Two people stand out throughout the decision-making process – Prime Minister John
Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer. They have therefore been identified
as the key decision-makers to be investigated in this section. In order to assess
Howard’s and Downer’s impact as key decision-makers, this section will discuss their
personal characteristics through Margaret Hermann’s six different categories –
Beliefs, Motives, Decision style, Interpersonal style, Training in foreign affairs, and
Interest in foreign affairs. By investigating these aspects of the key decision-makers
the aim is to gain a further understanding of their roles in the decision-making process
that led to the change in policy towards Solomon Islands.

The decision to intervene in Solomon Islands can be used as evidence of several of
Howard’s personal characteristics. The “crisis-leader” steps forward again,
articulating the intervention in terms of Australian security, to prevent a future
possible threat against Australia. Not, as one might have thought, in terms of
humanitarian needs in Solomon Islands. Considering his personal characteristic of
being a “strong leader”, there is no surprise that he framed the intervention in terms of
national security. It also fits into his belief in the importance of the US-alliance. The
“deputy sheriff”-role that Howard disputed nevertheless fit here too, particularly so
since he just came back from meeting President Bush before making the decision, and
his several comments that others expect Australia to take responsibility for its
neighbourhood.

Howard’s need for power can be connected to the intervention too, as can his
preference for decisive action. By changing policy, he set a course to where Australia
would take a more “hands-on”-approach to the countries in the South Pacific, not just
Solomon Islands, thereby increasing influence and power for Australia in the area.

His preference to conduct foreign policy in accord to the public opinion can also be
discerned here. The approval rate of the RAMSI-intervention from the opinion polls
stood at 75 %. This may have been particularly important in light of the Iraq-invasion
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2-3 months earlier, which was given the go ahead despite public opinion being
divided on the matter. A domestically popular decision, such as the Solomon Islandsintervention, served him well if seen in this perspective. 175 He displayed openness for
new information when Downer told him that it was perhaps time to consider changing
policy towards Solomon Islands, and also a willingness to take a risk by changing the
long-standing “hands-off”-approach.

Downer handled Solomon Islands almost on his own up until the policy change.
Downer went on several visits to Solomon Islands and handled the media and
defended the “hands-off”-approach. Finally, when he began having doubts of whether
the policy was working or not, and when the letter arrived from Kemakeza in April
2003, Downer told Howard that maybe it was time to re-appraise the Solomon
Islands-policy. In many ways, Downer is the key decision-maker in regards to
Solomon Islands up until the policy reversal. Then, and only then, Howard steps
forward as the key decision-maker.

This could reflect the difference in interest and training in foreign affairs between
Howard and Downer. Howard was less interested and had less experience up until
2001-2002, which made it natural for Downer, the Minister, to handle Solomon
Islands. When the time for a policy change arrived, Howard was ready to take over
after discovering his niche as the “strong leader”. Solomon Islands became another
part that fitted in with Howard’s personal characteristics.

Window of Opportunity
In order for a change in policy to occur there has to be a “window of opportunity”,
which needs to be perceived as such and acted upon by the key decision-makers. In
the case of Solomon Islands these aspects came together in April 2003 when
Kemakeza sent a letter to Howard requesting assistance from Australia.

The window had opened earlier than that but the key decision-makers, Howard and
Downer, did not act on it until April 2003. During 2002 it became clear the “hands175
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off”-approach had not achieved its aims. The Solomon Islands economy was still
struggling and the IPMT was withdrawn in June 2002, its task mostly incomplete.
Officially Downer emphasised the positive outcomes of the IPMT team and how it
had “ended ethnic conflict and overseen the destruction of over 2 000 weapons”. 176
However, DFAT still warned about travelling to Solomon Islands due to the large
amount of weapons still in the hands of criminal elements and Downer’s comment
that the IPMT had done “about all it can do”. Both these matters point to the “handsoff” approach not working. 177 Increased aid to Solomon Islands did not to serve to
alter the decline either.

The window of opportunity was there but it was not until December 2002 that one of
the two key decision-makers – Foreign Minister Downer – began to see that the
current policy would not make a significant difference. The period between the
IPMT-withdrawal and the December visit by Downer to Solomon Islands had not
resulted in any substantial progress. The later admission that this was when he came
to change his mind in December 2002 is important in that he finally perceived the
need for a new approach – a new policy. However, this perception was not acted upon
until April 2003.

The main reason for the gap between perceiving the need for change and acting upon
it was due to the Australian participation in the Iraq-invasion in March 2003. The
Howard-government’s focus in the months between December 2002 and April 2003
was on the Iraq-invasion and it was not until major combat operations were over that
Australia would consider a major change in policy.

The 22 April letter from Prime Minister Kemakeza to Prime Minister Howard was the
final piece of the puzzle. It allowed the Australian government to act on Downer’s
perception that a new approach was needed. Without the request from Kemakeza
options would have been limited. Instead different types of more active and direct
approaches became available. After asking for advice from relevant departments, a
multinational intervention was finally decided upon.
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The Window of Opportunity was finally perceived and acted upon. The War-onTerror context provided the rationale that the possibility of Solomon Islands
becoming a failed state could become a security threat to Australia in that terrorist and
criminal networks could use it as a base for operations against Australia. The Bali
bombing in October 2002 was still fresh in people’s mind and the policy change was
framed in that context. The beheading of an Australian missionary in May 2003 added
to the perception that Solomon Islands was indeed in need of help and helped justify
the intervention. Once acted upon, the policy shift led to the RAMSI-intervention in
July 2003.

Was this “Window of Opportunity” created by changes in the structural conditions,
that is, by changes in domestic and international factors? The international context
had certainly changed with security issues now placed in a “War-on-Terror”-context
after September 11, and even more so for Australia after the Bali bombing of 12
October 2002. There was also more pressure from Australian journalists and thinktanks such as ASPI and the CIS to alter the government’s policy towards Solomon
Islands and the South Pacific in general. The continued decline of Solomon Islands
economy and law-and-order situation also prompted a new response from the
Australian government. Looking at all these factors, the argument can be made that it
was indeed changes in the structural conditions that “opened” the window of
opportunity that the Australian government then clambered through. A more
interventionist Australia could be justified through the “War-on-Terror” framework.

On the other hand, James Walter and Kim Murray have both argued that Howard was
a pragmatist, prepared to wait for an opportunity to reengage to implement a policy.
Walter argues that Howard “is prepared to defer, to await a better climate, but he will
never give up”. 178 Murray states that Howard has always been pragmatic and that
some of his “policies may be modified, subject to strategic retreat, or postponed until
more propitious times”. 179 Howard’s waiting for situations to change to his advantage
reflects Errington & van Onselen’s assessment that “He’s Machiavelli with a dog
178
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whistle”. 180 This personality trait fits well in to the above argument. Howard’s
comments in The Bulletin article in 1999 indicated a more interventionist role by
Australia after the East Timor-intervention but the strong backlash from a number of
Asian countries forced him to backtrack from that desire. Patiently waiting, the
opportunity arose again in April-May 2003, when the climate was better suited for
such an approach.

However, there are no indications that Howard actively tried to manipulate the
sources of change to further his interests in this matter. Rather, he waited for the right
time and opportunity to pursue his old agenda. By April-May 2003 the Window of
Opportunity was perceived.

In conclusion, the Window of Opportunity opened in the second half of 2002 but was
not perceived as such by one of the key decision-makers until December 2002. Due to
other policy priorities, however, it was not acted upon until April-May 2003. The
letter from Kemakeza requesting direct Australian assistance finally provided the
Australian government with the opportunity to change its policy from the “handsoff”-approach towards the Solomon Islands to a much more interventionist stance and
to lead the RAMSI-intervention, but only when more important international issues
had been resolved.

Typology of Change
The Australian foreign policy change towards Solomon Islands in 2003 is here
classified as a Reform on the typology of change scale. The Howard-government’s
goals remained the same – a stable Solomon Islands, with a functioning government
and effective institutions, law and order upheld, and an improved economic situation.
What changed was the way to go about achieving those goals. From applying a
“hands-off”-approach involving aid and technical assistance, it now changed the
instruments used dramatically to a “hands-on”- approach. The new instruments
included a considerable force of military troops and police to create and entrench law
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and order in Solomon Islands, as well as a much more direct involvement in the
everyday running of the Solomon Islands government machinery by sending
bureaucrats and advisers to work alongside Solomon Islands officials in key
ministries.

From having been very careful not to interfere in the internal affairs of Solomon
Islands, it was now extensively involved in many aspects of the Solomon Islands
government through the RAMSI-intervention. The instruments used had changed
dramatically but the overall goals remained the same, thus it is a Reform and not
anything more radical.

Consequences of Change
To see whether the policy change met the expectations of the Australian government,
we can look at the first six months after the RAMSI intervention and its short term
results. It will discuss what actually took place after the intervention and how the
policy change encompassed Papua New Guinea as well as Solomon Islands.

The policy change towards Solomon Islands resulted in the Australian-led RAMSIintervention which began on 24 July 2003. The force consisted of 2 225 military and
police personnel with contributions from not just Australia but also New Zealand,
Tonga, Fiji, Samoa, and Papua New Guinea, making it a multinational deployment. 181
Australia provided the bulk of the force with about 1 500 soldiers from the defence
force, another 150 from the federal police and finally 90 personnel from the Protective
Services. 182

The initial reaction to the intervention was overwhelmingly positive. The citizens in
Honiara also showed their appreciation to the intervention. Minor results were
displayed almost immediately, such as the return of vehicles stolen in the 2000 coup.
Illegal stalls selling betel-nuts also disappeared from the streets of Honiara and, even
more importantly, 100 guns were handed in early in the intervention.183
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The first priority was to stabilise the law and order situation. The aim was to get hold
of as many weapons held by non-state forces in Solomon Islands as possible. The
operation must be deemed a success with roughly 3 800 guns apprehended by the
intervention force by January 2004. 184 The intervention forces also set out to rid the
RSIP from corrupt and criminal elements which resulted in a quarter of the police
force having to leave the force and 50 of them being charged with a total of 285
offences. 185 It was also important to apprehend key crime figures such as Harold
Keke, who had spread terror in parts of Solomon Islands. As the intervention came
closer, Keke already showed signs of bowing to the force. He released three hostages
the day before the intervention force was due. 186 Just before making that move he also
announced that he would be ready to give up his weapons to RAMSI. 187 These were
important moves by Keke as RAMSI naturally wanted to avoid violent clashes and
disarm key rebel leaders. After negotiations with RAMSI, Keke finally surrendered
and was arrested by RAMSI on 13 August 2003. His arrest was symbolic but also
important from a strategic point of view, as it took away one of the major combatants
in Solomon Islands. 188 Jimmy Rasta, another key crime figure, and his Malaita Eagle
Force men gave up about 100 guns to RAMSI two days later at a ceremony in
Honiara. 189

These two events were very important symbolically and strategically for RAMSI.
With two major combatants handing over their weapons, and with Keke arrested, the
very reason to go on fighting was diminished substantially. 190 It also meant that
RAMSI had just the successful start of the intervention that they had sought. The
Australian foreign policy change had met its first aim. Law and order was much
improved which meant that the second phase of the intervention – to improve the
Solomon Islands departments and get the economy growing again could begin.
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However, the overall success of RAMSI is beyond the scope of this case study and
some six years on it is still unclear if it has ‘worked’.

The second significant consequence of the new policy was Papua New Guinea. In
December 2003 the two states agreed on a new program named the Enhanced
Cooperation Package. It had the characteristics of the new “hands-on”-approach that
had begun with the policy change towards Solomon Islands. A more direct
involvement was added to the former aid-policy, including about 230 Australian
police being sent to PNG to help with law and order, and 64 administrators in several
sectors of the PNG government. An extra AUD$1.1 billion over several years was
added on top of the annual aid given to PNG by Australia. 191 This emphasised the
notion that it was not just a policy change towards Solomon Islands but the South
Pacific as a whole. Indicative of this is the fact that discussions on the new PNGapproach began in May 2003, around the same time as the policy change towards
Solomon Islands. 192

The new approach towards the South Pacific was initially received with caution by
PNG, although the government did support the intervention as such. Comments from
Foreign Minister Namaliu warned of being “heavy-handed” and argued for fewer
soldiers and more police for RAMSI. 193 PNG, as well as Fiji, also responded
negatively against comments made by Howard that aid in the future could be more
tied to the receiving countries attempts to combat corruption. 194 Put together, the
above mentioned reactions by the PNG show scepticism and suspicion to the new
Australian policy towards the South Pacific. However, in the end PNG agreed to
Australia’s proposal in the December 2003 and finally signed it in July 2004. 195 After
initially displaying its displeasure with the new tough Australian stance by postponing
a visit by Foreign Minister Downer to PNG and denying that PNG needed any
Australian help with its bureaucracy, the PNG government eventually agreed to the
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new arrangement. 196 However, it should be noted that the agreement had a setback in
May 2005, when the PNG Supreme Court ruled against granting full immunity to
Australian police involved in the ECP and they were subsequently withdrawn. 197

The Australian government had succeeded in implementing the new tougher policy,
First towards Solomon Islands and then with the new agreement with PNG. From the
Australian government’s point of view the first 6-9 months of the policy change could
be judged a success. Further aims tied to the new policy stance were put forward, such
as suggesting the possibility of pooling resources in some regional services, such as
airlines and police training, while Australian Greg Urwin became the new SecretaryGeneral for the Pacific Islands Forum. 198 More radical proposals made by the Senate
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee review, such as a common currency
for the Pacific and a “Pacific Economic and Political Community” 199 were rejected by
Howard. 200

The responses from the targeted actors were mixed. The Solomon Islands government
and public welcomed the intervention and the law and order situation was much
improved. PNG, on the other hand, accepted the changes grudgingly. The short-term
consequences appear positive, although the long-term relationship with PNG was
affected until the Rudd-government. That, however, is outside the scope of this study.
From the Australian government’s point of view, the first six months after the policy
change had been successful. The immediate aim with the intervention was to take
control of the law and order situation in Honiara and to arrest the criminal elements in
the Solomon Islands. With almost 4 000 weapons seized by January 2004, the arrest
of Harold Keke, and ridding the police force from corrupt and criminal personnel, it
had met the Australian government’s expectations up to this point.
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Conclusion
The Australian government’s foreign policy change towards the Solomon Islands in
2003 represented a significant regional policy change. It affected the Solomon Islands
directly but had an overall component that defined a new approach to the South
Pacific as a whole. A more direct and more interventionist stance were now taken to
deal with problems facing the South Pacific island states.

The reasons for the policy change were several. Domestic, as well as international
factors played a part in influencing and pressuring the Australian government to make
this decision. On the domestic arena, the think-tank ASPI played an important role in
drafting a report with the suggestion to change the policy in this manner. Hugh
White’s active lobbying of the bureaucracy was very important, as it provided them
with an alternative when Downer asked for new policy options. The international
context had changed in 2001 and 2002 with the emerging so-called “War-on-Terror”.
It was within this context that the intervention was framed and which provided
Howard and Downer with reasoning for the policy change. The Bali bombing played
an important role in this context as well, albeit on a regional level. The main factor
that allowed for the intervention was the key decision-makers perceiving and acting
upon the Window of Opportunity that was there. Without Downer sensing that the
policy was failing and saying so to Howard in April 2003, the intervention would not
have taken place, at least not at that time. Downer therefore also played a key role in
initiating change.

The intervention supported Howard’s personal characteristics, such as being the
“strong leader”, taking decisive action, and fits in with his need for power, in that it
was construed in a security-framework, allowing him to increase Australia’s power
and influence in the area, while securing public support at the same time. Still, the
intervention was initially a success. It stabilised the Solomon Islands and restored law
and order. The initial aims were met and support for the intervention was given from
most actors, such as the Solomon Islands itself, the Pacific Islands Forum, The United
Nations and the United States. The RAMSI-intervention represented a fundamental
shift in Australia’s relationship with the Solomon Islands and the Pacific Island states.
For the first time since their independence, Australia had now taken on a much more
interventionist role in Pacific Islands states.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
This study has been both empirical and theoretical in nature. The empirical objective
has been to investigate Australian foreign policy decision-making under the Howardgovernment and specifically Australian foreign policy change through looking at the
decisions to overturn two long-standing policies; firstly, the decision to change policy
on East Timor in 1998-99; secondly, the decision to abandon the hands-off approach
towards the South Pacific in general and Solomon Islands in particular and adopt a
more interventionist approach through the RAMSI-intervention in 2003.

The theoretical aim has been to introduce a new and improved model of foreign
policy change to enhance the understanding of why and how foreign policy change
occurs. The study has shown the interaction of domestic and international factors both
within and between the categories, often putting a combined pressure on the key
decision-makers to change foreign policy. Furthermore, it has emphasised the role of
the key decision-makers and their perceptions of the structural conditions and possible
window of opportunities. The results show that the model used takes into account and
illustrates the complexities of the decision-making process that leads to foreign policy
change.

It must be noted that in Chapter 2 the proposed theoretical model suggested that the
arrows were probabilistic rather than causal. This however was dealing with an
abstract theory where it was possible for any one or more factor to be of great, limited
or absolutely no influence. As a result, and until the theory is applied, no arrow could
indicate a casual relationship between any two factors. The results of the empirical
chapters however have applied evidence to test the theory against the two case
studies. It is now possible to show direct causal links between factors, policy makers,
key decision-makers and their perception of a window of opportunity. As a result all
arrows in this chapter become causal, as once the theory is tested against available
evidence it becomes clear which of the domestic or international factors were
important in fostering a change in decision making and which led directly to eventual
foreign policy change.
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Empirical findings
The empirical aim with this study has been to investigate Australia’s foreign policy
changes towards Indonesia regarding East Timor, and towards Solomon Islands. In
this chapter it will first be shown how the two policies changed, then the different
actors and factors involved in the decision-making process are discussed, as well as
the consequences of these changes. Finally, there is a discussion on how the results
found here fit in to the study of Australian foreign policy.

In the case of East Timor, Australia had from 1975 pursued a policy of “quiet
diplomacy”, which involved little criticism of Indonesia on its human rights record in
East Timor. The policy also gave de jure recognition to Indonesia over East Timor
from 1978, while the importance of the relationship with Indonesia dwarfed any
concerns over East Timor regardless of what took place there. The position was that
East Timor was not considered viable on its own and should therefore remain within
Indonesia.

The change can be said to have taken place in two steps. The first “30 degree” change
took place with the Howard letter of December 1998, in which Australia for the first
time supported an act of self-determination for East Timor, albeit in 10-15 years time.
However, since the basic tenets of the policy remained – East Timor should preferably
remain within Indonesia, at least for the foreseeable future, and Indonesia was still
recognised as the sovereign power over East Timor – this was only a minor change of
policy. On the typology of change scale it amounts to a Refinement, that is, a change
in the instruments of the policy, a mix of old (quiet diplomacy and emphasis of the
relationship with Indonesia) and new instruments (the letter). The goals of East Timor
remaining within Indonesia and upholding a good relationship with Indonesia
remained the same.

The major change occurred in September 1999 when the old policy was abandoned.
The ballot result caused the government to accept East Timor as a future independent
state, despite its previous concerns. Importantly, the tone towards Indonesia changed
in light of its failure to uphold security in East Timor and became more aggressive,
thereby giving up the idea of maintaining a good relationship with Indonesia at any
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cost. Finally, the Australian government took the lead in organising a peacekeeping
force into East Timor under an UN flag before the Indonesian parliament had
officially granted East Timor independence, which Australia had previously been
unwilling to do. In terms of its policy towards Indonesia, this would be a Redirection;
that is, old goals were given up (East Timor within Indonesia, not independent), while
others remained (a good as possible relationship with Indonesia and an end to the
violence in East Timor).

The foreign policy change towards Solomon Islands differs in the sense that it
happened in one go. The Australian government went from a “hands-off” approach,
involving assisting Solomon Islands with aid and technical assistance but to a much
more ‘muscular’ approach with military and police forces directly intervening in
Solomon Islands and bureaucrats becoming directly involved in Solomon Islands
Government departments. This was a “hands-on” approach, essentially at “statebuilding”, which Mark Berger has defined as “ … an externally driven, or facilitated,
attempt to form or consolidate a stable, and sometimes democratic, government over
an internationally recognised national territory”. 1 RAMSI concentrated on law and
order, administration, and the economy. The change can be defined as Reform,
wherein old goals remained (a stable Solomon Islands) but the approach and
instruments changed dramatically. Some instruments remained (aid and technical
assistance) but I would argue that it can be defined as Reform due to the complete
change in approach and its implementation compared to the earlier policy.

Neither case study constitutes a change at the highest end of the scale (restructuring)
but it should be noted that such change happens very rarely in Australian foreign
policy. Even the two greatest changes so far in Australia’s history – the shift from
Britain to the US (Redirection) and the recognition of China (Reorientation) – does
not quite make the highest form of change either.

Sources of Change and Key Decision-Makers
This section will discuss the actors and factors involved in the decision-making
process and assess their importance in bringing about the changes. The two cases
1
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show the complexity of decision-making and how different factors have an influence
at different times. What is notable is the interaction between domestic and
international factors, as well as within each of those categories, in putting pressure on
Howard and Downer and as an influence on their decision-making. Howard and
Downer also play a key role in the process, as the two main actors in the decisionmaking process, with their perception of the factors involved and whether they
perceived a window of opportunity or not.

Domestic Factors
The domestic factors were involved to quite different extents in the two case studies
investigated. They played a significant part in the case of East Timor but a much
smaller role in the case of Solomon Islands. Four out of five domestic factors can
clearly be seen in putting pressure on the Howard-government. Firstly, the ALP’s
shift in policy in January 1998 broke the bipartisan stand on East Timor. Interestgroups kept the issue alive throughout the investigated period and increased the
pressure in September 1999 through several unions initiating bans against Indonesian
companies. Several East Timor interest groups organised demonstrations in
September which culminated in up to 30 000 people marching in Sydney on 10
September 1999. Protests were spread around Australia and public opinion was thus
important in its strong showing in the demonstrations but also in contacting the media
and the politicians, thereby exerting strong pressure on the government. The media
itself provided extensive coverage of the atrocities committed in East Timor and thus
exerted pressure on the decision-makers. The Age in particular was critical of the
Howard governments policy before the change and particularly so during those
crucial days in September 1999.

The interaction between the separate domestic factors provided formidable pressure
on the Howard-government. The ALP’s policy shift invigorated the interest-groups
and by September 1999 they interacted with each other. Interest-groups channelled
public concern and the media covered the atrocities and the public outcry. Several
interest groups (unions, Ramos-Horta, the Catholic Church, East Timor support
groups and academics) figured in and used the media to further expose the situation;
public opinion was informed by the media and interest groups of what was occurring
in East Timor which further spurred them on. The ALP pointed to the public outcry as
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a basis for its criticism of the government’s inaction. It is clear that the interaction
between the relevant factors was of vital importance in exerting pressure on the
government. The combined force had more influence than individual factors alone
would have had.

The domestic category played a very different role in the case of the Solomon Islands
policy change. Only one factor can be said to have had an important role in the
government’s policy change. The ASPI had early on argued for a change in policy
and drafts of the ASPI-report on the Solomon Islands was carefully distributed to
important parts of the bureaucracy, so when Downer asked for proposals for a policy
change the framework was already there, ready for them to give to Downer. The fact
that the actual intervention had large similarities with the ASPI-report’s suggestion
and that Downer himself launched the report in June 2003, shows the influence of
ASPI.

However, the other four domestic factors had a minor part in influencing or pressuring
the government to change its Solomon policy. Public opinion was non-existent, the
media provided little coverage of the situation in the Solomon Islands with the
exception of Mary-Louise O’Callaghan and the political parties had little to say before
it was announced that Australia was to lead the RAMSI-intervention. The bureaucracy
did not serve as a source of change in itself but was an important tool for ASPI in
accessing the ears of the government, Downer in particular.

Between the two case studies, all five domestic factors had a role to play. Interestgroups were active in each, public opinion, the media, and political parties in the East
Timor-case, while the bureaucracy was not involved directly in either case but
deserves its place in the domestic factors category as it is an important channel for
access to the key decision-makers. The domestic factors relevant in each case can be
mapped in the figure below.
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Figure 8.1: Theoretical and empirical relevant domestic factors in the policy change towards
Indonesia regarding East Timor in 1999
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Figure 8.2: Theoretical and empirical relevant domestic factors in the policy change towards the
Solomon Islands in 2003
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International Factors
This category show similarities with the domestic factors category in that several
factors combine to put pressure on the government in one case study but much less so
in the second case. However, the roles are reversed here. All four international factors
play an important part in the Solomon-case but only one does so in the case of East
Timor.
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In both cases Regional factors were important in setting the context in which the
Howard-government viewed its policy. Events in Indonesia affected Australia’s East
Timor-policy and had to be taken into account by the Howard-government. The
process started when the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia in 1997, eventually
leading to Suharto stepping down as president in May 1998. Habibie’s proposal after
only weeks in office, to offer East Timor a ‘Special Status’ within Indonesia, further
suggested that a solution was possible to the East Timor-problem. The Australian
initiative to send a letter to Habibie was met with an unexpected reaction by the
Indonesia government – to resolve the East Timor-issue within a year, rather than 1015 years as suggested by Howard. This meant that the Howard government yet again
had to react to events happening in Indonesia.

The constant violence in East Timor further provided the context for Australian policy
making. The two massacres in April 1999 prompted Howard to call for a meeting
with Habibie which took place at the end of the same month. However, the most
prominent example of how Indonesian actions in East Timor shaped Australia’s
policy response came in September 1999, when the maelstrom of violence finally
forced a major policy change by the Howard-government. Throughout the
investigated period, it is clear that the Howard government had to react to events in
Indonesia and actions taken by the Indonesian government. The regional factors
category thus served as the main international factor to influence Australia’s East
Timor-policy, and Xanana Gusmao and Bishop Belo deserve a mention here. Both
served as a voice for the East Timorese. Gusmao, as the imprisoned symbol of the
resistance against the Indonesian occupation and Belo as the Nobel Peace prize
winner, offered a voice of resistance out of East Timor itself. They both helped keep
the East Timor-issue alive and in this way cooperated with interest-groups in
Australia (particularly with Ramos-Horta) and Australian media often reported their
comments and statements to the public.
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Figure 8.3: Mapping relevant theoretical and empirical international factors involved in the
policy change towards Indonesia regarding East Timor in 1999
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The other international factors did not offer much influence or pressure on the
Australian government. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch criticised
Australia for not acting tougher on Indonesia, but it is difficult to ascertain any direct
influence from them onto the government. Australia’s two main bilateral relations in
this case, Australia-US and Australia-Indonesia served as obstacles to change rather
than as influence towards change. Neither did global factors directly pressure
Australia to change in any great measure. Kofi Annan’s criticisms of Indonesia would
have reflected badly on Australia’s support of Indonesia, but there is no forceful,
direct, attempt to target Australian foreign policy change on the issue.

The Solomon case offers a different picture on the influence of international factors.
All four categories are involved and interact to influence the Australian policy
change. The interplay between the global War-on-Terror context and the new focus
on the potential threat from failed states was used in justifying the intervention. The
Bali bombing in October 2002 made it even more important to the Howard
government to prevent any neighbouring states to become potential bases for criminal
and terrorist networks, possibly using them to threaten Australia and Australian
interests. Australia also had strategic interests in the region and rumours that
Indonesia might send troops to the Solomon Islands may also have played in here.
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Howard kept referring to the Solomon Islands as “Our Patch”, as of a special
responsibility and to the expectation that Australia would look after the region. Who
these expectations came from were not defined but the US would most likely have
been a key player in this regard, particularly in its War-on-Terror campaign. That
Howard met Bush in Texas shortly before deciding to lead the intervention-force into
the Solomon Islands may have been a coincidence but it could also indicate that the
Australia-US relationship – with Australia having been accused of being the ‘deputy
sheriff’ to the US – has relevance in the overall picture to why Australia suddenly
decided to change its policy. Major combat operations in Iraq were at this point over
and Australia could now look towards its own backyard. These international factors
thereby influenced each other and interacted to form the context for the Howard
government to conduct this change in policy. The new focus on terrorist networks as a
real threat to Australia after the September 11 attacks, and particularly after the 2002
Bali bombing, highlighted Solomon Islands rapid descent towards failed state status
and provided the government the framework and justification for its foreign policy
change towards Solomon Islands.
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Figure 8.4 Theoretical and empirical international factors involved in the policy change towards
Solomon Islands in 2003
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The role of Howard and Downer and the Window of Opportunity
Throughout the two investigated case studies, it is clear that the dominant roles in
Australian foreign policy making under the Howard-government belonged to Prime
Minister Howard and Foreign Minister Downer. Indeed, in late 2008 Downer
admitted he and Howard basically conducted foreign policy without necessarily
taking it to Cabinet. 2 This is also the picture that emerges from the two case studies
investigated and backs Firth’s view of policy making, as opposed to the mechanical
depiction of Gyngell and Wesley.

Whether a policy change will be pursued or not depends on the key decision-makers –
in this case Howard and Downer – and whether they perceive the policy as either too
costly now, or as soon to be too costly, to maintain. If a change will bring greater
national benefit than the current policy in the eyes of the key decision-makers, then
they will work towards a change.

The difference between two situations can clearly be seen in the East Timor and
Solomon case studies. In regards to the East Timor-policy, the government held on to
it as long as possible, since the price to pay for a change was perceived by Howard
and Downer as too costly. The “30 degree” change in December 1998 did not achieve
what they were hoping for and only accelerated the process towards an independent
East Timor, which was contrary to their stated aim of a good relationship with
Indonesia. This belief was held all the way up to September 1999 when it suddenly
became obvious that the policy was no longer acceptable to the domestic audience.
Pressure simply became too great and it became unattainable to hold on to a policy
which supported an Indonesia that did little to control the destruction and violence in
East Timor. Howard and Downer ended up in a situation where they essentially had
no other choice than to abandon the old policy. Essentially, the political cost of the
old policy had become too great and they were essentially forced to change
Australia’s policy on East Timor.

It can be argued that the Window of Opportunity had been there ever since Suharto
stepped down in May 1998 and Habibie announced his ‘Special Status’ proposal a
2

Australian Broadcasting Corporation, The Howard Years, television program, broadcast 24 November
2008, http://www.abc.net.au/news/howardyears/ [Date accessed 19 January 2009]
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few weeks later. However, as it was not perceived as such by Howard and Downer, no
direct action was taken. It was not until November/December 1998 after consultation
with the East Timorese themselves, that they saw the Howard letter as an opportunity
to help solve the situation. Yet the main features of the old policy remained.
Throughout the months of 1999 until September, Howard and Downer still perceived
the old policy as the most beneficial, despite changes in Indonesian policy and events
in East Timor. From this it can be deduced that a window of opportunity may be there
in the eyes of external observers, but it will amount to nothing if the key decisionmakers do not perceive it as such.

The Solomon Islands case on the other hand represents an opportunity to change a
failing policy into a policy with several potential benefits as a result. Apart from
ASPI, there was no domestic pressure to change policy on the Solomon Islands and,
apart from the Solomon government themselves, virtually no direct pressure from any
external sources of change to deal with Solomon Islands any differently. Downer later
stated that he began to see in December 2002 that the policy was not producing the
desired results; however, he did not act on it until April 2003. Although the window
of opportunity can be argued to have been there since the year 2000, when the first
request came from the then Solomon government, the Australian government did not
perceive this as an opportunity. Constant references to Australia not wanting to act as
a “neo-colonial” power and Australia respecting Solomon sovereignty underlined the
policy. This stand can be traced back to the “deputy sheriff” debate that followed the
East Timor intervention in 1999. Another intervention in a neighbouring state would
not go down well in Asia and would have deterred the Howard government, seeing it
as too costly compared to any potential benefits from intervening. However, as the
international context changed with the new focus on terrorism and with the (at the
time) recent Bali bombing in October 2002, there was now an opportunity to be more
directly involved in helping Solomon Islands. The fact that it was not acted upon in
December 2002-January 2003 can be attributed to the large focus on, and subsequent
invasion of Iraq. This becomes apparent when one looks at the timeline of the process.
Solomon PM Kemakeza sends a letter requesting assistance on 22 April, Downer tells
Howard it may be time to consider a change in policy, major combat operations in
Iraq finishes at the end of April, Howard meet with Bush on 3 May, and at the end of
May an intervention is seriously considered, influenced by the framework provided by
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the ASPI-report, negotiations with the Solomon government in June, followed by the
deployment in July.

Due to the context, the window of opportunity is perceived as such by Howard and
Downer in late April/May for a change policy towards Solomon Islands. The current
policy did clearly not work and here was an opportunity to:
•

help stabilise the situation in Solomon Islands;

•

to take firm strategic control in the South Pacific;

•

to show the US that Australia takes care of its own backyard;

•

to prevent a failed state from emerging with possible criminal and terrorist threats
accompanying it;

•

to launch an intervention that would most likely be received favourably by a
public that had been deeply divided by the Iraq-invasion; and

•

to implement a similar policy to the region in general.

There were clearly many benefits to be had by a new policy.

The similarities and differences in the two cases are interesting. Howard and Downer
perceived the old policies quite differently. In the case of East Timor they stuck with
the old policy until pressure and common sense brought about the policy change. In
the Solomon Islands case however, there was no strong pressure for a policy change,
apart from ASPI which on its own would have been unlikely to exert enough pressure
on the government. Instead, it is more a case of Downer at first perceiving the failure
of the old policy and initiating the process towards change when the timing suddenly
was right in late April/May. In the East Timor case Howard and Downer conducted an
adaptive, or reactive, approach to the events, while in the Solomon case they adopted
an innovative, or proactive, approach.

What is also notable in both case studies is not only the dominant role Howard and
Downer play in the foreign policy making but also how and when they act. Downer
was the day-to-day manager of foreign policy which is only logical considering he
was the foreign minister. He was also the one who took the initiative to the policy
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changes in all three cases (I here include the “30 degree” change as well) and it is
only then that Howard steps in as a key player in the process. Once Howard takes
over, he is the one most visible in the media and driving the decision-making process.
The NSC and the Cabinet is sparingly used during the process and it appears that the
real drivers of the process are Howard and Downer.

Mapping the interaction of actors and factors in the two cases of East Timor and
Solomon Islands
It is evident in the above discussion that a number of variables have to be taken into
account when explaining the decision-making processes that led to changes in foreign
policies towards Indonesia regarding East Timor in 1999 and towards the Solomon
Islands in 2003. Domestic and international factors influence and/or pressured the
Howard government to change its policies, while at the same time interacting between
each other. The interaction combines the amount of pressure that the government
came under, which led to the changes. The below models illustrate how this occurred
in the two case studies:
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Figure 8.5: Combined interaction of Australia’s foreign policy change towards Indonesia
regarding East Timor in 1999
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It is evident in this case that there were more domestic factors that exerted the greatest
pressure on the government; however, without the changes in Indonesia and the
subsequent actions taken by them, the domestic factors would not have had a reason
to react so strongly. It is therefore not simply domestic or international factors acting
on their own, rather the interaction between domestic and international factors
produces the eventual force of pressure put on the government. It is the same story in
the Solomon case, only in reverse regarding which factors provided the influence:
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Figure 8.6: Combined interaction of Australia’s foreign policy change towards Solomon Islands
in 2003
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International factors appear to have had the greatest influence in the policy change
towards the Solomon Islands. However, as in the East Timor case, it is the interaction
of domestic and international factors that provides a combined influence and pressure
for a policy change. It is also interesting to note the interaction between the actors and
factors within the domestic category, as well as in the international category. Once
again it is clear that the interaction between factors is of vital importance.
Furthermore, as in the East Timor case, there is important interaction between the
domestic and international categories. ASPI reacted to the increased suggestion of a
threat of terrorism and failed states with the specific example of Solomon Islands.
Meanwhile, the government realises that the current policy on Solomon Islands is not
achieving its goals and found themselves in a new international context. Once a policy
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change was seriously considered, ASPI was there with a framework and justification
for an intervention.

The Consequences of the Foreign Policy Changes towards East Timor in 1999 and
Solomon Islands in 2003
This section will evaluate the policy changes made. Did the policy change succeed in
meeting the stated goals? What exactly changed and what were the implications? The
East Timor policy change did succeed in its objective but it came at a price. The
change in policy towards the Solomon Islands was very successful in the initial stage.
The long-term consequences are outside this study’s reach, so focus will be on the
short-term consequences (six months to a year after the change).

The new East Timor policy was a mixed success. On the one hand it succeeded in the
stated goal of ending the violence in East Timor through the INTERFET-intervention
led by Australia and it led eventually to an independent East Timor. However, on the
other hand it damaged the relationship with Indonesia, which the new policy aimed to
limit as much as possible. The relationship remained strained for some time and it was
not until the cooperation after the Bali bombing in 2002 and the aftermath of the
tsunami in December 2004 that it became cordial again. The consequences of the East
Timor change links to the Solomon intervention as well. The “deputy sheriff” debate
that came out of the Howard interview with The Bulletin shortly after the INTERFETintervention caused a strong reaction from several Asian states and made the Howard
government very wary of any further interventions in its neighbourhood. It is not until
after the Bali bombing those suggestions of pre-emptive Australian strikes in the
region may be conducted in an extreme case and that interventions became politically
accepted again within the War-on-Terror context that now had emerged. During the
interval, Australia repeatedly referred to the sovereignty of the states and of not being
a “neo-colonial” power.

The Solomon Islands case is much more of a success story, at least initially. Law and
order was quickly established, the rival gangs handed in their weapons and many
wanted criminals were arrested and charged. Reform of the Solomon Islands economy
began immediately, although the results of this go outside the scope of this study.
Solomon Islands was thus stabilised. Australia had also established itself as the main
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power in the South Pacific and began to expand the policy to the region immediately,
most visibly with the attempted introduction of the Enhanced Cooperation Program
with PNG in December 2003. In the short term perspective, the Solomon Islands
policy change certainly was a success. However, six years on the long-term
consequences are unclear and not as easily judged a success.

The findings in the overall Australian foreign policy context
The two case studies highlight several features of Australian foreign policy that has
been observed previously. Foreign policy change in Australia is quite rare but has
shown to have lasting implications when it happens. The same is true for the two
cases investigated here. It also supports the notion of the power of the Australian
leaders, the idea of Australia as a middle power, and specific features such as the USalliance and Australia’s role in the region.

Major Australian foreign policy change brings lasting consequences when it occurs.
The shift from Britain to the US as the protector of Australia has proven long-lasting
and is very much in place today. The recognition of communist China grew into an
important and lasting relationship, politically and economically. The two cases
studied here bear similar features in terms of lasting consequences. Australia is now
closely working with the East Timorese government and provided $AUS 43.6 million
in aid in 2006-07, as well as in helping the East Timor government with security after
riots in April/May 2006 and the assassination attempts on President Ramos-Horta and
Prime Minister Gusmao in 2008. 3 Australia’s close cooperation with East Timor is a
direct consequence of leading the intervention in 1999 and taking responsibility for
the aftermath of it. The RAMSI-intervention into the Solomon Islands began a new
more interventionist approach towards the South Pacific, which is still in place under
the Rudd-government.

The case studies also support the argument that Prime Minister Howard had a lot of
power in conducting foreign policy. 4 Howard emerges in both cases as the main

3

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘East Timor – Country brief”,
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/east_timor/east_timor_brief.html [Accessed 26 March 2009]
4
See for example, Patrick Weller, Cabinet Government in Australia, 1901-2006: Practice, Principles,
Performance, Sydney, UNSW Press, 2007, p. 177 and 189, and James Walter, ‘John Howard and the

293

decision-maker, together with his foreign minister Alexander Downer. Howard and
Downer’s pragmatic approach is visible in both cases by changing the policy towards
East Timor when domestic pressure becomes too great and in framing the justification
of intervening in Solomon Islands around the current War-on-Terror context. The
framing of Solomon Islands as a possible threat to Australia if it was to become a
failed state fits in with Howard as the “crisis-leader” and allows him to take on the
role of a “strong leader”.

The case studies also reveal and increase the view of Australia as a middle power. The
East Timor case showed the limitations of Australian power, having to wait for
Indonesia’s consent to allow peacekeepers in to East Timor and by the snub by the US
when asking them for assistance on the ground. The Solomon Islands case on the
other hand show the relative power Australia has in the South Pacific when dealing
with much smaller states. The US-alliance plays a role in each case, albeit not directly
perhaps, and the aim to conduct the interventions through multilateral institutions (the
UN and the PIF) also fits the middle power description and provides legitimacy.

Finally, an important result of the investigation of these two case studies is the
importance of looking at all the different actors and factors involved in the decisionmaking process when conducting foreign policy in Australia. It is clear that the key
decision-makers, domestic factors and international factors are all involved and their
interaction shows the complexity of the process. It is therefore important for further
studies of Australian foreign policy and foreign policy change to take these actors and
their interactions into account, and not, like Gyngell and Wesley, assume a central
role for DFAT.

Theoretical findings
This study has produced important results with implications for the study of foreign
policy change. The introduced model takes the previous work by foreign policy
change scholars a step further in the search for a model that can explain better the
complexities of foreign policy making and the actors and factors behind foreign
policy change. A discussion below outlines the theoretical findings according to the
‘strong leader’ thesis’, Paper presented at the John Howard’s Decade Conference, National Museum of
Australia, Canberra, 3-4 March 2006
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structure of the model and compares them to previous contributions in the field of
foreign policy change.

Domestic and international factors in foreign policy making
The investigated case studies clearly show the interaction between domestic and
international factors. As Putnam has shown, the leader has to take into account both
the domestic and international arena in making decisions.5 The two studies display the
intricate relationship between two arenas often treated separately in traditional IR
analysis. It also shows the importance of the interaction between domestic factors, and
between international factors, how they can reinforce each other for greater effect on
the decision making process.

Many previous studies on foreign policy change have acknowledged the importance
of looking at both domestic and international factors, 6 yet there has previously been a
tendency to fit all possible domestic and international factors into one or a few
categories, to simplify the model. However, as this study has shown, doing so risks
missing out on the complex interactions between the actors and factors involved. By
listing what I believe are the relevant domestic and international factors, the
interaction between them is now easier to pinpoint, which in turn enables the model to
be a greater explanatory tool to explain foreign policy change.

All listed sources of change in the model have proven relevant in at least one of the
two case studies. If the researcher feels the need, one or two of them can be replaced
with a particular relevant factor. However, looking at examples of such factors in
previous models indicate that they can be incorporated in the existing factors in this
model. For example, Holsti’s “military threats” can be classed as “international
5

Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’,
International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer 1988, p. 434
6
See for example, Jakob Gustavsson, The Politics of Foreign Policy Change: Explaining the Swedish
Reorientation on EC Membership, Lund University Press, Lund, Doctoral Dissertation, 1998, and
Charles, F. Hermann, ‘Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy’,
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, pp. 3-21, 1990, and Kalevi J. Holsti, (Ed) Why Nations
Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World, Allen & Unwin, London, 1982, and
Sanqiang Jian, Foreign Policy Restructuring as Adaptive Behavior, China’s Independent Foreign
Policy 1982-1989, University Press of America, Inc. Lanham, 1996, Fredrik Doeser, In Search of
Security After the Collapse of the Soviet Union: Foreign Policy Change in Denmark, Finland and
Sweden, 1988-1993, Doctoral Thesis in Political Science at Stockholm University, Sweden,
Universitetsservice, Stockholm, 2008 to name a few
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factors”, depending on where the threat is coming from. The military as a domestic
factor can be put into the category of interest-groups; Ataman’s ethnic movements can
be put in to interest-groups or non-state actors, perhaps even political parties, again
depending on the context; Holsti’s historical and cultural factors would probably be
projected through either political parties, interest-groups, public opinion, or even the
media and can thus be put in either of these categories depending on the particular
case. 7

The structure of the model proposed by this thesis and the actors and factors listed
make the explanatory tool more comprehensive and allows the researcher to explore
the interaction between and within them. The two case studies also show the
importance of looking at all the listed factors, as the relevant factors will not
necessarily be the same in each case. All nine factors are therefore needed in order to
understand the interaction between them and the complexity of foreign policy making.

The role of Key Decision-Makers
As previously shown by Gustavsson and Holsti among others, it is important to study
the role of the key decision-maker(s) in explaining foreign policy change. 8 The two
case studies certainly underline this notion and highlight the roles of the Prime
Minister and the Foreign Minister. This goes to show that more than one person can
have a decisive effect on the decision-making process and a focus on just the leader
may not be enough to fully understand the process.

This study also supports Carlsnaes’s idea of an innovative leader. He rightly asserts
that a leader does not always simply adapt to the structural conditions but can on
occasion construct a situation suitable for his agenda. 9 The Solomon case study is a
good example of this, where there was no strong direct pressure to change the policy
but a threat was pointed out, in the bigger context, which needed to be pre-emptively

7

See K. J. Holsti, (Ed) Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World, p.
14 and Muhittin Ataman, An Integrated Approach to Foreign Policy Change: Explaining Changes in
Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1980s, University of Kentucky, Doctoral Dissertation, 1999, pp. 56-58
8
J. Gustavsson, The Politics of Foreign Policy Change: Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC
Membership, p. 24 and K. J. Holsti, (Ed) Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the
Postwar World, p. 208
9
Walter Carlsnaes, ‘On Analysing the Dynamics of Foreign Policy Change: A Critique and
Reconceptualization’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 28, Issue 1, 1993, p. 22
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dealt with. Key decision-makers can thus be adaptive as well as innovative in their
decision-making.

This in turn relates to a concept introduced by Gustavsson in the foreign policy
change context. He argues that for change to occur there needs to be a “presence of a
crisis of some kind”. 10 The case studies support this claim; however, in the Solomon
case it was a threat that was not acute, and arguably even constructed by the key
decision-makers. The point here is that the crisis in question does not have to be
obvious to the general public or even to be real in order to be presented as such.

The perception of the key decision-makers is of vital importance in understanding
foreign policy change. In the end it is their perception that decides whether a change
is necessary or more specifically if holding on to the current policy is, or will be, too
costly. Welch argues that “foreign policy change will be most likely when policy fails
either repeatedly or catastrophically, or when leaders become convinced that it will
imminently do so”. 11 This is certainly true to an extent. As the Solomon case shows it
is crucial how the decision-makers see a range of benefits from a policy change and
act on it. Still, the current policy was perceived as not achieving the required goals
and was therefore a failure, but whether there was an imminent policy collapse is
debatable. Regardless, it can be argued that decision-makers can pursue a policy
change for reasons of cost, as well as for benefits.

The decision-maker’s perceptions are therefore connected to whether they perceive a
window of opportunity or not. Gustavsson provides an important contribution in his
discussion of policy windows and the need for decision-makers to perceive it as such
in order for a policy change to occur. Although Gustavsson did not include it in his
actual model, even though he acknowledges its importance, it has been included in
this model to emphasise its importance in the decision-making process. Furthermore,
this study has shown that even though the window of opportunity may arguably be in
place, it has to be perceived as such, through a cost/benefit calculation, by the
decision-makers in order for foreign policy change to occur. It is thus vital that key
10

J. Gustavsson, The Politics of Foreign Policy Change: Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC
Membership
11
See David A. Welch, Painful Choices: A theory of foreign policy change, Princeton University Press,
New Jersey, 2005, p. 221 for a discussion on cost/benefits in changing policy
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decision-makers perceive the window of opportunity for a foreign policy change to
occur and its importance warrants more emphasis and a more prominent place in a
model of foreign policy change, as in the model presented in this study.

The model thus acknowledges the constant interaction between the key decisionmakers and the sources of change. This interaction pushes the process forward and
can ultimately lead to a policy change, as the context changes through events or
actions taken by actors within the sources of change, but it is all a matter of timing
and perception.

Typology of Change and Consequences of Change
The new typology of change presented in this thesis builds on that of both Hermann,
and that of Kleistra and Mayer. 12 It aims to illustrate changes in instruments, goals
and a complete restructuring of a state’s foreign policies. It aims to specify the change
by introducing seven levels of change, as compared to Hermann’s four, while at the
same time take into account the Kleistra and Mayer’s focus on changes in goals and
instruments. It thus represents a more detailed guide or test to the level of a state’s
foreign policy change.

Stability: No change in policy.

Intensification/Reduction: A quantitative change in instruments used. For example,
to increase or decrease aid.

Refinement: A qualitative change in instruments used with a mixed pattern. Both old
and new instruments used. For example, technical assistance is now incorporated but
aid continues.

Reform: A qualitative change in instruments, where all, or a large majority of, old
instruments are replaced by new instruments.

Redirection: The goal(s) change but with a mixed pattern. New goals are pursued but
some of the old goals remain.

12

C. F. Hermann, ‘Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy’, pp. 5-6
and Yvonne Kleistra, & Igor Mayer, ‘Stability and Flux in Foreign Affairs: Modelling Policy and
Organisational Change’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 36, Issue 4, 2001, pp. 393-94
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Reorientation: All or almost all old goals are replaced or disappear altogether.

Restructuring: A change in many issue areas, which involve and affect many actors.
For example, for a state to go from neutrality to joining a military alliance.

Finally, the consequence of change variable is added to the model for two reasons.
Firstly, although the primary aim is to understand why and how the policy change
occurred in the first place, it is also important to assess the actual consequences of the
change. Did it meet the objectives of the key decision-makers? Why or why not? Due
to research or time constraints of analysis, a short-term focus may be appropriate, to
investigate the immediate impacts of the policy change. Secondly, a policy change
may in itself lead to a new round of foreign policy change and may therefore be
important to investigate. This was shown in the link between the two case studies.
One of the consequences of the first case study (the “deputy sheriff”-debate) led the
government to, directly or indirectly; pursue a policy that had consequences for the
second case study (to not intervene directly in the Solomon Islands). In order to
overcome the previous consequences, the second policy change was framed in such a
way to overcome the constraints that came out of the first case study.

Conclusion
The case study-method chosen for this study has proven effective in understanding the
change in Australia’s foreign policy towards both Indonesia regarding East Timor in
1999 and towards Solomon Islands in 2003. The proposed theoretical model of
foreign policy change has proven its worth as a “checklist”-model, in that applying
the model to two different case studies resulted in the identification of different sets of
variables that influenced the key decision-makers. It is thus capable of discovering
relevant factors and actors involved in the process of foreign policy change within its
methodological framework, and of detecting and assessing their relative importance in
the shift towards foreign policy change.

The two case studies have shown important aspects of Australian foreign policy
making, and particularly Australian foreign policy change. A theoretical model of
foreign policy change was applied and showed the interaction between domestic and
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international factors in the decision-making process and in turn their interaction with
the key decision-makers. The two cases showed how the perception of said key
decision-makers was vital in whether a foreign policy change was to occur, and in
whether they perceived it as a window of opportunity.

The policy changes had long term effects. The relationship with Indonesia was
damaged, while Australia rather unwillingly took on a certain responsibility for
welfare of the new independent state East Timor. In the case of Solomon Islands, it
arguably led to a new approach towards not just the Solomon Islands but to the South
Pacific as a whole.

The theoretical model improves upon previous efforts as it introduces new factors (the
media and bilateral relations) and a new typology of change. More importantly, it
looks at the interaction between and within the domestic and international factors, as
well as their interaction with the key decision-makers. The role of the key decisionmakers is given an important standing in the model, together with their perceptions in
relation to the cost/benefit of a policy and whether they perceive a window of
opportunity, which will determine whether a foreign policy change will take place.
This furthers Gustavsson’s concept of policy windows by placing greater importance
on the window of opportunity. It also shows how decision-makers do not just adapt to
structural conditions but can also, if the context is right, be innovative and construct a
suitable context for policy change. The detailed model thus increases our ability to
understand the complexity of the foreign policy change decision-making process and
is broadly applicable to most situations. It can assist scholars and students of foreign
policy change in determining the chain of events that affect decision-making in an
increasingly fluid post-Cold War international environment.

It is clear that the proposed model can be applied to foreign policy change occurring
in liberal democracies, as it contains the most likely important variables found in such
states. As to the wider applicability of the model it needs to be acknowledged that this
exact model as described in this thesis may not fit neatly for totalitarian states where
the influence of public opinion is rather less of a concern for policy makers, and
where the media is often controlled by the state. However, the model can easily be
modified to suit the particular case in question, based on the preference of the
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researcher. For example, when investigating Poland’s dramatic restructuring of its
foreign policies in the late 1980s/early 1990s, the Solidarity movement could be
classified as either an Interest Group or a Political Party. Similarly the role of the
military in an authoritarian state, for example, Indonesia under Suharto, could also be
seen as filling the role of an Interest Group, in particular its connection with the
country’s economy. In China the media is normally state controlled although the
influence of the internet is now providing some space for public comment, so here too
the categories are fluid and capable of exploring a variety of foreign policy change.
Historical religious and/or cultural factors that play an important part in the change
process could be investigated under the heading of Political Parties, for example if a
political wing develops to a resistance movement (Sinn Fein emerging from the IRA
in Northern Ireland), or possibly under Interest-Groups (Buddhist monks in Myanmar
advocating for change).

Thus, the researcher can modify the theoretical model

proposed to suit his or her needs.

Notwithstanding the above claims there are limitations. The level of political spin
placed on government action has a tendency to reinforce present policy and not
engage in self-criticism as the protection of a government’s legacy and the decisions
taken by it is a key factor in a party’s continued public support. One area that would
certainly heighten our understanding of causal relationships between sources of
change and key decision makers would be extended interviews with direct
participants in events, as this may reveal complications of causality, for example,
what key decision makers say publicly about their reasons for foreign policy change
may be expressed to maximise public support for that change, but may not however
reflect entirely the reasons why action was taken, e.g. concern over failed states and
terrorism in Solomon Islands formed a large part of the public discourse surrounding
the RAMSI intervention but it is highly likely these reasons were overstated in order
to foster public support. Similarly such reasons as may be advanced in interviews may
change over time as hindsight may reinforce or change perceptions of specific actions
as individuals tend to advance a version of events that reflects positively upon
themselves and others. Sensitive documents on foreign policy are classified, often for
several decades, and a full picture of actual reasons for why governments change their
foreign policies is therefore difficult to arrive at until all such information is publicly
revealed.
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